Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume XIII - March-October 2017 by unknown
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Homeland Security Affairs (Journal)
2017-12
Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume XIII
- March-October 2017
Monterey, California.  Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume XIII - October 2017
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/57100
The copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the
author[s] of the articles. Any commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs or the
articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the
copyright holder. Anyone can copy, distribute, or reuse these articles as long as the
author and original source are properly cited.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 1 ( January 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Volume 13 / 2017
Homeland 
Security Affairs
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cognitive Defense: 
Influencing the Target Choices of 
Less Sophisticated Threat Actors
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  2
Abstract
With the emergence of non-state threats and new operating environments since the end 
of the Cold War, the relevance of deterrence as a security tool has repeatedly been called 
into doubt. Modern adversaries often lack territory, militaries, economies, or even identities 
to threaten and retaliate against. Their motivations are diverse and they are increasingly 
selecting soft targets on the basis of opportunity. Governments can no longer be relied upon 
as they once were to deter attacks against the homeland, shifting the burden of deterrence 
downward to the private and public parties being targeted. Alternative approaches are 
needed that account for this fundamental change. Taking inspiration from criminology and 
behavioral economics, we identify ways in which cognitive biases can be manipulated to 
affect adversary target preferences and then explore how this approach can be used to aid 
defenders on the ground. 
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Introduction
With the emergence of new threat actors since the end of the Cold War, the relevance of 
deterrence as a security tool has frequently been called into doubt. Unlike past foes, many 
modern adversaries lack territory, militaries, economies, or even identities against which to 
retaliate. Their motivations are often varied and actions uncoordinated, making it virtually 
impossible to dissuade them from ever attacking in the same sense the United States was 
able to deter the Soviet Union from direct military conflict. In addition, increasingly these 
actors are selecting soft targets opportunistically instead of harder, more symbolic targets 
with grander payoffs. 
Just six months before the 2015 Paris attacks, a prominent French jihadist was quoted in 
the Islamic State magazine Dar al-Islam telling his followers to abandon symbolism: “My 
advice is to stop looking for specific targets. Hit everyone and everything.”1 Meanwhile 
homegrown violent extremists, frustrated by domestic political conditions and inspired by 
international movements, are lashing out increasingly at targets in their local communities 
without discrimination.  An underappreciated consequence of these developments is 
that the burden of deterrence has shifted downward from government to the private and 
public parties being targeted. The relevant question for security practitioners now is no 
longer whether there will be an attack, but who will be attacked. Alternative approaches to 
deterrence are needed that account for this fundamental change. 
This article attempts to advance homeland security research by integrating findings from 
national security, criminological, and psychological disciplines to improve our understanding 
of deterrence at the target level. In doing so, it offers defenders on the ground practical 
ideas for how cognitive biases can be exploited to influence adversary preferences. The 
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forthcoming sections review the deterrence literature from a variety of perspectives. We 
follow up with   an analysis of theoretical gaps and the development of a framework to 
fill these gaps. Finally, we present the implications of these findings with various notional 
examples to demonstrate their application in the real world. 
Background
The contemporary deterrence literature is vast, spanning nearly three quarters of a century 
and multiple disciplines. In the international and national security fields, early research sought 
ways to prevent nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union. Consequently, 
most view deterrence from the strategic perspective of a unitary, rational government and 
assert that challenges to the status quo can best be thwarted by removing an adversary’s 
motivation to act.2  Some have criticized this line of thinking for relying on unrealistic notions 
of rationality and lacking empirical support.3 Others have also challenged classical theory 
by exploring alternative models of decision making.4 But the absolute prevention of conflict 
between rational state actors has continued to remain the dominant paradigm in both 
academic and policy circles. 
Perhaps because of this, many have questioned the effectiveness of trying to deter the 
threat from modern terrorist entities  which seem  insatiable, lack territory or identity, 
and appear neither unitary nor rational.5 The  2002 National Security Strategy of the United 
States embodied this view when it stated: “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work 
against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting 
of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent 
protection is statelessness.”6 What the document advocated instead was a counterterrorism 
strategy designed to defeat, deny, diminish and defend—the word deter didn’t even appear in 
the final version of the 2003 National Strategy for Counterterrorism despite being a principal 
objective in earlier drafts.7    
Others have argued, however, that while it might be difficult to deter terrorists, longstanding 
deterrence principles such as punishment and denial can be applied to these non-state 
actors.8 The idea is that even if one cannot directly affect their motivation to act, one can 
still influence terrorists in the same manner as a state by threatening their capability to act 
(e.g., bases, finances, and sponsors). Moreover, one can deny them the benefits of action by 
hardening targets, downplaying effects, or communicating the target society’s resolve. The 
Department of Defense’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review explicitly acknowledged a need 
to customize deterrence depending on the threat by introducing the concept of “tailored 
deterrence.”9 
Irrespective of these opposing conclusions, most skeptics and supporters of deterrence 
typically rely on the same classical deterrence mindset to understand how these new threat 
actors can or cannot be influenced, and by doing so they also subsume the same strategic 
imperative of absolute prevention of attack.10 Deterrence skeptics see adversaries that are 
highly motivated, lack territory, and appear neither unitary nor rational and wonders how 
they could possibly be deterred in the same manner as past adversaries like the Soviet Union 
from ever attacking. Deterrence supporters see actors that, while in some ways are different 
from enemies of old, generally remain susceptible to the very same principles thought to 
achieve strategic deterrence previously. Scholars tend not to approach the problem in a 
fundamentally different way, but there are exceptions.
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James Smith,Brent Talbot,  Andrew Morral, and  Brian Jackson do depart from this implicit 
goal of strategic deterrence (i.e., deterring attacks completely) to contemplate deterrence 
at tactical and operational levels of analysis.11 Coming at the problem from a homeland 
security perspective as opposed to international strategy, they examine how terrorists might 
be deterred once the decision to attack has already been made. In doing so they consider 
methods for how individual attacks can be displaced onto less critical targets. Other lesser 
known works,12 whose conceptualization of deterrence better resembles law enforcement’s 
than the Pentagon’s, become more important once the strategic imperative is dropped and 
attention turns to winning at the target level. 
Collectively, these exceptions represent a category of deterrence that might be called “non-
strategic” for they are concerned not with the absolute prevention of attack but rather 
the prevention of attack at specific locations. That being said, non-strategic deterrence 
should not be thought of as completely independent of strategic deterrence but rather 
complementary, at least when it comes to terrorism. For example, Doron Almog’s theory of 
“cumulative deterrence” based on the Israeli experience asserts that repeated tactical and 
operational victories can, over time, deter an enemy strategically.13 
Research at the non-strategic level, while a significant improvement in understanding how 
deterrence can be used effectively against non-state actors, does not address sufficiently a 
certain theoretical movement that has received increasing attention within the fields of public 
law and criminology. Although these disciplines are similarly rooted in strategic perspectives 
and rational choice models of decision making,14 researchers have begun to question the 
validity of this, pointing to contrary evidence and findings from behavioral economics, a 
social psychological approach which rejects traditional homo economicus models of decision 
making, and which shows how biases in human cognition often cause systematic deviations 
from optimal choices.15 These critics contend that while the general threat of punishment 
by governments may have some deterrent power, specific policies likely do not unless they 
deliberately account for cognitive biases. Criminology research at the non-strategic or target 
level echoes these concerns, suggesting that behavioral models, for instance, are superior 
to rational choice models in explaining the target preferences of burglars.16 
For those interested in resuscitating deterrence to combat modern security threats such 
as terrorist groups and homegrown violent extremists, research at the non-strategic level 
of analysis is a step in the right direction. This work, however, remains hindered by an 
overreliance on orthodox notions of decision making and a disproportionate focus on the 
role of government as opposed to the actual defenders of targets. Much can be learned by 
applying behavioral economics principles in non-strategic contexts. But before doing so, it 
is first necessary to understand how differences in decision making between threat actors 
can affect deterrence.    
Decision Making and Deterrence
The universal goal of deterrence is to influence decision making so that individuals, groups, or 
states choose not to take actions deemed undesirable by the deterrer.17 Doing this requires 
manipulating one of two underlying factors required to act: motivation and opportunity.18 
Motivation is the reason why an actor seeks out a particular course of action. Opportunity 
is the actor’s belief that he possesses the necessary knowledge and capability to successfully 
carry out that action. Knowledge represents awareness of targets that could satisfy 
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motivations.19 Capability refers to technical skills, equipment, weaponry, etc. estimated 
to have reasonable chance at success. For example, a destitute father responsible for the 
welfare of his children may be motivated to rob a convenience store because he needs to 
feed his family. However, failing to know the location of any nearby stores (knowledge) or 
not having a weapon (capability) may preclude the robbery due to a lack of opportunity. 
Conversely, a wealthy man with a concealed weapon standing outside a deserted gas station 
is not likely to consider theft for lack of any compelling motivation. Each of these factors is a 
point of influence a deterrer could potentially exploit to achieve deterrence.  
While motivation and opportunity are the core elements of decision making, their relative 
importance for deterrence depends on the threat actor’s level of sophistication. All 
actors are not created equal when it comes to their susceptibility to manipulation. More 
sophisticated actors, such as states or advanced terrorist groups (e.g., Hezbollah) are less 
likely to be influenced by intentional distortions of knowledge (e.g., decreasing a target’s 
visibility) or inflated capability demands (e.g., increasing a target’s defenses) because the 
financial, technical, and organizational resources available to them can be used to overcome 
attempts to deny them opportunity. Of all types of potential threat actors, the knowledge 
of these sophisticated actors comes closest to perfect information and their capabilities 
are hardest to mitigate, which is why they can deliberately select harder targets with larger 
payoffs. Ironically, though, actors of greater means are more sensitive to deterrer actions 
which negatively impact their motivation (e.g., military strikes, economic sanctions) because 
they have much to retaliate against. Moreover, because of their ability to seriously hurt their 
adversaries, these actors are more likely to receive positive inducements (i.e., incentives 
that encourage restraint) in exchange for refraining from acting.
For instance, U.S. deterrence policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War centered on 
influencing Soviet motivations through cost imposition (e.g., flexible response) and positive 
inducements (e.g., removing Jupiter missiles from Turkey). In later years, U.S. strategy also 
broadened to include programs such as missile defense that challenged the Soviet capability 
to execute a successfully attack, even though the effectiveness of these programs was, and 
still is, dubious. Due to their advanced intelligence network and deliberate decision making 
process, however, the U.S. never really pursued the knowledge element of opportunity. 
Although a campaign aimed at influencing Soviet perceptions of critical American targets 
may have seen short-term success, U.S. leadership likely assumed it would ultimately fail as 
the Soviets eventually gravitated toward optimal actions based on information that came 
closer and closer to reality. 
In contrast, less sophisticated threat actors such as domestic terrorists, homegrown violent 
extremists, or criminals have few if any resources to retaliate against and are less likely 
to be presented with acceptable alternative courses of action given their relative inability 
to hurt governments. Consequently, they have relatively little to lose by acting and are 
unlikely to be as responsive as more sophisticated actors to attempts to manipulate their 
motivation. These actors are, however, highly susceptible to efforts which seek to deny them 
opportunity since they lack the resources necessary to allay distortions of knowledge and 
inflated capability demands. Of all potential threat actors, their knowledge is farthest from 
perfect information and their capabilities easiest to mitigate, which is why they are more 
likely to  select softer targets with smaller payoffs. 
For example, in an interview shortly before his execution in 2001, Timothy McVeigh explained 
why he chose the Alfred P. Murah federal building for his 1995 attack: “I didn’t have the 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  6
ability to scope out every federal building in the nation. But I did scope out a number so I 
could pick the best out among those. The building was chosen out of a phonebook, looking 
in the blue pages, and looking under law enforcement agencies.”20 Moreover, because these 
actors do not necessarily need to attack one target in particular, they may select capriciously 
rather than employing a strict cost/benefit calculation. David Headley, for instance, when 
describing why he surveilled the Oberoi-Trident Hotel in Mumbai for the 2008 Lashkar-i-
Taiba terrorist attacks stated: “[b]ecause I was in the area, and I was going to watch a movie 
in a nearby theatre, and I had about an hour left. So I went there, and I just made the video.”21 
Finally, criminology studies show that burglars, including more experienced perpetrators, 
frequently select targets based on immediate opportunity.22
In each of these examples, the actor’s motivation to attack was already hardened and 
apparently unaffected by government efforts to deter them. Strategic deterrence had 
failed; someone was going to be targeted. Rational choice-based models tend to assume all 
decision makers then maximize utility by picking the best target among the universe of all 
possible options. While this may be a reasonable assumption for more sophisticated actors, 
it does not appear to be the case at least for some less sophisticated actors. Instead, targets 
are selected within a constrained set of choices to satisfy minimal knowledge and capability 
requirements. And why one is selected over another has less to do with maximizing utility 
than the threat actor’s casual perceptions of opportunity.23 Next we will explore the theoretical 
and empirical justification for this reasoning, as well as how it expands the tools available to 
defenders at the target level.
Target Selection and Cognitive Biases
To achieve deterrence, information must be communicated to potential adversaries that 
convinces them not to act. In the strategic context, this typically occurs in the form of verbal 
threats of punishment or shows of force by governments. In the non-strategic context, it 
is usually just a byproduct of a target’s security measures intended to defeat or mitigate 
attacks should deterrence fail as opposed to proactive efforts by a defender to prevent an 
attack in the first place. For example, federal buildings may have guards to interdict and 
neutralize potential attacks with the assumption that such actions also have some residual 
impact on deterrence attacks by communicating an increased cost of action. Although there 
are security systems which are designed first and foremost with deterrence in mind, 24 a 
high correlation between defeat and deter measures generally inhibits the development of 
systems much beyond guns, gates, and guards. 
This assumption that defensive actions have some degree of positive impact on deterrence 
is almost certainly true so long as they are visible or otherwise perceived by the adversary. 
However, such a view of deterrence fails to appreciate the full spectrum of actions the 
defender of a target may take to deter less sophisticated threat actors. The means to deter 
can also include the deliberate manipulation or concealment of information pertaining to 
the capabilities required to act or the target’s associated payoff. These more unconventional 
forms of deterrence may influence the preferences of potential threat actors just as do 
conventional forms, the only difference being in the former case the actor might not even 
realize they have been deterred.
How can this be done? Non-strategic deterrence success requires only that a specific target 
not be attacked. This can be accomplished in one of two ways: either the target is considered 
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but not selected or the target is never considered in the first place. The former suggests 
that if perceived capability demands and payoffs can be shaped so that a potential actor 
discounts a target they otherwise would have preferred relative to all others, deterrence 
will have been achieved. The latter suggests that if the perceived viability or existence of a 
target can be altered so that a potential actor fails to consider the otherwise desirable target 
at all, deterrence will have been achieved. Defenders of targets, unlike governments, are in 
an advantageous position where they control much of the information from which values 
and choices are derived and can use it to influence surreptitiously threat actor perceptions. 
Viewed this way, non-strategic deterrence becomes less about directly affecting decisions 
than about shaping preferences and the development of choices governing those decisions—
something better explained by psychology and behavioral economics than rational choice. 
The theoretical and empirical support for this proposition is rooted in the idea of bounded 
rationality. According to this view, decision making is more accurately modeled as an intrinsic 
process of satisficing by which a choice is made amongst a constrained set of options on 
the basis of whether it is merely good enough rather than a deliberate process of utility 
maximization amongst an idealized set of options, as often modeled by rational choice 
theorists.25 All actors, but particularly those less sophisticated who have fewer materiel and 
cognitive resources, lack perfect information regarding the existence, benefits, and costs 
of every possible target and do not make decisions with a god-like objective calculus. Some 
60 years ago in introducing bounded rationality, Herbert Simon asserted: “[i]t is precisely 
because of these limitations on its [the organism’s] knowledge and capabilities that the 
less global models of rationality described here are significant and useful.”26 The same can 
be said for deterrence today. Using a more realistic model of decision making based on 
bounded rationality may reveal previously unknown unconventional means to deter.      
While bounded rationality provides the underlying model, deciphering its significance 
for non-strategic deterrence requires understanding the psychology of human cognition. 
Daniel Kahneman explains the major cognitive processes generally agreed to be operating: 
System 1 (Intuition) is passionate, reflexive, involuntary, and hard to change; while System 
2 (Reasoning) is purposeful, conscientious, and malleable.27 According to Kahneman, “the 
perceptual system and intuitive operations of System 1 generate impressions of the attributes 
of objects of perception and thought. These impressions are not voluntary and need not 
be verbally explicit. In contrast, judgments are always explicit and intentional, whether or 
not they are overtly expressed.”28 He further describes System 1 as “effortlessly originating 
impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate 
choices of System 2.”29 These systems usually perform quite well and allow humans to make 
sound decisions quickly; however, System 1 has two traits that can cause problems-- it has 
systematic biases and cannot be turned off.30 
Given the materiel and cognitive resources of more sophisticated threat actors, including 
their likely use of command and control systems for decision making, it is fair to assume these 
groups “think slower” with cognition weighted more heavily toward System 2 than System 
1.31 With relatively fewer resources and little to no formal decision making bureaucracy, less 
sophisticated actors, on the other hand, undoubtedly “think faster” with cognition weighted 
more heavily toward System 1 than System 2. An important question then for non-strategic 
deterrence is what are the biases associated with System 1 and can they be used to deter less 
sophisticated adversaries? There is a substantial body of empirical research in psychology 
that has identified numerous System 1 biases.32 More than just an academic curiosity, 
these biases have been known and exploited by the advertising industry for decades, and 
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as mentioned previously, have recently begun to infuse behavioral economic approaches 
to public and criminal law, health, finance, etc.33 Though there are perhaps hundreds of 
different biases, only a subset of the major categories will be explored here. 
The first of these is accessibility. Because human beings are unable to collect and recall 
every piece of relevant information for any particular activity, only those thoughts which 
are perceived and accessible will ever be evaluated. Some information will simply never be 
perceived because of time and resource constraints. Other information, while perceived, may 
not be readily accessible due to biases in System 1. For example, ingrained predispositions 
to avoid certain negative stimuli, physical salience, and strong emotions can all influence 
accessibility on a subconscious level. This inability to perceive all relevant information 
together with System 1 prejudices creates a selection effect in which choices available to an 
actor do not represent the true population but rather a truncated sample. If as Kahneman 
says, “[h]ighly accessible features will influence decisions, while features of low accessibility 
will largely be ignored,…” defenders may be able to manipulate perceptions in order to bias 
that sample in their favor so that a target or its features are more/less likely to be accessed 
by an adversary when it comes time to make a decision.34 
A second and related category of bias is availability. Availability has to do with how people 
estimate the frequency or probability of something. Instead of making objective evaluations 
on the basis of fact, humans tend to give greater weight to those impressions that are 
more readily available mentally. Recent occurrences, continual media attention, personal 
experience, negative emotions, salience, and associate bonds can all work on System 1 to 
distort reality. For instance, experiments have suggested that certain facial features (e.g., eyes 
color/shape, facial width-to-height rations) can lead people to misjudge temperament due to 
prejudices of availability, despite evidence to the contrary. Defenders that understand these 
biases may be able to increase deterrence by seeking to maximize or minimize “availability” 
of a target or its features.   
The third category of bias, representativeness, refers to the propensity of the human mind 
to evaluate the probability or value of something based on its similarity to an archetype 
(prototype heuristics) as opposed to using base-rates and accounting for uncertainty. 
Studies have demonstrated corollaries of this bias in violations of monotonicity and 
dominance.35 For example, individuals will assign higher values to sets of sports cards that 
do not include extra, less desirable cards despite being exactly the same.36 In addition, 
patients will report preferring longer colonoscopies to shorter ones provided they do not 
end in pain.37 Tangential to representativeness is self-affirmation theory, which explains how 
people respond to threats against their perceived notions of self-integrity.38 Experiments, 
for instance, have shown that using self-relevant nouns like “cheater” in instructions, as 
opposed to “cheating,” significantly reduces rates of dishonest behavior.39 It is possible 
defenders could exploit representativeness in order to  deter threat actors non-strategically 
by playing on their System 1 tendencies to make erroneous assessments on the basis of 
stereotypes, misremembered utilities, and distorted self-images. 
Related to representativeness is a fourth category of bias, relativity. Relativity biases 
arise because human beings do not make absolute value judgments but instead assess 
everything relative to something else. A number of specific biases can be thought of as 
associated with relativity including anchoring, the decoy effect, and framing. It is also a 
foundational principle of prospect theory which asserts that utility is experienced as change 
from a neutral reference point.40 Evidence in support of relativity-based biases is abound. 
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For instance, studies have shown that people over (under) estimate the probability of 
conjunctive (disjunctive) events because their estimates are anchored on the probability 
of the components which are relatively higher (lower).41 Manufacturers often create decoy 
product models solely for the purposes of pushing consumers towards another model.42 
Finally, experiments have called into question the stability of people’s preferences by 
showing that they can be highly dependent on whether information is framed positively 
or negatively.43 By shaping how information is presented, defenders may be able to take 
advantage of a threat actor’s relativity bias so that it induces a greater deterrent impact.
The aforementioned biases are just some of the ways System 1 can cause human beings to 
systematically deviate from what might objectively be considered optimal behavior. There 
are many others that may be relevant for deterrence such as hyperbolic discounting, illusion 
of control, and even optical illusions.  Thus, a behavioral economics approach to non-
strategic deterrence reveals additional means to prevent attack that have been previously 
overlooked. Because the decisions of less sophisticated threat actors are boundedly rational 
and defenders control critical inputs used to make those decisions, there is a tremendous 
amount of latent deterrence untapped by conventional security measures. 
Application
With the theoretical implications established, it is now possible to contemplate notional 
illustrations of how defenders may influence the target choices of less sophisticated threat 
actors by exploiting their cognitive biases. The best way to do this is to think of deterrence 
as a force that either pushes a potential attacker away from a target of interest or pulls them 
towards it. Push is desirable and is realized by communicating high costs of action or low 
benefits of action. Pull is undesirable and comes about by communicating low costs of action 
or high benefits of action. The goal of non-strategic deterrence is to effectively manipulate 
these levers to the advantage of the defender. Critical infrastructure owners and protectors 
can exercise both push and pull by communicating information to potential attackers 
through visual or audio cues (e.g., signs, personnel, building facades, loudspeakers) and old 
media (e.g., television, radio, and print) but also new mediums such as social networks (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter) and websites. In fact, new media have created an unprecedented opening 
for defenders to influence less sophisticated threat actors due to their likely reliance on such 
media as a cheap source of target information. 
The means of deterrence used to push or pull adversaries can be conventional or 
unconventional. Undoubtedly, defeat measures which also happen to provide some 
degree of deterrent benefit account for a disproportionate amount of the deterrence for 
most defenders. However, these are often expensive and fail to capitalize on the potential 
opportunities afforded by taking advantage of the less expensive and more unconventional 
means discussed previously. The following offers some preliminary ideas for how cognitive 
biases might be manipulated to achieve non-strategic deterrence. 
The targets of less sophisticated threat actors vary as widely as the manner in which they are 
protected. A store may do nothing to defend itself against criminals apart from locking the 
register, whereas a government building fearing terrorism may have armed guards, cameras, 
and anti-vehicle barriers. All these measures likely have some deterrent effect by pushing 
an actor away from a target provided they perceive the costs of attack, but this is not always 
the case. Defenders may simply fail to appreciate the significance of communicating costs 
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or conceal defensive capabilities deliberately so potential threat actors are unaware of the 
specific skills and equipment required to defeat the system. For example, while defense in 
depth security strategies may be optimal, they project lower costs of attack at the perimeter 
than is actually the case overall. To compensate for this, defenders should consider the value 
of overt security patrols and interactions with the community, regardless of their limited 
tactical benefit. Websites and other media too may be helpful for communicating criminal 
penalties or the use of deadly force should attacks be attempted. And for those concerned 
about defeat, signs describing the security system can be employed to emphasize the costs 
of action without having to divulge compromising information. The more easily costs are 
available and accessible by threat actors mentally when it comes time to consider and select 
targets, the more likely deterrence will succeed. 
Defenders may likewise fail to appreciate the significance of communicating low benefits 
to push threat actors away, although coming up with practical ideas is not as easy as one 
might think. The most obvious example, of course, is the use of signs by stores or banks 
to indicate limited cash available. Defenders could also conceivably lie about benefits to 
lower perceptions, which might be advisable if  it is legal and the consequences of being 
found out do not undermine the original intention. A more realistic example, however, could 
be potential targets such as power plants and distribution systems going out of their way 
to publicize that an attack on their facilities would not cause widespread damage due to 
equipment and network redundancies. Resiliency must be plainly obvious to attackers if it 
is to have any influence on their perceptions of whether the target is a viable opportunity.     
Just as important as what information is conveyed about the high costs and low benefits of 
action, is how that information is conveyed. Well-understood techniques from advertising 
can help increase the chances that information regarding the costs of action presented 
through social networks, websites, or visual cues is readily available, accessible, and relative 
in the minds of potential threat actors. For instance, defenders should frame information in a 
manner which expresses the losses actors would experience as opposed to the effectiveness 
of the security system. Words may be less powerful than certain colored imagery that 
conveys a willingness to employ violence against attackers and evokes feelings of fear. 
The inclusion of subtle, negative stimuli (e.g., suspicious looking eyes) that elicit primitive 
emotional responses of fear could be used as well to inflate the costs of action perceived. 
Other techniques might include contrasting security features with generic targets that are 
less secure and present a greater payoff.
In addition to availability, accessibility, and relativity biases, manipulating representativeness 
biases associated with the costs of action could also be effective. Ensuring that security 
guards and spokesman most likely to come in contact with the public look “more like security” 
and have facial features known to stimulate negative reactions may increase the perception 
of high costs. Providing these individuals with equipment (e.g., tactical vests) which that 
may not be operationally relevant but which promote an illusion of validity could help to 
reinforce this perception. Furthermore, the mindful placement of warning signs, guards, etc. 
near exits to ensure they are the last stimuli received by threat actors before departing a 
target location might have a disproportionate effect on how costs are remembered. Lastly, 
publicizing the consequences of failed attacks at other similar locations could influence 
adversary perceptions of the target’s net value.
The converse to these means which push adversaries away is minimizing information which 
pulls them in (i.e., low costs of action or high benefits of action). The simplest way to do 
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this is to reduce the amount of potentially attractive information released or portrayed to 
the public so that it is less available and mentally accessible by threat actors when it comes 
time to consider and select targets. Examples might include masking vulnerabilities that 
cannot be mitigated, conducting sensitive operations at night, and ensuring that staging/
queuing locations are not easily observable by the public. In addition, enforcing strict media 
blackouts on minor security incidents or near-misses may help avoid attracting attention 
from potential attackers who may have previously been unaware of the target.  
An even more powerful device, given our reliance on the internet as a source of information, 
is search engine “de-optimization”. Much like online reputation management services use 
tools to diminish the rank of embarrassing links in search results or remove unflattering 
information entirely, defenders can do the same thing to decrease (or increase) the likelihood 
that certain information is seen by threat actors (e.g., via robots.txt files).  Defenders can do 
this much more easily considering they own or can edit many of the websites of interest. For 
example, defenders can diminish the rank of search results pertaining to a target’s payoffs 
while at the same time inflating the rank of information related to security features. Even 
more popular targets for which the “cat is already out of the bag” in terms of payoff can be 
counter-balanced by higher ranking information that reduces pull or increases push. 
Although the concept of push and pull is most directly applicable to defenders of discrete 
targets, it may also be useful for government agencies or corporations responsible for a 
portfolio of potential targets. The Department of Homeland Security, for instance, is 
charged with assessing risk and allocating resources for assets across the United States. 
They, like many, usually define risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence or 
(TVC).44 Where threat is the probability of attack, vulnerability is the probability the attack 
succeeds should it occur, and consequence is the impact of successful attack. There are 
numerous problems, however, with using such a framework to assess risk including the 
inability to measure threat, limited notions of what constitutes vulnerability, and correlated 
or interdependent terms.45 Alternative models have been proposed that alleviate some of 
these issues by either ignoring the threat component altogether and focusing instead on 
vulnerability, or treating threat as an output of the adversary’s expected utility calculation 
based in part on their capabilities to defeat a target.46 
None of these approaches  address the knowledge element of opportunity emphasized 
throughout this article, and therefore, they do not account for associated biases that likely 
impact adversary target selection. The less sophisticated the actor, the less likely it is that 
they maximize opportunity by selecting the best target off the full menu according to 
vulnerability and consequence, and the more likely it is that they simply satisfice within 
a local subset. Evidence indicates terrorists and criminals usually choose targets that are 
geographically close or familiar due to, among other things, their limited ability to project 
power and propensity to seek immediate gratification.47 Assuming defenders of targets 
with similar payoffs take roughly equal actions to deter attacks, the nature of the local 
environment will influence the level of push and pull perceived by the threat actor.
For example, all things being  equal, a government building or transportation hub that does 
not have equivalent targets nearby is likely to exude greater pull than one that resides in an 
environment with a plethora of substitute targets. Critical infrastructure found on a busy 
street downtown will probably exude greater push than an equally well known sister site 
found in an industrial park on the outskirts of town. In other words, an absolute level of push 
and pull is less relevant than the relative levels associated with proximate targets. As a result, 
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the risk of attack would be more accurately assessed through a lens that normalizes relative 
levels of push and pull across similar targets within the local environment. Governments 
and corporations should at least consider this effect when determining how to best allocate 
resources across their enterprise.
Conclusion
To account for new challenges that existing theories have struggled to address, we presented 
an alternative view of deterrence here featuring a behavioral approach to preventing attacks 
at the target level. It is applicable to terrorist and criminal actors alike and offers defenders 
new tools that go well beyond basic operational security. While we have made a number of 
contributions to homeland security research, one important question remains unanswered. 
How much do the hypothesized unconventional means of deterrence impact target 
selection and preferences? Though the cognitive biases referenced have received strong 
empirical support in psychology and behavioral economics, their non-strategic deterrence 
applications have yet to be directly tested. Doing so is the obvious next step but this will be 
challenging given the phenomena in question and available data.
The global proliferation of terrorism has increasingly threatened public and private parties 
that cannot employ advanced security either because of its expense or operational impact. 
The 2015 Paris attacks were carried out by a moderately sophisticated threat actor against a 
variety of soft targets including a football stadium, two bars, four restaurants, and a concert 
hall. The tragic result was 130 people killed and hundreds wounded. For the city of Paris 
and the French government it was an all too common, and perhaps unavoidable, failure of 
strategic deterrence. For the many establishments targeted, it was a failure of non-strategic 
deterrence.
For equivalent locations that were not chosen by the attackers, however, deterrence 
succeeded. Perhaps this was because they had sufficient security to dissuade the attackers 
or offered relatively smaller payoffs. Perhaps it was because they simply appeared more 
secure and less valuable, or didn’t appear at all. The upshot is that public and private parties 
are not completely powerless in the fight against terrorism—they have the ability to influence 
the target choices of threat actors in their favor. A shrewder approach to deterrence based 
on the principles described herein could provide significant improvements in overall security 
for relatively little cost.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  13
About the Authors
Jesse T. Wasson is a Senior Policy Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis in Alexandria, 
Virginia where he primarily focuses on threat assessment, security risk, and organizational 
performance for the U.S. Navy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and private sector 
clients. Dr. Wasson holds a Ph.D. in political science from the State University of New York at 
Buffalo and was formerly a visiting assistant professor of political science at the Rochester 
Institute of Technology. He can be reached at jwasson@spa.com.
Christopher E. Bluesteen is a Senior Security Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis in 
Alexandria, Virginia where he focuses on vulnerability assessment and risk management 
for the U.S. Navy, National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and private sector clients. Prior to this, Mr. Bluesteen served as an Armor Officer in 
the U.S. Army. Mr. Bluesteen holds a B.S. in computer engineering from The College of New 
Jersey and a M.S. in operations research from George Mason University. He can be reached 
at cbluesteen@spa.com.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  14
Notes
1  Rukmini Callimachi, Alissa J. Rubin, and Laurie Fourquet, “A View of ISIS’s Evolution in New Details of Paris 
Attacks,” New York Times, March 19, 2016.
2  Notable examples include William Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in William Kaufmann 
(ed.), Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Daniel Ellsberg, “The 
Theory and Practice of Blackmail” (Lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, March 10, 1959); Herman Kahn, On 
Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961).
3  Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Ole Holsti and Alexander L. George, “The Effects of Stress on the 
Performance of Foreign-Policy Makers,” in Cornelius Cotter (ed.) Political Science Annual, VI (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merril, 1975); Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977); Glenn H. 
Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Robert Jervis, 
“Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979).
4  Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Keith B Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction 
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” 
Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (2002); Gary Schaub Jr., “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory,” 
Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004).
5  Paul K. Davis and Brain Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the 
War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2002); Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American 
Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002); Colin S. Gray, “Maintaining 
Effective Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Institute (US Army War College, 2003).
6  Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
7  Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters, 34, no. 4 (2004):  15. The 
word “deter” does appear in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, though it is not an overarching 
goal.
8  Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International Security, 30, 
no. 3 (2005); Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 
2012).
9  Available at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
10  Due to the extremely high costs of nuclear war, it is understandable that contemporary deterrence theory 
began with a focus on the absolute prevention of conflict. Applying that same standard to newer adversaries 
that cannot existentially threaten the deterrer, however, is unnecessarily limiting theoretically. See Jeffrey W. 
Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy, 31, no. 1 (2010).
11  James M. Smith and Brent J. Talbot, “Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial,” in Paul R. Viotti, Michael A. 
Opheim, and Nicholas Bowen (eds.), Terrorism and Homeland Security (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008); 
Andrew R. Morral and Brian A Jackson, Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009).
12  Robert W. Anthony, Deterrence and the 9-11 Terrorists (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2003); Tom LaTourrette et al. ,  Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Centers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 
2006); James H. Lebovic, “Deterrence and Homeland Security: A Defensive-Denial Strategy Against Terrorists,” 
in Esther Brimmer (ed.), Five Dimensions of Homeland and International Security (Washington, DC: Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University, 2008); Konstantinos G. Gkonis, Harilaos N. Psaraftis, and 
Nikolaos P. Ventikos, “Game Theory Contributing to Terrorism Analysis in Merchant Shipping: An Application 
to Port Security,” Working Paper, National Technical University of Athens, 2009; Henry H Willis, Joel B. Predd, 
and Paul K Davis, Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corp, 2010).
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  15
13  Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence”.
14  Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
15  Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,” 
Stanford Law Review 50 (1998); Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral 
Investigation,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24, no. 2 (2004); Christine Jolls, “On Law Enforcement with 
Boundedly Rational Actors,” Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 494 (2004); Richard H. 
McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, “Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics,” University of Chicago Law & 
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 440 (2008).
16  Paul F. Cromwell, James N. Olson, and D’Aunn W. Avary, Breaking and Entering: An Ethnographic Analysis 
of Burglary (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991); Kristie R. Belvins, Joseph B. Kuhns, and Seungmug Lee, 
“Understanding Decisions to Burglarize from the Offender’s Perspective,” The University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology (2012).
17  Deterrers may be governments or those responsible for defending discrete targets, though their goals 
differ. Governments are less concerned with deterring single attacks than they are in reducing their overall 
likelihood, since any one attack is a failure of deterrence. Defenders of discrete targets, on the other hand, 
care only about deterring attacks against themselves even if that means displacing attacks elsewhere.
18  Requiring theoretically that actors possess both motive and opportunity in order to act is hardly novel. 
The framework, or some variation thereof, is fundamental to criminology theories and has even been 
used at the nation-state level in the study of war. See for example Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, 
“Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (1990).
19  Despite its importance, knowledge is frequently overlooked or assumed away in most analyses of threat 
actor decision making because of how difficult it is to measure compared to capability.
20  Toby Oppenheimer, The McVeigh Tapes: Confessions of an American Terrorist (United States: MSNBC Films, 
April 19, 2010).
21  Sebastian Rotella, “The American Behind India’s 9/11—And How U.S. Botched Changes to Stop Him,” 
ProPublica, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist.
22  Cromwell et al., Breaking and Entering (note 13); Belvins et al., “Decisions to Burglarize.”
23  Because the biggest factor influencing threat actors’ target choice is likely their spatial constraints, 
perceptions of opportunity are relative within the immediate environment. Significant evidence points to 
the fact that crimes and terrorist attacks are usually conducted in locations that are geographically close 
or familiar to the perpetrators. For criminal examples, see Wim Bernasco and Paul Nieuwbeerta, “How do 
Residential Burglars Select Target Areas?” British Journal of Criminology 45, no. 3 (2005). For terrorism, see 
Nurit Kliot and Igal Charney, “The Geography of Suicide Terrorism in Israel,” GeoJournal 66, no. 4 (2006); 
Claude Berrebi and Darius Lakdawalla, “How Does Terrorism Risk Vary Across Space and Time? An Analysis 
Based on the Israeli Experience,” Defense and Peace Economics 18, no. 2 (2007).
24  Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), for example, describes how the natural or 
constructed environment can be deliberately shaped to improve access control, surveillance, or other means 
to reduce the opportunity for criminal acts to occur. For a review of the literature see Matthew Robinson, 
“The Theoretical Development of CPTED: Twenty-five Years of Responses to C. Ray Jeffrey,” in W. Laufer and F. 
Adler (eds.), Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 8 (New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 1996).
25  Herbert Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 1 (1955); 
Herbert Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,” Psychological Review 63, no. 2 (1956).
26  Simon, “A Behavioral Model,” p. 112.
27  Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” The American 
Economic Review 93, no. 5 (2003).
28  Ibid.,  1452.
29  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 21.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  16
30  Ibid., 25. Given practice and experience, System 1 biases can be partially, but not completely, mitigated by 
System 2.
31  This is not to suggest these actors are completely immune from bias. But they likely face a different set of 
decision-making biases (e.g., group think, non-transitive preferences) based on group dynamics as opposed 
to human cognition.
32  For detailed reviews of this research see Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under 
Uncertainty,” Science 185, no. 4157 (1974); Kahneman, “Bounded Rationality” (note 24); Kahneman, Thinking 
Fast (note 27); Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).
33  See for example Marc Andrews, Matthijs van Leeuwen, and Rick van Baaren, Hidden Persuasion 
(Amsterdam: BIS, 2013); Jolls, “On Law Enforcement” ; Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
34  Kahneman, “Bounded Rationality,” 1459.
35  Ibid.
36  John A. List, “Preference Reversals of a Different Kind: The ‘More is Less’ Phenomenon,” American Economic 
Review 92, no. 5 (2002).
37  Donald A. Redelmeier and Daniel Kahneman, “Patients’ Memories of Painful Medical Treatments: Real-
time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures,” Pain 66, no. 1 (1996).
38  David K. Sherman and Geoffrey L. Cohen, “The Psychology of Self-Defense: Self-Affirmation Theory,” 
Advances in Experimental Psychology 38 (2006).
39  Christopher J. Bryan and Gabrielle S. Adams, “When Cheating Would Make You a Cheater: Implicating the 
Self Prevents Unethical Behavior,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 142, no. 4 (2012).
40  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk,” 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979).
41  Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1129.
42  Ariely, Predictably Irrational ,  14-15.
43  Kahneman, Thinking Fast.
44  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals (April 2011).
45  Louis A. Cox, “Some Limitations of ‘Risk=Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence’ for Risk Analysis of 
Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis 28, no. 6 (2008); National Research Council of the National Academies, Review 
of the Department of Homeland’s Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: The National Academies 
Press, 2010); Gerald G. Brown and Louis A. Cox, “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism 
Risk Analysts,” Risk Analysis 31, no. 2 (2011); Eric F. Taquechel and Ted G. Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence 
and Reduce Critical Infrastructure Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs 8 (August 2012); Richard White, “Towards 
a Unified Homeland Security Strategy: An Asset Vulnerability Model,” Homeland Security Affairs 10 (February 
2014).
46  See White, “Homeland Security Strategy” and Taquechel and Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence”, 
respectively.
47  See note 23.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 1 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Jesse Wasson & Christopher Bluesteen,  Cognitive Defense  17
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is an 
academic journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. 
Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible 
dissemination of knowledge, copies of this journal and the articles 
contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed 
for personal, research or educational purposes free of charge and 
without permission. Any commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs 
or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the 
written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles 
published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the author(s) of the 
article. Homeland Security Affairs is the online journal of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). 
 
Cover image by Mstyslav Chernov - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=45277301
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 2 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Coordination in Crises: 
Implementation of the National 
Incident Management System by  
Surface Transportation Agencies
by Nicholas B. Hambridge, Arnold M. Howitt, & David W. Giles
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 2 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Hambridge, Howitt, & Giles,  Coordination in Crises  2
Abstract
For more than a decade, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) has served in 
the United States as the mandated framework for coordinated organization, operational 
command, and implementation of response to emergencies nationwide. This article 
examines whether surface transportation agencies are developing the capabilities necessary 
to fit effectively into NIMS. It reviews the literature on NIMS, focusing on its implementation 
in “second and third circle responder” professions, including transportation, rather than 
in traditional first responder fields such as police, fire, EMS, and emergency management. 
The article also reports on exploratory interviews with city, metro, state, and federal 
transportation officials about the extent of NIMS implementation and the factors that 
facilitate or impede its use. Finally, we present a consolidated conceptual model of factors 
influencing NIMS implementation and make recommendations about how to enhance NIMS 
use in the transportation sector.
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Introduction
As a consequence of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 mandated the creation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
to be the standard method for managing emergency response operations at all levels of 
government regardless of incident type, size, or complexity.1 The intent of NIMS, including 
its key component, the Incident Command System (ICS), is to provide a consistent system 
for managing incidents – no matter the agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions involved. 
In more than a decade since the federal mandate, every state government has officially 
adopted NIMS through executive order or other policy mechanism,2 and many agencies 
and organizations nationwide (e.g., fire, police, hospitals, private industry) have worked to 
incorporate NIMS concepts and principles into their methods of operation, with varying 
levels of success.3
In many studies of NIMS implementation, analysts have focused on first response 
organizations – e.g., police, firefighters, and emergency medical services – the organizations 
and professions typically in the forefront of emergency response. But NIMS is intended 
for broader use than just by first responders. If emergency response is to operate as a 
substantially integrated system in major crises, it is crucial that not only first responders but 
others that will be involved should be ready and able to use NIMS effectively.
In this article, we inquire whether NIMS is penetrating the practices of agencies and 
organizations that are not primarily emergency response entities but would nonetheless play 
critical roles in response to a very large-scale emergency such as a major terrorist attack, 
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natural disaster, infrastructure failure, or public health crisis. We think here of agencies such 
as transportation, public works, social services, public health, or others having crucial skills, 
resources, and personnel that would need to be deployed effectively in collaboration with 
traditional first responders to cope with a severe event. These agencies may be considered 
as part of a second circle of emergency responders integrating with traditional first response 
organizations. A third circle of agencies, less directly involved, provides additional support.
Our article asks whether surface transportation agencies – one example of these second 
circle agencies – are developing and mastering the organizational practices that NIMS is 
intended to foster. This is by no means a given. As committed to public welfare as these and 
other second circle agencies may be – and notwithstanding the formal federal mandate – we 
might expect such agencies to be less attuned to NIMS implementation than first response 
organizations. The former have many more concerns and priorities than emergency 
preparedness. For second circle agencies, emergency response is a secondary mission in 
potential competition with the demands of their primary and other secondary missions. 
Devoting people, funds, time, and managerial attention – all scarce organizational resources 
– to emergency preparedness imposes opportunity costs on such agencies and thus is not 
necessarily a priority relative to other mission imperatives. Yet in a major emergency, the 
ability of such agencies to mobilize, operate effectively, and – crucially – work in tandem with 
other responders is essential. America’s preparedness would fall far short if such entities 
were not able to contribute and collaborate in a crisis.
Transportation fits the description of a second circle organization well. It does play a significant 
role in the emergency management system – the US Department of Transportation is the 
co-lead in the “Critical Transportation” Core Capability under the National Preparedness 
Goal4, and the lead agency in “Emergency Support Function #1 – Transportation” under the 
National Response Framework.5 Many of its sister agencies lead their states’ equivalents, but 
transportation does not regard emergency response as its primary mission and therefore 
may engage NIMS in different ways or regard it as a less significant requirement than 
traditional first response organizations.
There has been limited previous study about whether second circle entities are adopting and 
using NIMS. In an effort to lay the groundwork for systematic inquiry on this topic, we have 
conducted an exploratory study of state transportation agencies and metropolitan mass 
transit agencies – the functions and resources of which are often crucial to crisis response. 
We first review the NIMS statutory requirement and the professional literature on NIMS 
implementation. Then, to highlight current issues in NIMS implementation by transportation 
agencies, we review findings from a series of semi-structured interviews we conducted with 
city, metro, state, and federal transportation agency officials.6 We asked our respondents to 
describe the extent to which NIMS had been implemented in their organizations, how it was 
used, and what factors had facilitated or impeded that implementation. 
As will be reported in more detail, these interviews revealed that all agencies in our sample 
have implemented some form of NIMS. Each of the interviewees saw benefit to using NIMS’ 
common response structure, terminology, and principles when involved in multi-agency 
response operations. At the same time, the interviews highlighted varying philosophies and 
approaches to implementing NIMS and show variation in the degree to which NIMS has 
diffused through these agencies and is used in practice. Importantly, they also revealed 
factors which respondents felt help or hinder successful NIMS implementation. Overall, 
the research indicates that NIMS aligns with the cultures and organizational practices in 
transportation but that continued work is needed to fully embed and institutionalize NIMS 
within the sector.
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Background and Literature Review
The underlying logic of developing and deploying an emergency response system like 
NIMS/ICS rests on the need for coordination of resources, particularly in major events. 
Ideally, a robust emergency response, especially when involving multiple organizations 
and jurisdictions, requires effective collaboration so that the tasks of response can be 
carried out with necessary urgency, maximum feasible substantive effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness, with minimal duplication of effort or unmet response needs. Responders in a 
large-scale emergency often do not know each other and have not worked together before; 
yet they have to work together as smoothly as possible. The lives of affected populations 
– and their own – may depend on that. If that coordination depends to a large degree on 
ad hoc improvisation, however, it is likely to be slow to take hold or fall short of what is 
needed. Responders would have to figure out how to divide responsibilities, establish 
common procedures, and mutually adjust operations – all under the intense pressures of 
disaster conditions. By contrast, NIMS can reduce these frictions and improve the speed 
and effectiveness of emergency operations that involve diverse response organizations 
by serving as a common system that response organizations of all types adopt, train for, 
exercise, and use.
The congressional mandate for NIMS, however, did not in itself ensure success in diffusing 
NIMS practices broadly, let alone universally. The United States has more than 89,000 units 
of subnational government7: states, counties, municipalities, school districts, and special 
districts. To achieve the potential benefits of a standardized emergency management system 
that fosters effective coordination, NIMS must be diffused across levels of government 
and jurisdictions, must be accepted by diverse professions, must take root in hundreds of 
thousands of individual agencies and organizations, and must spread through the public, 
private, and non-profit sectors. Unlike many other kinds of innovation, responsibility for 
NIMS cannot be assigned to a special organizational unit in each of these entities; rather it 
requires full engagement by all agency personnel at the operating level.8 The broad sweep 
and depth of the NIMS requirement entails a massive implementation process – one that is 
still going on nearly 15 years after the congressional mandate. 
The Evolution of NIMS
The NIMS mandate in the Homeland Security Act of 20029 was amplified in 2003 through 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5)10, which underscored the use of NIMS 
as the nation’s single, comprehensive incident management system.  
The Incident Command System (ICS) is fundamental to NIMS as a framework for managing 
operations at or near the scene of an emergency. It provides responders a way to coordinate 
emergency efforts through a common, flexible, and scalable command structure that 
organizes response under four major sections: operations, planning, logistics, and finance/
administration. As the scale of response expands, responders may organize sub-units of 
the four core sections, either by functional specialization (e.g., fire suppression operations 
group and emergency medical operations group) or by geographic sector, called divisions. 
(See Figures 1 and 2, respectively, for depictions of a basic ICS structure and an expanded 
structure for complex events.) 
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Figure 1. Basic Incident Command System (ICS) Structure11
Figure 2. Expanded Incident Command System (ICS) Structure12
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 2 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Hambridge, Howitt, & Giles,  Coordination in Crises  6
Overseeing and coordinating these functions is either a single Incident Commander (IC) 
or a collaborative Unified Command (UC). An integrated command structure under a 
single IC is typically employed when emergency responders come from a single agency or 
jurisdiction or in mutual aid situations where there is no ambiguity about lines of authority 
over all responders. Unified command, by contrast, is employed when no single hierarchy of 
authority exists (as when responders come from multiple political jurisdictions) to connect 
the full set of deployed responders who must collaborate. Unified Command then provides 
a potentially effective voluntary means of integrating decision making and allocation of 
resources. 
To seek to ensure that ICS is used as universally as possible, the federal government issued 
NIMS implementation requirements starting in FY 2005 which gave jurisdictions two 
years to comply with the full array of NIMS implementation standards.13 NIMS compliance 
was made a precondition for any agency or organization to receive homeland security 
preparedness funding – a potentially powerful incentive for adopting and implementing the 
system.14 However, the impact of actually withholding funds from jurisdictions that did not 
comply with the NIMS mandate may have seemed too strong or even counter-productive 
to those developing the regulations for NIMS compliance.15 Withholding funds would have 
removed resources that those entities needed to improve emergency response systems, 
and that action would undoubtedly have caused political reaction by local, state, and federal 
officeholders representing those jurisdictions.16 Therefore, states and sub-state jurisdictions, 
when applying for homeland security grants, have only been asked to self-certify, with 
minimal documentation, that they are NIMS compliant.17 
States also provide additional documentation, outside the grant funding process, to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on an annual basis attesting to their 
NIMS compliance; but, again, this process allows for self-certification by each state.18   And, 
although states may choose to do so, the federal government does not require them to track 
and enforce NIMS compliance by individual jurisdictions (e.g., counties or municipalities). 
Nor does the federal government track NIMS implementation in specific disciplines (e.g. 
transportation, fire, police).19  
Although it has only lightly enforced NIMS compliance, FEMA has fostered NIMS 
implementation by issuing guidance documents to all levels of government, as well as 
to private industry and nonprofit organizations, to describe in general form what would 
constitute compliance.20 In addition, FEMA has created NIMS training resources for specific 
disciplines, including healthcare, hospitals, higher education, schools, public works, public 
health, and volunteer organizations.21 It has also collaborated with the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) to develop a customized workbook for frontline transportation 
workers as a replacement for the introductory ICS 100 training. 22 FEMA’s attention to the 
variation among emergency response groups is important to the success of NIMS writ 
large because it makes a seemingly monolithic system adaptable to the variety of cultures, 
missions, needs, and capabilities present across emergency response disciplines. Tailoring 
NIMS guidance and resources to different groups may also reduce resistance to NIMS 
implementation within organizations that have not previously used NIMS and may be wary 
of changing their routines or adopting systems developed outside. 
It is worth noting that the federal government has recently prioritized engagement of a 
broader cross-section of American society in emergency management efforts. Presidential 
Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), issued in 2011, calls on federal departments and agencies to work 
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with the “Whole Community,” including private citizens, private enterprise, the nonprofit 
sector, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government, to improve collective 
emergency preparedness, response, and resiliency.23 This emphasis on a Whole Community 
approach to emergency management can be found in multiple federal documents, including 
the National Preparedness Goal,24 the National Preparedness System,25 and National 
Preparedness Report.26 However, there are very few references to NIMS in general or, more 
specifically, on how to integrate NIMS into the new Whole Community approach or vice 
versa.
PPD-8 did, however, lead to adjustments in NIMS training requirements. Under PPD-8, the 
new NIMS Training Program,27 issued in 2011, gives federal, state, tribal, local and private 
sector stakeholders greater flexibility than did the 2008 Five-Year NIMS Training Plan28 in 
determining which of their employees need to take NIMS training. According to Edwards and 
Goodrich, “While the 2011 Training Program continues to define the curriculum and required 
course elements…the onerous list of mandated personnel has been modified to provide 
some latitude to local emergency management leaders to select those employees who need 
to be trained” (36 – 37). 29 
Emergency Responder Circles
Understanding the differences among professions that participate in emergency response, 
particularly the contrast between first responders and other disciplines, is critical to evaluating 
the success of NIMS implementation thus far and improving NIMS moving forward.
The term “first responder” has been used popularly or colloquially to refer most often to fire, 
police and emergency medical disciplines.30 Somewhat more broadly, the U.S. government’s 
statutory term for individuals and organizations involved in emergency response is 
“emergency response provider” as defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
subsequently amended twice in 2006 to mean “federal, state, and local governmental and 
nongovernmental emergency public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, 
emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities) and related personnel, agencies, 
and authorities.”31 
But other public and non-public agencies may become crucial actors in emergencies. Howitt 
and Makler (2005) use the imagery of concentric circles where the inner circle is occupied by 
agencies whose principal mission is emergency management and the outer circles contain all 
the other organizations with potential involvement in emergency-related activities.32 Several 
other researchers (i.e., Lutz and Lindell [2008]; Robinson and Gerber [2007]; and Robinson 
[2012]) have subsequently focused on institutional mission as a way of determining which 
organizations fall within the first responder category and which do not. They assert that 
agencies whose primary purpose is to respond to emergencies should be deemed first 
responders; and other organizations, whose roles in emergency response are not usually 
part of their core missions, should fall outside this category.33 
Figure 3 adapts Howitt and Makler’s construct to further define and differentiate their 
circles of responders and the types of organizations that occupy them. The inner circle 
contains traditional first responders (fire, police, and emergency medicine) and emergency 
management agencies. The second circle contains organizations whose primary missions 
are not emergency-focused but which often find themselves directly involved in emergency 
response efforts alongside first responders. This category includes disciplines such as 
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transportation, public health, public works, and utilities.34 The third circle is comprised of 
entities that play support roles to first and second circle response agencies during emergency 
response. Private businesses, religious institutions, and schools typically provide support 
services and resources to frontline responders in the emergency response phase of an 
incident, while taking on a greater share of direct service delivery to disaster victims in the 
recovery phase.      
Figure 3. Centrality of Emergency Response to Organizational Mission
NIMS Implementation in the Transportation Sector
September 11th led to a flurry of emergency preparedness initiatives within the transportation 
sector. A leader in these efforts, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) conducted “security 
assessments at 36 transit agencies, emergency response planning with the 60 largest transit 
agencies, grants for emergency preparedness drills to 80 transit agencies, security training 
to staff and first responders, R&D for security-related technology, [an] MOU [Memorandum 
of Understanding] with DHS, and development of the protective measures to support the 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)” (xii - xiv).35 The newly created Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) came 
together to form the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ 
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(AASHTO) Security Task Force (now the Special Committee on Transportation Security and 
Emergency Management – SCOTSEM) and created a number of guidance documents related 
to preparedness for terrorist events.36 During the time between the 9/11 attacks and the 
official release of NIMS in 2004,37 emergency management efforts within transportation – 
as in many other sectors – focused primarily on security preparedness and response to 
terrorist attacks. 
When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August of 2005, NIMS was still new to many 
in the emergency management community, having been released only in March of the 
previous year as part of the National Response Plan.38 There had not been sufficient time 
to integrate NIMS fully into emergency response procedures prior to the storm; and the 
transportation sector struggled in its emergency response efforts, especially with respect 
to inadequate pre-positioning of transportation assets for evacuation needs and incomplete 
assistance to special needs populations.39 The problems witnessed during Hurricane Katrina 
shed even more light on the country’s need for a fully functional incident management 
system that could meet the demands of disasters of this scale and complexity. 
The transportation sector thus began moving further toward an “all hazards” approach to 
emergency management. Guidance documents began emphasizing general emergency 
preparedness over terrorism-specific preparedness, and references to the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) began to emerge.40 At the same time, to ensure 
broad understanding and acceptance of NIMS within transportation agencies, USDOT and 
TSA also promoted NIMS-focused trainings (IS/ICS 100, 200, 300, 400, 700 and 800) and 
exercises.41 FHWA, in coordination with FEMA, developed the publication The National Incident 
Management System – A Workbook for State Department of Transportation Frontline Workers 
as a replacement for ICS 100 training, and the Transportation Research Board funded the 
creation of ICS training for field level transportation staff through the Mineta Transportation 
Institute in conjunction with the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans).42 These 
are just a sample of the many initiatives that have taken place within the transportation 
sector to try to institutionalize NIMS.
However, the transportation sector must cope with the fact that transportation-specific 
NIMS compliance standards are not available, and where guidance has been issued, it is 
not consistent. For example, the USDOT and Transportation Research Board (TRB) have 
issued guidance documents with NIMS compliance recommendations. However, the 
recommendations vary. And in both documents, transportation agencies are advised to 
consult with their states’ emergency management agencies for specific NIMS compliance 
requirements for the sector43 because the federal government has delegated creation of 
discipline-based standards to state governments.44
NIMS Implementation Factors
In the literature, several factors are consistently identified as having an impact on NIMS 
implementation or emergency preparedness in general. These factors were subsequently 
used as a starting guide for our interviews with transportation agency representatives.
1. Compliance requirements and enforcement – Federal preparedness funding for states 
and localities, as discussed above, is now contingent upon NIMS compliance, although 
FEMA has required only state-level self-certification.45 Moreover, while federal grant 
funding could be a strong incentive to compel NIMS compliance for first response 
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organizations, many second and third circle responder groups – for example, private 
industry and the NGO community – do not rely on this funding. 
2. Comprehension of risk – The literature also identifies an organization’s or individual’s 
level of perceived risk of experiencing a severe emergency as another factor influencing 
whether they have adequately prepared for a crisis.46 When the level of perceived risk 
is low, the chances of a person or group doing something to prepare for or mitigate 
that risk are also low. Conversely, when persons or groups believe that a risk is likely to 
affect them, they are more likely to take action to prevent or prepare for it. Therefore, 
helping organizations in the outer circles better understand their risks is a primary step 
in influencing action. The Federal Government has begun to put greater emphasis on 
risk assessments as part of the National Preparedness Goal47 and National Preparedness 
System.48
3. Commitment of resources – For second and third circle organizations, diverting 
resources (time, money, and staff) away from their own “mission-critical” activities and 
into emergency management programs has proved problematic, especially because 
of shrinking budgets resulting from the recession of 2008-2010 or the limited size and 
financial and administrative resources of many of these agencies.49 Agency leadership 
has been critical. Without the commitment of executive leadership within these 
organizations to fund and support emergency planning and preparedness initiatives, 
NIMS implementation is much less likely.
4. Customization of NIMS – Researchers have noted that some outer circle organizations 
may perceive NIMS/ICS as overly prescriptive and rigid and hence unsuitable for 
organizations that do not primarily function as command and control hierarchies.50 These 
researchers have argued for flexibility in customizing NIMS in ways that are relevant to 
each individual organization’s needs, structure, and culture, while maintaining sufficient 
fidelity to the basic system so that collaboration with other organizations remains feasible. 
While there are varying opinions on whether or not NIMS is designed to accommodate 
this flexibility, adaptation of NIMS at the organizational level seems to be an important 
condition for successful NIMS implementation by second and third circle organizations. 
5. Collaboration with first responders – A number of articles discuss the benefits that 
pre-incident collaboration between emergency response groups brings, whether it be 
in planning, training, exercising, etc.51 Robinson talks specifically about the need for 
organizations in the outer circles to partner with first responders in order to have a seat 
within the inner circle of emergency planning and response. Those second and third circle 
groups that are able to maintain these close linkages are more likely to be successful in 
emergency planning and NIMS implementation efforts.
6. Consistency of use – Infrequent utilization of NIMS is another obstacle to full 
implementation by outer circle responders. While first responders usually have 
opportunities to use NIMS/ICS on a frequent – often daily – basis as part of their normal 
work activities, second and third circle responders encounter emergency situations 
much less frequently and are therefore more likely to be uncomfortable using NIMS 
when they do respond to emergencies. In their article on organizations involved in 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activities during Hurricane Katrina, Neal and Webb 
(2006) observe that “[o]rganizations that use some form of ICS on a regular basis (e.g., 
fire departments, medical related organizations) did appear to use ICS and NIMS during 
the response to the hurricane. On the other hand, most of the other organizations at 
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both the federal and local level that did not use ICS on a daily basis generally did not 
use ICS or NIMS during the hurricane response” (272).52 Finding ways to embed NIMS 
into day-to-day processes; using NIMS during smaller, more routine incident responses; 
and increasing the frequency of NIMS use through regular trainings and exercises will 
improve NIMS proficiency.
Interview Method & Discussion of Findings
To explore how NIMS implementation is progressing in transportation agencies, we 
conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews by phone or in person with agency 
emergency management and security officials. A set of open-ended questions about NIMS 
implementation guided all interviews at the start. These questions were based on findings 
and conclusions from the existing literature on NIMS implementation, adapted and extended 
for a focus on second circle agencies rather than first response organizations. (See appendix 
1 for a list of these questions.) Depending on the answers provided by interview subjects, 
we asked a series of additional questions that were customized to a specific interview. Such 
an approach allowed us to follow the general questions with more specific, interactive 
discussions tailored to each agency’s specific circumstances as revealed in responses to the 
initial queries. As seemed appropriate for a topic that had not been previously much studied, 
we purposefully traded the potential breadth of a broadly based, random-sample survey for 
the depth of longer, more intensive, more customized interviews. To provide variation in our 
non-random sample, we focused our interviews on city and metro transportation agencies 
that would afford a view of a geographically diverse mix of transportation agencies in large 
metropolitan areas (the sample includes agencies on the East and West coasts, the Midwest, 
and the Southwest). We also interviewed the corresponding state-level transportation 
agencies for these metro areas in order to understand the interplay between these two 
levels, as well as to learn if there were differences in NIMS implementation results at the state 
and metropolitan agency levels. Finally, we interviewed officials from the US Department 
of Transportation (USDOT) and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including 
FEMA, to provide a federal-level perspective. In all, the research team conducted interviews 
with twelve city, metro, or state-level transportation agencies in five states and with two 
federal agencies between October 2013 and February 2016. All interviewees held leading 
roles in their agencies’ security and/or emergency management departments. A list of 
agencies participating in this study is presented in Figure 4.
A shortcoming of this interview approach is that our relatively small sample size does not 
permit confident generalizations. However, we hope this exploratory research will serve 
as a starting point for broader investigation and analysis of NIMS implementation in 
transportation and other second and third circle response organizations in the future.    
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City / Metro State
Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (Boston, MA)
Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT)
SunRail (Orange County, FL) Florida Department of Transportation 
(FDOT)SunTran (Ocala, FL)
Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris 
County (Houston, TX) Texas Department of Transportation 
(TxDOT)
VIA Metropolitan Transit (San Antonio, TX)
Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (Los Angeles, CA)
California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans)
Chicago Transit Authority (Chicago, IL) Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)
Federal
United States Department of Transportation (USDOT)
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
• Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
Figure 4: Transportation and Emergency Management Agencies Participating in this Study
NOTE: The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) and MassDOT are separate 
legal entities under the same governing board. A central emergency management department 
supports both the MBTA and MassDOT, so one interview was conducted covering both 
entities.
Patterns of Implementation: Facilitating and Impeding 
Factors
While in most of the transportation agencies interviewed NIMS implementation efforts 
began soon after the official NIMS framework was issued in 2004, some agencies had been 
using the ICS-component of NIMS much earlier. The Illinois Department of Transportation 
(IDOT) representative noted that transportation agencies in Illinois were using ICS at least as 
far back as 1994. California, the birthplace of ICS in the 1970’s, developed the Standardized 
Emergency Management System (SEMS) and mandated its use in 1993 for all multi-agency 
and multi-jurisdictional responses. SEMS includes ICS and, as the Caltrans representative 
described it, “SEMS has all the NIMS guidance and goes a level higher because it incorporates 
California’s specific emergency response structure and procedures.” Therefore, California 
agencies like Caltrans and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA 
Metro) were already familiar with ICS when NIMS came into being. Overall, the interviewed 
transportation agencies that had experience with components of NIMS, most notably ICS, 
prior to the NIMS mandate generally found NIMS implementation easier than those that did 
not. 
In terms of actual use of NIMS, the interviews revealed a range of practices and experiences. 
At one end of the spectrum, the Florida Department of Transportation’s (FDOT) central 
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Emergency Management (EM) office aligns itself as closely as possible with NIMS/ICS’s 
command structure at all times, both during incident responses as well as in day-to-day, non-
emergency activities. This is reflected in the organizational structure of the FDOT Emergency 
Management office, which follows ICS, and in the regular position titles of its staff, which also 
correspond to ICS position titles – e.g., Operations Chief and Logistics Chief. While FDOT’s 
central office strictly follows ICS, decentralized authority among its seven districts and 
turnpike authority creates varying levels of adherence to ICS. In contrast to FDOT’s central EM 
office, the Emergency Management group that serves both the Massachusetts Department 
of Transportation (MassDOT) and its metro Boston transit service, the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA), indicates less stringent adherence to NIMS/ICS by using the 
“philosophy of ICS” (e.g., the principle of unity of command and common terminology) but 
not necessarily the exact ICS structure during emergency responses or day-to-day activities. 
For the most part, the transportation agencies interviewed did not use NIMS on a day-to-
day basis but almost always used it during incident responses that required engagement 
with first responders and other external organizations. For emergency incidents that did 
not require interaction with external responders, there was a mixed response (roughly 
split evenly) on whether or not the transportation agencies used NIMS/ICS. Those that did 
not use NIMS/ICS in these situations presumably used internally-developed structures 
and procedures until outside agencies became involved. At that point, the transportation 
agencies indicated they were able to transition to NIMS/ICS, although some noted difficulty 
in this transition. As the representative from VIA Metropolitan Transit in San Antonio, Texas 
stated, “[w]hen there is an emergency, shifting that gear from our regular operations to an 
emergency operation can sometimes be a sticky clutch…but once we come together under 
[an ICS] unified command, we do it very well.”
The interview respondents most often cited a state or locality’s Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) as the location where their agencies utilized NIMS – more often than saying that 
they used NIMS/ICS at the actual scene of incidents. An EOC is typically activated during an 
emergency by the affected municipality at a location, away from the incident scene, where 
multiple agencies and organizations come together to provide coordinated support to the 
operations occurring at the scene(s) of the incident. It is important to reiterate that EOCs 
provide support to on-scene operations. Under NIMS and ICS, the Incident Commander at 
the scene of the emergency maintains command and control of response decisions and 
actions even when an EOC is activated. 
This on-scene command principle of NIMS/ICS is in tension with typical practices in the 
transportation sector, particularly in mass transit agencies. During routine, non-emergency 
operations, these agencies usually function under a quite different model. A central Transit 
Control Center is in active command of the entire transit system instead of this authority being 
decentralized to in-the-field personnel. As the MassDOT/MBTA representative describes it,
[t]ransit control centers tell everyone in the field what to do…100% command and 
control. So, if operational management typically occurs within transit control centers, 
then transportation agencies tend to be more cautious about transitioning their agency’s 
command to the scene during emergencies, preferring to maintain the transit control center 
management model and supplementing it with support from the EOC, when needed. Given 
the complex transit operating environment (e.g., overhead and third rail power, vehicle 
movement, etc.), concerns over safety factor heavily into this approach. 
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Transit control centers’ dual role of managing incidents and simultaneously keeping the 
rest of the transit system running is an important insight that transit agencies and their 
emergency response partners should consider as part of their emergency planning, training 
and exercising efforts.
With a better understanding of when, how and where NIMS is being utilized in selected surface 
transportation agencies/organizations, we next reviewed which factors have facilitated and 
which have impeded the adoption and use of NIMS by transportation agencies. Figures 5 
and 6 provide an overview of the perspectives of our interview respondents. Each factor 
identified by interviewees is connected back to the factor(s) identified in the literature review 
(in parentheses in Figures 5 and 6). 
Figure 5. Factors Facilitating NIMS Implementation in Transportation Agencies
Figure 6. Factors Impeding NIMS Implementation in Transportation Agencies
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 2 (April 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Hambridge, Howitt, & Giles,  Coordination in Crises  15
When asked what had been most important to the success of their NIMS implementation 
efforts, many interviewees first referenced commitment and support for NIMS from their 
agencies’ executive leadership, especially their chief executives. The executives’ motivations 
for this support tended to come from two main sources: (1) a perceived need to comply with 
state or federal legal/regulatory requirements and/or (2) a perception that their agency was 
sufficiently vulnerable to risks or threats to warrant strengthening its system for responding 
to and recovering from hazards and disruptions. Several interview respondents highlighted 
the added benefit of having a formal statement of support from their leadership which 
helped to achieve greater acceptance of and involvement in the NIMS implementation effort 
agency-wide. Examples include a memorandum from the Director of Caltrans, a policy 
statement from VIA’s President & CEO, and a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors 
of the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County (METRO) in Houston, TX.
In addition, external collaboration with first circle response organizations is also critical to 
transportation agencies, especially to the city and metro transportation agencies. These 
transportation agencies rely most heavily on local and state emergency management 
agencies for support with NIMS implementation since these agencies typically provide 
guidance and monitor overall NIMS compliance within their respective jurisdictions. 
Emergency management agencies also typically provide a significant number of free, 
classroom-based NIMS trainings to area emergency responders. These training opportunities 
were highly valued by the transportation agencies interviewed because most did not have 
the internal resources to conduct the trainings themselves. Furthermore, emergency 
management agencies typically oversee their jurisdictions’ EOC operations, and EOCs were 
the most frequently cited location where transportation agencies utilized NIMS. For all these 
reasons, strong relationships with emergency management agencies were perceived as very 
important for successful NIMS implementation by transportation organizations.    
Transportation agencies also referred to a number of other external groups with 
whom they collaborated on NIMS-related activities. Those most often cited, aside from 
emergency management agencies, were law enforcement (police, sheriff, highway patrol), 
fire departments, FEMA, the federal Transportation Security Administration (TSA), other 
transportation agencies, hospitals, and EMS, in that order. The most beneficial collaborations 
with these and other groups, in terms of improving NIMS proficiency, were multi-agency 
drills and exercises. Among the examples cited were Florida’s annual hurricane exercise in 
which FDOT participates, Texas’ annual contraflow exercise in which TxDOT participates,53 
hospital and airport-based exercises in which METRO (Houston, TX) participates, and annual 
nuclear power station exercises in which IDOT participates. 
While simulated incidents – i.e., drills and exercises – give responders a glimpse of the 
situations in which NIMS would be needed, actual emergencies tend to make the point more 
dramatically. Many interviewees talked about how their agencies tended to take emergency 
preparedness and NIMS implementation more seriously after being involved in large-scale 
incident responses. From the Texas agencies recounting their experiences during hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita (2005) and Ike (2008), to IDOT and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) 
describing Illinois’ harsh winter storms, to the MassDOT/MBTA remembering the traumatic 
events surrounding the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, many interviewees explained 
how the perception of their agencies’ exposure to disasters pointedly increased in the face 
of a major emergency – and with it came a revitalized dedication to the agency’s emergency 
management program overall. 
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Funding issues also loomed large during the interview discussions. In the years closely 
following 9/11, when homeland security grant funding was more readily available than it 
has been more recently, transportation agencies were able to use federal emergency 
preparedness funding primarily through the TSA’s Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) for 
NIMS implementation activities. Transportation agencies used this funding predominantly for 
training and exercises, specifically to cover overtime costs or “backfilling” costs – i.e., having 
other employees cover the work that the trainees/exercise participants would have done. 
However, grant funding has diminished significantly in recent years,54 and transportation 
agencies have not been able to make up for this loss through internal budgets. As an 
example, the MBTA’s security and emergency preparedness funding from DHS dropped by 
more than half from $6.6 million in 2012 to $3.25 million in 2013.55 Funding constraints were 
cited by many agencies as the primary obstacle to better, more sustainable NIMS execution.
Interviewees also frequently mentioned that getting high-level commitment for NIMS has 
proven difficult because neither NIMS nor the agency’s overall emergency management 
program are seen as mission-critical by others within the organization. Dedicating funding, 
staff, and other assets to emergency preparedness rather than to core operational tasks 
like transporting customers and maintaining equipment has proved a hard-sell for these 
resource-constrained agencies. As the VIA representative put it, “It’s hard to justify bringing 
[personnel] off the street for NIMS training and exercising when our number one job is to 
move people and serve our customers.” This tension or conflict between emergency-related 
priorities and core mission needs can be quite strong for agencies in the outer circles, but 
not something with which first response groups must grapple because of the primacy of 
emergency response among their goals. 
Interview respondents noted that understanding this tendency and developing strategies 
to overcome it are critical to successful NIMS implementation in their organizations. One 
strategy mentioned is how VIA in San Antonio, realizing the difficulty it was facing finding 
funding for NIMS training, succeeded in embedding NIMS training into its mission-critical 
Operations Refresher training, thereby not incurring the additional backfill and overtime 
costs it would have if NIMS training was conducted separately from the Operations Refresher 
training. Similarly, Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) requires ICS 100, 200 and 
700 trainings as homework for supervisors during the National Highway Institute (NHI) 
Maintenance Leadership Academy.
Even for agencies committed to implementing NIMS and having the resources to do so, 
attainment of this goal can prove elusive when compliance standards are unclear or 
unavailable. All the agencies interviewed stated that they had implemented NIMS, but there 
was wide variation in the criteria by which each agency judged itself to be “NIMS compliant.” 
As mentioned earlier, FEMA has developed NIMS implementation guidelines, beyond just 
training compliance, for different levels of government (federal, state, tribal, local) and for the 
NGO and private sectors as a whole. It has also developed guidelines specific to healthcare, 
but it has not developed NIMS specific standards – i.e., specific requirements necessary for 
compliance – for the transportation sector or other outer circle disciplines.56 FEMA, moreover, 
only tracks NIMS compliance at the state level; and only some states have developed or 
track compliance standards at the discipline or agency level.57 With no authoritative set 
of compliance standards to follow, transportation agencies are implementing standards 
derived from various outside sources or deciding on their own what it means to be NIMS 
compliant, as shown in Figure 7.  
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Agency Adhere to Externally / Internally Developed NIMS Compliance Standards?
California DOT External (FEMA / State)
LA Metro (CA) External (FEMA / State)
Illinois DOT External (FEMA / State)
Texas DOT External (FEMA / State)
SunTran (FL) External (FEMA)
VIA (TX) External (FEMA)
SunRail (FL) External (FTA)
CTA (IL) External (City)
Florida DOT Internal
Massachusetts DOT / MBTA Internal
Houston METRO (TX) Internal
Figure 7. Sources Providing NIMS Compliance Standards
It should also be noted that DHS/FEMA rather than USDOT oversees NIMS compliance – 
and then not specifically for transportation agencies at the state or city levels.58 Several 
transportation agencies interviewed (MassDOT/MBTA, SunRail, SunTran, Houston METRO 
and VIA) did note, however, that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA), both sub-agencies of USDOT, include some NIMS compliance 
criteria in their initial certification and periodic assessment programs of transit agencies. 
Overall, however, NIMS oversight, guidance, and support come mostly from DHS/FEMA and 
state emergency management agencies, which most interviewees seemed to feel was the 
appropriate model. 
The DHS/FEMA-sponsored NIMS training program was the measure of compliance most often 
raised by the transportation representatives during the interview discussions. The NIMS 
core curriculum is made up of a series of online and in-class courses designed to provide 
emergency response personnel with key information on all components of NIMS with an 
emphasis on ICS. Baseline trainings provide preliminary information and are intended for 
all responders, while advanced courses are intended for responders in leadership positions 
or responders in jurisdictions at greater risk for complex incidents based on hazard/
threat analyses.59 Some interviewees saw the trainings, especially the online courses, as 
valuable resources in their NIMS implementation toolkits. Others saw them as too generic 
and instead developed internal courses customized to the field of transportation and/or 
to their specific agencies. The vast majority of interviewees, whether having positive or 
negative impressions of the DHS/FEMA training program, saw it as the primary activity 
for and measure of NIMS compliance. Therefore, they generally dedicated more time and 
financial resources to their NIMS training programs than any other NIMS-related activities. 
Due to this, many interviewees voiced a strong desire to see more specific guidance as to 
which NIMS courses are required for transportation workers and which level of workers 
are recommended/required to take these courses. As seen in Figure 8, there is currently 
significant variation in the types of workers that transportation agencies require to take 
NIMS trainings.
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NIMS Core Curriculum
Baseline Training Additional / Advanced Training
Agency IS-700 ICS-100 ICS-200 IS-800 ICS-300 ICS-400
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Figure 8. Personnel within Transportation Agencies taking NIMS Trainings 
NOTE: This table does not include position-specific or function-specific courses that are part 
of the NIMS core curriculum.
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Figure 9. Factors Affecting Transportation Agencies’ NIMS Implementation
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Conclusions
The preceding pages have covered the factors that affect NIMS implementation in the 
transportation sector. Figure 9 presents a graphical representation of inter-relationships 
revealed both by the review of literature about NIMS implementation and by the exploratory 
interviews conducted for this study. This diagram characterizes the variables as internal and 
external factors and shows how they affect NIMS implementation. Future research should 
test whether this representation holds for a broader sample of transportation agencies and 
if it could extend to other second and third circle professions and agencies.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) has been the United States’ framework 
for managing incidents for nearly a decade and a half. The fact that all agencies interviewed 
have implemented NIMS to some degree and have plans to or expressed an interest in 
further developing their NIMS programs are indications that NIMS is becoming embedded 
in the transportation sector and will help it contribute to the multi-disciplinary incident 
management system that the nation needs to respond to complex disasters. At the same 
time, the research points to several issues within these agencies as well as with NIMS itself 
that, if not addressed, could slow or block NIMS’ progress within the sector.        
Quite importantly, the lack of clarity in NIMS compliance standards for transportation 
agencies – and the consequent uncertainty for those agencies about which compliance-
related  areas to focus their time and resources on – has led to inconsistent implementation 
efforts, most notably with respect to training. To mitigate this, the federal government, 
namely FEMA and USDOT, should work together to develop more specific NIMS standards 
adapted for the transportation sector and integrate them into the statewide NIMS 
implementation tracking process. Doing so would provide more authoritative support for 
the transportation-tailored training and guidance documents already in existence and would 
send clearer signals to transportation agencies at the city, metro, and state levels, making it 
easier for emergency management specialists in these agencies to advocate for enhanced 
agency-wide commitment to NIMS. Clearer standards for transportation might also increase 
the degree to which transportation agencies are integrated with first response agencies in 
NIMS implementation.
In designing NIMS implementation programs, policy makers should take account of the 
differences between first, second, and third circle response agencies, particularly the non-
emergency-focused missions of second and third circle groups. These affect the time and 
resources these organizations devote to NIMS implementation. FEMA has recognized the 
need to simplify the NIMS doctrine and is in the process of doing so, not only due to second 
and third circle concerns but also to a general perception of NIMS’ over-complexity.60 The 
updated doctrine is expected to focus more on the concepts of incident management and 
EOCs, areas most relevant and useful to response groups, while downgrading other content 
that is already covered in complementary, overarching national preparedness doctrine.61 
FEMA is also considering revisiting and simplifying the NIMS core curriculum so that students 
are not overwhelmed with content that is irrelevant to their expected level of involvement 
in emergency response operations.62 These are productive steps on the part of FEMA to 
sharpen NIMS, which should, in turn, allow transportation agencies to more efficiently focus 
their NIMS implementation efforts. 
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Simplifying NIMS may also have the added benefit of increasing the frequency with which it 
is utilized by transportation agencies. For transportation agencies to use NIMS as effectively 
as possible during incident responses, they must engage with it on a regular basis to develop 
and sustain proficiency. Many fire departments, for example, use ICS on all responses, 
whether minor or major, in order to build proficiency and confidence in using the system. 
Employing NIMS only during multi-agency incident responses, as some of the transportation 
groups interviewed reported, may be insufficient for second and third circle agencies to 
develop proficiency and be truly ready to mesh with other response organizations under the 
severe pressures of a major emergency. It should be the goal of these organizations to use 
NIMS on all incident responses and as consistently as possible when emergencies are not 
occurring through drills, exercises, and other mechanisms. 
Simplification is one way of increasing the likelihood that second and third circle responders 
will use NIMS. But flexibility to customize NIMS – to adapt it to the operating circumstances of 
particular professions or services – is also important to second and third circle responders. 
Transit agencies, in particular, which tend to maintain command within their transit control 
centers during incidents instead of on-scene as espoused by NIMS, rely on this flexibility to 
carry out their emergency response operations effectively. With that said, over-customization 
of NIMS by agencies can lead to an inability to integrate with others during incidents. 
The issue of customization thus creates a major tension. At its root, NIMS makes sense in 
order to prepare responders in all of the circles for major emergencies that require them 
to operate effectively in concert. That level of collaboration requires common systems 
that allow personnel from different organizations and professional disciplines to interact 
under great pressure when the stakes are very high. But under ordinary circumstances, that 
level of collaboration is frequently unnecessary; response organizations often can operate 
independently or with relatively low need for integrated action. The greatest need for NIMS 
proficiency comes under truly extraordinary conditions. Thus, on one hand, thoughtful 
customization allows NIMS to adapt to the operating requirements of different agencies and 
professions and makes the system more palatable, particularly to second and third circle 
organizations; on the other hand, sufficient standardization across professions is required 
to ensure that the basic premise of NIMS – collaboration through a common incident 
management framework – is achieved. There is no simple resolution to this dilemma, but 
it should be explicitly confronted by local and state emergency management agencies and 
their collaborators such as transportation agencies. 
A key challenge for those responsible for NIMS implementation within second and third 
circle organizations is to find ways of showing the link between NIMS and their agencies’ 
mission priorities. If that link is not apparent, agency leaders are not likely to commit time, 
energy, and internal political capital to building NIMS capacity, and agency staff are much 
less likely to treat NIMS proficiency as a significant personal or organizational goal, resulting 
in incomplete penetration of NIMS within the agency, which was the case in some of the 
transportation agencies interviewed. In a major emergency, would those agencies’ personnel 
be genuinely prepared to collaborate with other responders more deeply experienced with 
NIMS? Minimal commitment is highly likely to result in reduced capability in times of stress.
While actual emergency incidents highlight the link between NIMS and an agency’s mission 
priorities most effectively, agencies must not wait for disaster to strike before taking serious 
action. But this requires emergency managers within transportation agencies to manage 
up (by convincing senior leadership of the risks their agencies face) and to manage across 
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(by finding ways to persuade managers in other divisions of the agency of the importance 
and priority of emergency preparedness). Drills, exercises, after action reviews, threat and 
hazard vulnerability assessments, and perhaps other initiatives can clearly illustrate the 
costs of inaction and, as importantly, the benefits to mission continuity that come from 
investments in NIMS implementation. But these are not self-evident propositions in agencies 
whose major mission is not emergency preparedness and response.
Finally, transportation agencies must find alternative ways of funding their NIMS-related 
efforts. It is unlikely that homeland security grant funding will, in the near-term, return to the 
levels witnessed in the years directly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nor is grant funding 
intended to be a permanent solution to the sustainability of NIMS within the transportation 
sector. Transportation agencies must dedicate internal funding; and, since internal funding is 
likely to be limited, they must also find creative, low-cost ways to maintain NIMS proficiency 
through cost-sharing activities like conducting joint exercises with external partners and 
combining NIMS trainings with other professional training programs. 
Transportation agencies have made important strides in NIMS implementation. But more 
work remains. Institutionalization of NIMS in transportation depends on addressing funding 
issues, improving transportation executives’ understanding of agency risk, increasing the 
frequency of NIMS utilization within agencies, simplifying the NIMS doctrine and curriculum, 
developing transportation-specific compliance standards and allowing agencies some 
flexibility in customization of NIMS to work effectively with the cultures and organizational 
practices within the sector. These challenges and opportunities can also be extended beyond 
transportation to other second and third circle response agencies; and they are important 
considerations as the country continues to strive to develop ever more robust and effective 
emergency response capabilities and systems across the “Whole Community.”
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Appendix 1: General Interview Questions 
for City, Metro, and State Transportation 
Agencies
Agency and Department Overview:
•	 Please describe your agency’s primary areas of responsibility with respect to 
emergency management. Which departments are responsible for which aspects? 
How many staff and what are their roles? 
External Emergency Management Partnerships:
•	 Can you overview the emergency management community in your area? Which 
organizations are most involved? With whom does your agency collaborate most 
closely? How does your agency/department fit into this framework?
NIMS Implementation:
•	 How have you implemented NIMS within your agency? 
•	 Do you view NIMS as primarily the emergency response structure (ICS) or other 
components as well (planning, preparedness, resource management, etc.)?
•	 What does it mean to you to be NIMS-compliant?
•	 Can you describe your agency’s general history with adopting and implementing 
NIMS? When did implementation start? What were the drivers? Any significant 
milestones in adoption? 
•	 What have been major factors (internal and external) that have helped in facilitating 
NIMS adoption/implementation?
•	 What have been the major obstacles (internal and external) to adopting and 
implementing NIMS?
•	 What, if any, future NIMS implementation efforts do you foresee for your agency?
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NIMS Training and Exercises:
•	 Please talk about ways in which you have trained agency staff on NIMS.
o Individual? Team? Online? In-class?  What are benefits and limitations of these 
approaches?
o What staff? Level of staff? Types of departments?
•	 Please talk about ways in which you have conducted exercises using NIMS.
o What types of exercises? How often?
o What are the objectives you are trying to achieve by exercising - performance/
plan evaluation, relationship-building, education/learning, compliance?
•	 What facilitates/impedes your ability to have a successful training and exercise 
program? 
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Countries are inverted pyramids that rest precariously on their strategic innards--
their leadership, communications, key production, infrastructure, and population. If 
a country is paralyzed strategically, it is defeated and cannot sustain its fielded forces 
though they may be fully intact.
— Colonel John Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century2
Abstract
Nationally significant infrastructure facilities whose loss can cripple the essential functions 
of the entire country would be attractive targets for an enemy nation-state to strike with 
ballistic missile and airpower capabilities during a strategically-planned campaign against 
the United States. Terrorists lack the intelligence, organizational coordination, manpower, 
and resources to conduct a strategic warfare campaign with the intent of crippling 
essential-to-life systems across the country. The strategic warfare approach, which hinges 
on identifying, understanding, and targeting the interdependencies across infrastructure 
systems, does not match the capabilities or previous target selection patterns of terrorist 
groups. The Department of Homeland Security’s current infrastructure protection policies 
are rooted in the theories of strategic warfare and make the flawed assumption that critical 
infrastructure facilities are the same targets that terrorists would have the intention and 
capability of attacking.
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Introduction
Infrastructure facilities which are essential for the continued functioning of the entire 
country would be attractive targets for an enemy nation-state to strike with ballistic missiles 
and aircraft during a strategically planned war against the United States. The current 
terrorist threat comes from homegrown violent extremists who are motivated to inflict 
mass casualties in locations that are visible and easily accessible. Examples of these types of 
attacks would be the recent ISIS-inspired shootings in Orlando and San Bernardino.3 These 
terrorists lack the organizational intelligence, coordination, manpower, and resources to 
conduct a sustained series of precise attacks with the intent of crippling essential-to-life 
infrastructure systems across the country. Employing a strategic warfare approach hinges 
on identifying, understanding, and targeting the interdependencies across infrastructure 
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systems. Terrorists are not capable of waging strategic warfare, and conducting attacks 
against infrastructure systems would be a radical departure from their previous target 
selection patterns across the world. The Department of Homeland Security’s infrastructure 
protection policies are rooted in the theories of strategic warfare, and they make the flawed 
assumption that terrorists have the intention and capability of attacking critical infrastructure 
facilities. 
Military Theory and Target Selection
We must not start our thinking on war with the tools of war—with the airplanes, 
tanks, ships, and those who crew them. These tools are important and have their 
place, but they cannot be our starting point, nor can we allow ourselves to see them 
as the essence of war. Fighting is not the essence of war, nor even a desirable part 
of it. The real essence is doing what is necessary to make the enemy accept our 
objectives as his objectives. 
— Colonel John A. Warden, The Enemy as a System4
The primary component of the DHS critical infrastructure protection mission stems from the 
PPD-21 requirement to “reduce the risks to critical infrastructure [from] intrusions, attacks, 
or the effects of natural or man-made disasters.”5 To create a plan for the protection of 
critical facilities, the intentions of the enemy must first be understood. It is unlikely that 
a terrorist group operating in the United States has the capability to destroy a significant 
infrastructure target that provides life-sustaining services at the national level. A RAND 
terrorism risk modeling report, using a 10-ton explosive as the least likely type of bombing 
attack, found negligible terrorism risk outside of the top eight Urban Areas Security Initiative 
(UASI) cities, meaning that terrorists are not interested in targeting, and are not capable of 
destroying, the majority of infrastructure facilities across the country.6  
The current terrorist threat comes from homegrown militants and members of violent 
extremist groups who are motivated to inflict mass casualties by killing and injuring as 
many people as possible in a location that is accessible to the public.7 These individuals or 
small groups lack the intelligence, organizational coordination, manpower, and resources to 
conduct a strategic war campaign against nationally significant infrastructure targets.
Methods of Attack
Different military strategies have been taught and utilized by the United States and other 
modern militaries throughout history. The method of attack used is based on the strategic 
objectives, the ability to gather intelligence, military capabilities, and available resources. The 
Air Corps Tactical School theory8 states that targeted strikes to specific facilities or functions 
can result in economic destruction which would lead to social collapse and defeat of the 
enemy. Lt. Col. Peter Faber, an expert in strategic aerial warfare, theorizes that targeted 
strikes provide the means to win a war in the following manner: 
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1. Modern nations rely on industrial and economic systems for production of weapons and 
supplies for their armed forces, for manufacture of products, and provision of services 
to sustain life. Disruption or paralysis of these systems undermines both the enemy’s 
capability and will to fight. 
2. Industrial and economic systems contain critical points, the destruction of which will 
break down these systems if bombs can be delivered with adequate accuracy to do this.
3. Air strike forces can penetrate air defenses without unacceptable losses and destroy 
selected targets. 
4. Proper selection of vital targets in the industrial/economic/social structure of an 
industrialized nation, and their subsequent destruction by air attack, can lead to fatal 
weakening of an industrialized enemy nation and to victory through air power.9
Winning a war by employing targeted strikes requires knowledge of the enemy’s key systems, 
intelligence to understand and select the critical points, having forces capable of making the 
attack, and avoiding unacceptable losses.10
Colonel Warden’s The Enemy as a System11 addresses infrastructure as the systems that are so 
important that “even minor damage to essential industries may lead the command element 
to make concessions.”12 The concessions may come because: 
•	 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) leads to the collapse of the 
system.13
•	 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) makes it physically difficult or 
impossible to maintain a certain policy or to fight.14 
•	 Damage to organic essentials/essential systems (CI) has internal political or economic 
repercussions that are too costly to bear.”15
The homeland security definition of Critical Infrastructure (CI) is very similar to Warden’s 
concept of organic essentials. DHS defines CI as “the assets, systems, and networks, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would 
have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof.”16 Warden states that organic essentials cause a collapse 
of the system, which is the same as saying “debilitating effects.” The systems that make it 
impossible to maintain a fight are the systems “vital to security, national public health, and 
safety.” The organic essentials that cause great political and economic repercussions are the 
same as those that endanger the “national economic security.” Thus, the current definition 
that DHS uses to describe CI closely aligns with Warden’s organic essentials to target during 
strategic warfare.
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan operates under the assumption that “both 
domestic and international critical infrastructure assets represent potential prime targets 
for adversaries. Given the deeply rooted nature of these goals and motivations, critical 
infrastructure likely will remain highly attractive targets for state and non-state actors and 
others with ill intent.”17 Based on this research, infrastructure protection (IP) efforts are 
framed under an inaccurate assumption of the terrorist threat to them. CI protection policies 
should not focus on large-scale attacks to facilities when they have not been the target of the 
largest domestic terrorist attacks and have rarely been the target of the 130,000 terrorist 
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attacks across the world over the last 50 years. Terrorists have not previously targeted 
infrastructure and are unlikely to change their intentions in the future, which means that the 
way DHS views protecting infrastructure and preventing terrorism needs to be reformed.
Much of the current IP analysis conducted by DHS focuses on the attributes of individual 
facilities within separate functional sectors or subsectors of infrastructure. Military warfare 
strategies hinge on understanding the entire system that allows an enemy to function and 
then targeting the weaknesses that cause failures across the system. The focus on individual 
facilities that provide separate functions lacks the network-wide viewpoint necessary to 
understand criticalities and assign priorities within the entire infrastructure system, which 
prevents DHS from accomplishing the statutory protection mission.
Series Warfare
Unlike targeted strikes that are carried out with aircraft, in series warfare, 
a commander concentrates forces in order to prevail against a single vulnerable part 
of the enemy’s forces. If the commander prevails, the army regroups forces and 
moves on to attack another point in the enemy’s defense. While the attacking army 
regroups, the enemy army may counterattack or move to defend another position.18 
This back and forth process is termed “serial warfare” because of the “subsequent maneuver 
and counter-maneuver, attack and counterattack, and movement and pause.”19 Series 
warfare continues until either army does not have the capabilities or will to continue fighting.
Parallel Attack
Combining multiple waves of targeted attacks and series warfare is at the core of the concept 
of parallel attacks which destroy a wide array of essential systems. The most important 
element of the parallel attack is understanding the targets that hold the highest value to the 
enemy system. Once the system is understood, a strategy must be developed to damage 
or paralyze it. A nation is likely to have a “small number of vital targets at the strategic 
level because most systems only cause localized disruptions if damaged.”20 The nationally 
significant targets “tend to be small, very expensive, have few backups, and are hard to 
repair.”21 These targets align with the same concept as DHS’s definition of CI, which are 
interdependent systems that cause system-wide failures.
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Figure 1: Process of Actions during Strategic Warfare
If a significant percentage of key targets are struck in parallel, the damage becomes 
insurmountable. The enemy can mitigate the effects of serial attacks by “dispersing 
the location of critical targets, by increasing the defenses of targets that are likely to be 
attacked, concentrating resources to repair damage to single targets, or conducting a 
counteroffensive.”22 The purpose of the parallel attack is to target the attacks in a manner 
that deprives the enemy of the ability to respond effectively to mitigate the impacts. The 
higher the number of significant targets destroyed during each set of strikes, the higher 
the likelihood of debilitating the enemy.23 The current DHS strategy of protecting CI by 
adding redundancies and hardening targets directly relates to the concept of identifying 
and protecting key targets from the parallel attack.
Mass Casualty Attacks
Online publications, such as The Islamic State’s Dabiq and Al Qaeda’s Inspire, have provided 
instructions for supporters to carry out small-scale attacks with homemade conventional 
explosive and small arms. The intent of these attacks is to inflict as many deaths and injuries 
as possible by targeting crowded public areas and special events. An example of this tactic 
was the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing attack where two radicalized individuals 
produced small homemade explosives that were detonated at the crowded finish line area 
of the city’s annual marathon. 
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Figure 2: Process of Actions Occurring During Conventional Terrorist Attacks
The likely purpose of these attacks on the general public was to kill and injure people to cause 
fear. A terrorist attack of this manner on infrastructure would serve a different purpose 
than a focused military strike on infrastructure intended to cause cascading impacts to the 
systems that underpin the functions of the United States.
Mutually Assured Destruction
The underlying theory of nuclear war between multiple super-power nations is that if a 
nuclear weapon were detonated, mutually assured destruction would occur to all nations 
involved due to nuclear counterattacks. In the end, nobody would win the nuclear war 
because the casualties and damage on every side would be catastrophic.
The mutually assured destruction concept is applicable to planning critical infrastructure 
protection based on the size of an attack that would be required to damage a critical system. 
If a terrorist group were to obtain and use the massive amount of explosives (a theoretical 
10,000 pounds or more of explosives exceeding the size of the Oklahoma City federal 
building attack) that would be needed to destroy a large dam, that group would be assuring 
its own destruction because the full power of the country’s military and law enforcement 
agencies would be focused on responding. It is unrealistic to plan for, or protect against, 
attacks of this scope at infrastructure facilities because it is unlikely that terrorist groups 
could obtain, utilize, or even be motivated to possess such a large quantity of explosives. 
Increasing physical security at a facility with taller fences and stricter identification checks 
designed to stop a small-scale attack would also not deter the large-scale attacker who has 
already accepted that mutually assured destruction.
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Warden’s Five Ring System Theory
Warden’s five-ring system theory is a concentric ring concept, as shown in Figure 3, of 
targeting the central rings that hold the highest strategic value (the central ring is also the 
smallest target). In the rings beyond the highest value targets, the targets become larger 
but have less strategic significance. Warden selected five general systems that he believed 
were key centers of gravity to exploit against any enemy (leadership, organic essentials,24 
infrastructure, population, and fielded military forces). 
Figure 3: Warden’s Five-Ring System Theory25
Warden’s model provides a framework for how to defeat an enemy through destruction of 
critical components instead of engaging in combat with a conventional army.26 This strategy 
is only effective if the attacker has the ability to identify and plan strategically how to destroy 
each of those systems in a specific order.27 If military theorists trained in Warden’s approach 
looked at how to identify and protect domestic infrastructure, they would likely think of it in 
terms of a concentric ring-based system. Warden’s theory aligns with DHS’s tiered approach 
to infrastructure protection as demonstrated by the target capabilities list, the national 
asset database, and annual  mandatory threat, hazard, and risk assessments (THIRA) for 
states, counties, and local jurisdictions. 
A flaw in applying Warden’s theory to domestic infrastructure protection is that the strategic 
values of the targets within each ring are not static. Leadership can be adaptive and resilient, 
the relationships between systems can be too complex to understand completely, and most 
adversaries lack the resources necessary to conduct parallel attacks across a vast array of 
domestic targets.28 These same problems are also evident in current critical infrastructure 
protection policies because as facilities are hardened, demand for services changes, 
populations shift, different technologies are developed, and the criticality of infrastructure 
facilities also changes. Compounding the problem, the concentric ring system is ineffective 
if the wrong facilities are identified as being the key targets. Placing non-essential systems 
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into the central rings creates a large core rather than concentric rings that delineate the 
importance of different assets.
Warden’s theory depends on taking a snapshot of the enemy system and carefully analyzing 
it to understand the weaknesses in the system. This same strategy is not an effective 
method for analyzing vulnerabilities to domestic infrastructure over an extended period of 
time. Conducting assessments of infrastructure and creating tiered lists of resources would 
provide strategic planners with snapshots of the critical systems. But because the systems 
are not static, the value of targets changes over time and the target list becomes less and 
less useful. The effectiveness of the target list would also be contingent on how completely 
it captured the entirety of the system. Identifying individual facilities would only be useful 
if their destruction caused the cascading impacts that could cripple the essential functions 
of the enemy. The process of identifying these interdependencies would require an analysis 
of the entire system to determine the points of failure and then tracing the failures back 
to identify individual facilities as key targets. The current DHS policy identifies sectors of 
infrastructure and then identifies individual facilities within the separate sectors. This 
approach lacks the key “enemy as a system” concept of understanding the interdependencies 
and identifying the specific points of failure in the system. These points of failure are not 
broad sets of infrastructure systems; they are small areas of high strategic value in the 
center of the concentric rings.
Terrorism Differs from Strategic Warfare
The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the March 11, 2004 train 
bombings in Madrid, the July 7, 2005 London transit bombings, the 2010 attempted Atlantic 
airline bombings with ink cartridges concealing explosives, the 2015 Paris attacks, and the 
2016 Brussels airport bombing are all examples of how the most sophisticated terrorist 
attacks in recent history are different from strategic warfare. 
These attacks were not targeted strikes against essential systems intended to cripple an 
enemy population. The Madrid29 and London30 attacks targeted transportation systems and 
occurred along busy transit pathways. However, the attacks did not target the key hubs of 
the system or cause cascading outages throughout the transportation system. The same 
attacks carried out in more carefully selected locations could have caused wider impacts to 
the transportation system and inflicted a greater number of casualities. The Brussels airport 
bombing targeted the most accessible area of the facility rather than an essential part of 
the system required to direct, land, load, or fuel aircraft. If these attacks were strategically 
targeted strikes intended to cripple transportation system, they would have occurred in a 
different manner.
These major terrorist attacks also did not follow the concepts of series warfare in which an 
attack is mounted, resources are regrouped, and a subsequent attack occurs. Following the 
plane crashes at the WTC and the Pentagon, no plan or operation was in place for a second 
wave of attacks. If the 9/11 attacks were part of a series warfare strategy, a second operation 
would have already been underway but was not.31 The same was true of the European transit 
bombings and the Paris bombings where coordinated attacks occurred, but no second or 
third wave of subsequent attacks were prepared to occur in quick succession.
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While the 9/11 attacks and the European transit bombings targeted multiple locations, these 
attacks were not examples of a parallel attack strategy either. A parallel attack simultaneously 
strikes the key facilities in an area causing a crippling effect across the entire system. These 
significant terrorist attacks did not cripple the individual systems that they targeted (e.g., 
striking the Pentagon did not shut down the U.S. military) or cause cascading impacts that 
crippled other essential systems. Each attack caused isolated impacts to a single component 
of the infrastructure system.
The timing and location of the 9/11 and Madrid transit attacks also demonstrate that the 
attacks were not intended to cause the maximum number of casualities possible. While 
50,000 people worked in the original WTC towers, the attack occurred before 9:00 a.m. 
when most people get to work.32 Instead of potentially killing 50,000 people, 2,977 people 
died when the plane struck at 8:46 a.m.33 Al Qaeda operatives spent years planning the 
9/11 attack so it seems unlikely that they would have chosen to strike before 9:00 a.m. if the 
intent was to carry out a mass causality attack that would kill as many people as possible.
Figure 4:Warden’s Five-Ring System Theory Applied to DHS Critical Infrastructure Sectors
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Based on Warden’s concentric rings theory, each of the terrorist attacks targeted the 
outermost rings that consist of the population and the fielded forces. If the terrorist attacks 
were strategic in nature, they would have likely tried to target the inner rings to cause more 
disruption across the entire country. Attacks targeting the inner rings could have been the 
New York Stock Exchange or the White House.34
Historically Terrorists do not Target 
Critical Infrastructure
Improvised explosives, vehicle borne explosives, and firearms were the primary weapons 
used in more than 99% of terrorist attacks according to the Mineta Transportation Institute 
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence study of multiple terrorism attack 
databases.35 While these types of attacks have the power to kill people and cause damage 
to property, they do not have the destructive capability to cease the functions of most 
critical infrastructure facilities, such as power plants, telecommunications hubs, dams, 
water treatment facilities, regional transportation systems, and so on. Why is protection 
of facilities providing essential infrastructure functions a primary goal of DHS when these 
facilities are rarely targeted, and do not align with the motivation for terrorist groups?
Protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks is a primary mission of DHS, but 
the execution of this mission is flawed in many ways. Current policies and procedures look at 
targets in a different way than how a terrorist would select a target for attack. The protection 
of potential targets is designed around methods of attack that are different from how the 
majority of terrorist attacks are carried out. The consequences of an attack on a target 
are assessed based on the number of deaths, injuries, and dollars rather than the public 
exposure or alignment with an ideology that the target represents. Following similar ideas 
as the book, From the Terrorist’s Point of View, rather than refine the approach to identify 
threats, current practice is to cast a larger and larger net, which requires greater resources 
for smaller results.36
Fear—The Critical Strategy of Terrorism
Terrorism experts including Bruce Hoffman argue that large-scale terrorist attacks with 
weapons of mass destruction (which have never occurred) and large events like the 9/11 
attacks on the WTC are counter-productive strategies for terrorist groups. Small-scale attacks 
cause “disproportionately enormous consequences, generate fear and alarm, and thus 
serve the terrorists’ purposes just as well as a larger weapon or more ambitious attack.”37 
According to Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “a heightened sense of crisis can lead to political 
disaffection and diminished confidence in the government,”38 and the resulting fear and 
anxiety across the population from the attack aligns better with terrorists’ goals of political 
or social changes than inflicting mass destruction or causalities. For example, Osama Bin 
Laden’s attacks on the United States prior to September 11, 2001 were also attempting to 
erode public support and cause political pressure to remove U.S. forces from the Middle 
East. These attacks were intended to erode the general public’s support of U.S. leaders, not 
to kill the entire American population. As Bruce Bonger argues, 
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It is not surprising that fear and apprehension can have considerable political 
consequences. Affective influences on attention, memory, and judgment contribute 
to the widespread experience of disproportionate vulnerability and looming threat 
appraisal that make terrorism a more psychologically complex phenomenon.39
Osama Bin Laden’s Strategy
While the conventional army wants to conquer territory at the lowest cost, Osama Bin Laden’s 
strategy was the opposite. Instead of wanting to invade America and take over resources, 
his plan was to draw the United States into a prolonged and unwinnable military conflict in 
the Middle East that would eventually bankrupt this country. In 2004, Bin Laden delivered 
the message that: 
all that we have to do is to send two Mujahedin to the farthest point East to raise a 
piece of cloth on which is written al-Qa’ida in order to make the generals race there to 
cause America to suffer human economic and political losses without their achieving 
for it anything of note other than some benefits to their private companies. This is in 
addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to 
fight tyrannical superpowers as we alongside the Mujahedin bled Russia for 10 years 
until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. So we are continuing this 
policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.40
Bid Laden’s motivation for waging this style of war stemmed from his view of his territory as 
being under occupation and the strategy was designed to make the continued deployment 
of U.S. troops unsustainable. In his videotaped messages, Bin Laden states, “we fight you 
because we are free men who don’t sleep under oppression. We want to restore freedom 
to our Nation and just as you lay waste to our Nation, so shall we lay waste to yours.”41 Bin 
Laden’s message showed no interest in invading the United States or eradicating the entire 
American public.
This freedom fighter warfare strategy is problematic for a conventional military because of 
the imbalance between the extreme expense of a maintaining a remotely-deployed modern 
military force with the minimal expense of conducting guerilla operations with a small 
number of operatives and homemade explosives.
Homeland Security Enterprise versus 
Homegrown Violent Extremists
The same imbalances in the costs of waging warfare exist between the thousands of law 
enforcement agencies within the homeland security enterprise and their battle against 
individual homegrown violent extremists who self-radicalize to conduct jihad against 
domestic targets.
In 2010, Al Qaeda transitioned to a “death by a thousand cuts” strategy, which focused on a 
high volume of low cost attacks. An example was the plot to use bombs in printer cartridges 
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to destroy planes. This plot had an estimated cost of $4,20042 but would have done hundreds 
of millions of dollars in damage to the aviation industry by destroying two Boeing 747 aircraft 
valued at more than $200 million each,43 and causing subsequent groundings of other 
flights.44 Similar to the problems that have resulted from prolonged military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the cost of maintaining thousands of intelligence analysts and law 
enforcement officers dedicated to counter-terrorism is unsustainably expensive, while the 
cost of conducting small-scale terrorist operations is a minimal expense for Al Qaeda or ISIS.
Both Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine and the Islamic State’s Dabiq offer similar guidance to 
future jihadists to conduct small attacks close to home. There are examples of this message 
in Dabiq No. 6 asserting that  “the Muslims will continue to defy the kāfir war machine, 
flanking the crusaders on their own streets and bringing the war back to their own soil.”45 
The Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting is a stark example of this low-cost warfare strategy 
because online videos and propaganda materials alone can provide enough motivation to 
draw vulnerable individuals to jihad and virtual affiliation with ISIS.46 
Terrorist Target Selection—Maximum Exposure not 
Critical Functions
The use of fear as a tactic makes the target selection for a terrorist attack even more 
complicated to determine. As Bruce Bonger points out, “the potential for misplaced threat-
related priorities may represent a particularly daunting challenge for the United States, 
which can anticipate a vast array of possible terrorist targets and methods, but relative to 
many areas of conflict, it has had little historical experience with terrorist attacks.”47
Without a framework of past experience with terrorism, DHS likely used conventional military 
strategies to identify domestic infrastructure. One of these sources was likely Sun Tzu’s war 
strategy, which centered on defeating the enemy with the least amount of effort possible. 
This same strategy has been utilized by the United States in the air bombing campaigns 
against Iraq. Using Warden’s theory of concentric rings, the highest value targets (the 
leadership and most critical systems) are targeted to cripple the remainder of the country. 
Precise attacks to the strategic core leave the population mostly unharmed. 
Terrorism is not about conquering the enemy or using strategic strikes. Since the objectives 
of a terrorist group are different from an army, critical facilities have lower value and are 
less likely to be targeted. The intent of the terrorist is to send a message and gain maximum 
exposure, but not necessarily cripple the functions of the target. Of the 125,087 incidents 
in the Global Terrorism Database, more than 74,000 had no injuries and 90% had fewer 
than 10 injuries from the attack. Nearly 63,000 incidents also had no fatalities and more 
than 90% of incidents also had fewer than 10 fatalities.48  This small number of injuries and 
deaths occurred even though 59,982 of the incidents were bombings/explosions targeting 
primarily private citizens, businesses, military, and government. As shown in Figure 5, less 
than .5% of the attacks were against telecommunications systems, which would be a high 
value strategic target to cripple infrastructure. 
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Figure 5: Terrorist Attack Targets by Type
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 2015, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo Subway using sarin is an example of a terrorist 
attack that occurred at a critical transportation facility, but the intent of the attack was not 
to disrupt operations or functions of the transportation system. The doomsday cult held a 
belief that the Japanese government was corrupt and responsible for a pending apocalypse, 
so they believed that a shocking attack would result in the people of Japan prescribing to 
the Aum Shinrikyo beliefs. This attack was deadly, but it did not cause any damage to an 
infrastructure system. It was an attack on a mass gathering of people inside a vulnerable 
area.49
Another terrorist group focused on the message of the attack rather than the death and 
destruction caused by it was the IRA. It was a standard practice of the IRA to call in and 
report bombings prior to the explosion because the intent of attack was not to harm 
civilians.50 Based on the Global Terrorism Database, in 74,838 of 125,087 attacks (59.8%), no 
injuries occurred. Mass injuries harming more than 100 people occurred less than .08% of 
the time.51 In the majority of cases, the goal of a terrorist attack has been to send a message 
rather than cause widespread harm.
In the video tape Osama Bin Laden released taking credit for the 9/11 attack, he said, “the 
Twin Towers were legitimate targets, they were supporting U.S. economic power. These 
events were great by all measurement. What was destroyed were not only the towers, but 
the towers of morale in that country.”52 Bin Laden’s statement makes it clear that the attack 
was not intended to destroy the American economy or collapse the infrastructure of New 
York City; the purpose of the attack was to scare the American people and damage their 
morale. Like those conducted by the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and Aum Shinrikyo, the attack 
was a message, not a targeted strike on critical infrastructure systems.
When considering the facilities at risk for a terrorist attack, the DHS’s infrastructure 
protection policies do not align to the most frequent targets for terrorist groups around the 
world. Shown in Figure 5, the most common targets are private citizens, police, military, and 
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government (general and diplomatic), accounting for 70% of all attacks. Facilities providing 
purely infrastructure functions, such as telecommunications and utilities, were targeted in 
4.4% of attacks. 
Terrorist’s Motivation—Attention and Reward
Conventional thinking about terrorist tactics and targets would suggest that they want 
to inflict the most damage possible. For this reason, standard practices for protecting 
critical infrastructure include building fences, installing traffic bollards, monitoring security 
cameras, and screening visitors at locations such as government buildings, commercial 
offices, stadium, hotels, casinos, sports arenas, and museums. These measures are 
designed to prevent the terrorist from reaching the facility by building a fortress around it. 
Unfortunately, the motivation for terrorist attacks is also distinctly different from a targeted 
military strike designed to cripple the infrastructure systems of the enemy. The attack is 
not about destroying the function of the physical system; it is about sending a message to 
society. That message can be sent by detonating an explosive beyond the security perimeter 
at points where civilians must congregate to enter the facility as was the case with Brussels 
airport bombing.
The functions of a “terrorist attack can include:
•	 Showing that the authorities are weak and vulnerable to attacks
•	 Proving that the authorities are unable to control events
•	 Lowering allegiances to the authority institutions
•	 Creating a sense of instability and lawlessness in society
•	 Creating a sense of helplessness among the population
•	 Giving the impression of terrorist organizations as being very powerful
•	 Giving the impression that there will be no end to terrorist attacks until a final 
victory”53
These functions of a terrorist attack are not exclusive to Islamic extremists. The same 
fundamental goals motivated groups like the IRA, Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo Subway 
sarin attack, and domestic lone-wolf attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing. In each case, 
employing a strategy of protecting physical facilities does not deter attacks or prevent 
terrorists from accomplishing their functions.
Difference Between Critical and Targetable 
Infrastructure
A potential point of confusion in the infrastructure protection mission is the difference 
between facilities that are part of an infrastructure system and locations that are attractive 
targets for terrorism. While a water treatment plant might be a critical infrastructure facility, 
its remote location, inaccessibility to the general public, and lack of people at the site would 
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make it an unattractive target for a terrorist. Inversely, an outdoor concert might not serve 
any infrastructure function, but due to the large crowds and open access to the area, it could 
be an attractive location for terrorist attack. 
By looking at the types of facilities attacked in the Global Terrorism Database, a difference 
can be seen between a “targetable” facility and a “critical infrastructure” facility. Looking 
more specifically at domestic terrorist attacks that have caused 1–10 fatalities or injuries 
(Figure 6), the Global Terrorism Database includes 149 incidents from 1973 to 2014.54 The 
two attacks targeting utilities include the 2012 attempted bombing of a gas pipeline by a 
sovereign citizen in Plano City, Texas,55 and the utility targeted by the New World Liberation 
Front in 1976.56 The majority of attacks target government, police, private citizens, educational 
institutions, and businesses. Infrastructure systems including airports, transportation, and 
utilities are seldom the target. During the recent attack in Brussels, even though the main 
terminal of the Zaventem International Airport was targeted by terrorists during the April 
2016 bombing, the location was chosen because it was publicly accessible, not because it 
was a critical node in the overall operations of the airport. The Brussels attack targeted a 
vulnerable location where civilians congregated outside of the security perimeter.57 If the 
attack was against the airport as a component of the transportation infrastructure, the 
terrorists would have targeted the fuel storage system, power substation, air traffic control 
tower, radar system, baggage-screening area, or another key node upon which the entire 
airport was dependent. The seven airport and aircraft attacks cited within the START data 
represent similar circumstances to the recent Brussels attack. When airports had minimal 
security, they were vulnerable to attacks in which terrorists could hijack a plane and take the 
defenseless passengers hostage. Today the vulnerable point beyond airport security is now 
an attractive target.58
Figure 6: Domestic Attacks Causing 1–10 Fatalities/Injuries
From “Global Terrorism Database, Search Results: 141966 Incidents,” accessed July 22, 2015, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
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Since 1970, eight terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States that have killed or 
injured more than 101 people, as shown in Table 1. These incidents include: the 2016 
Orlando, FL Nightclub Shooting; the 2013 Boston, MA Marathon Bombing; the 9/11 attack 
at the Pentagon in Arlington, VA; the 9/11 attack at the WTC in New York, NY; the 9/11 plane 
crash in Shanksville, PA; the 1996 Olympic bombing in Atlanta, GA; the Oklahoma City 
federal building bombing in 1995; and the 1984 biological (salmonella) attack in The Dalles, 
Oregon.59 The target of each attack was selected to send a specific message from the group 
responsible. In each case, the attack did not cause a significant disruption to infrastructure 
or the functions of the facility attacked, the surrounding facilities, or government (local, 
state, or federal).
Table 1: Terrorist Attacks Causing more than 101 Deaths or Injuries in the United States 
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As these eight attacks demonstrate, targeting and injuring a large number of people does not 
align with attacking a facility that provides essential infrastructure functions to the nation or 
region. In each case, the disruptions to essential infrastructure services were nonexistent or 
minimal in even the immediate areas adjacent to where the attacks occurred. 
Why does critical infrastructure protection policy focus on large-scale attacks to infrastructure 
facilities when they have not been the target of the largest domestic terrorist attacks, and 
were rarely the target of the 130,000 terrorist attacks across the world over the last 50 years?
Terrorists are interested in attacking locations that are accessible, crowded with people, 
have minimal security, and will draw the interest of the general public and the media. The 
eight major terrorist attacks on the United States fit these criteria. For example, the Olympic 
Park in Atlanta, Georgia was accessible to the general public and had no security screenings. 
On the local scale, the 10 restaurant salad bars targeted in the 1984 salmonella attacks were 
easily accessible to the terrorist group, frequented by the public, and the consequences 
were intended to be widespread across the community.63 The attack at the Boston Marathon 
targeted an event that was open to the general public, did not have security screenings, 
drew large crowds, and would draw international media attention. The Boston Marathon 
attack did not directly target transportation or specific infrastructure functions in Boston 
with the intent of crippling the city’s essential functions.
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The November 13, 2015 coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, France further highlight the 
selection of accessible targets over those that provide critical functions.  The simultaneous 
terrorist attacks in Paris targeted Le Bataclan (concert venue), Le Petit Cambodge (restaurant), 
Le Carillon (restaurant), Stade de France (stadium), Les Halles (shopping center), The Louvre 
(museum), and La Belle Equipe (restaurant).64  Each of these targets were areas likely to 
contain a large number of people on a Friday night, but none of these locations included 
a critical infrastructure system that would have a cascading impact on the essential-to-
life functions of the city.  Seven groups of terrorists armed with automatic weapons and 
explosives could have likely damaged bridges, power distribution equipment, water 
treatment facilities, transportation hubs, or other infrastructure systems but their intent 
was not to attack infrastructure systems.
A terrorist’s interest lies not in the functions that a facility provides, such as a high demand 
electrical substation responsible for regional power distribution, but instead focuses on 
publicly accessible areas that are high-visibility locations for attacks. Targetability is the 
primary motivation of the terrorist over the criticality of the facility to the interconnected 
infrastructure system.
Conclusion
Modern military theories provide a potential explanation for the focus of DHS’s efforts 
because the threats from terrorism have likely been evaluated by senior officials who draw 
on their education and experiences with the principles of strategic warfare. Nationally 
significant infrastructure facilities that can cripple the essential functions of the entire 
country if destroyed would be attractive targets for an enemy nation-state to strike with 
ballistic missile and airpower capabilities during a war. The current terrorist threat comes 
from homegrown violent extremists and members of terrorist groups who are motivated 
to inflict mass casualties in the locations that are most visible and easily accessible.65 An 
individual terrorist or a small group of terrorists most likely lack the intelligence, organizational 
coordination, manpower, and resources to conduct a strategic warfare campaign against 
nationally significant infrastructure targets with the intent of crippling essential-to-life 
systems across the country. The strategic warfare approach of developing a static list of 
vulnerable assets does not match the unpredictable and dynamic threat from terrorism. 
The current IP policies identify the likely targets of a nation-state military and assume them 
to be the same targets that terrorists would have the intention and capability of attacking.
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan operates under the assumption that “both 
domestic and international critical infrastructure assets represent potential prime targets 
for adversaries. Given the deeply rooted nature of these goals and motivations, critical 
infrastructure likely will remain highly attractive targets for state and non-state actors and 
others with ill intent.”66 Based on this research, infrastructure protection efforts are framed 
under an inaccurate assumption of the terrorist threat to them. Protection policies should 
not focus on large-scale attacks to facilities when they have not been the target of the largest 
domestic terrorist attacks and have rarely been the target of the 130,000 terrorist attacks 
across the world over the last 50 years. A possible solution in the mission of protecting 
critical infrastructure can be refined through a psychological approach to evaluate why a 
terrorist attacks, the likely method of attack, and the type of target that would align with the 
desired results. Unlike conventional  warfare, terrorists view their tactics as a driver for social 
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change, making their highest value targets different from those chosen by a conventional 
army commander.
The flaw in using a strategy that aims to prevent all types of attacks is compounded by the 
extreme difficulty of identifying individuals who are terrorists.67 The focus on protecting 
critical infrastructure has been identifying all possible targets then building better barriers, 
installing more security and surveillance systems, and gathering large amounts of real 
time intelligence. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine who will become a terrorist 
before they strike, and it is impractical to fortify every potential target to withstand every 
possible type of attack. Protection policies should  focus instead on determining the most 
likely targets and the most realistic forms of attack based on goals and capabilities of the 
terrorist groups. In most cases, the most likely targets are not the most critical facilities to 
the infrastructure system. 
Terrorists have not previously targeted infrastructure and are unlikely to change their 
intentions in the future. The most recent terrorist attack on U.S. soil, which also was the most 
deadly shooting in the country’s history, targeted a nightclub that served no infrastructure 
function and had no interconnectivity to any type of infrastructure systems or facilities. 
Based on the historical and current targets of terrorists, the way DHS views protecting 
infrastructure and preventing terrorism needs to be reformed to remove the focus on the 
facilities that hold strategic value in a war between nation-states.  
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Abstract
The rise of social media and the broad diffusion of ‘smart devices’ in contemporary society 
have profound implications for crisis management. The emergence of social media and smart 
devices pose both major challenges and major opportunities to crisis managers (c.f. Palen, 
2008; Veil et 2011).  These social practices and technologies change rapidly which can create 
difficulties for organizations seeking to incorporate them into their preparedness and crisis 
management efforts. This article unpacks crisis management into a number of key tasks 
(Boin et al, 2005) and identifies a number of aspects of social media enabled by personal 
communications technology of particular relevance to these tasks.  The article concludes 
with a set of practically-oriented observations relevant to the ongoing effort to bring social 
media and smart devices into crisis preparedness.
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Introduction
The rise of social media and the dramatic proliferation of ‘smartphones’, tablets, smartwatches 
and other forms of wearable devices in recent years have profound implications for the 
management of public and private life, not only under normal conditions, but also in times 
of crisis.   The potent combination of social media and smart devices pose both challenges 
and tremendous opportunities for crisis managers.1  These social practices and technologies 
evolve rapidly and are thus a moving target for organizations seeking to incorporate them into 
their preparedness and crisis management efforts. This article unpacks crisis management 
into a set of key tasks2 and identifies aspects of social media of particular relevance to these 
tasks.  In addition, a number of observations relevant to the complex, challenging and 
multidimensional task of bringing social media into crisis preparedness are made. 
Why do social media and the rise of the smartphone present such serious challenges—
and dramatic opportunities—to crisis communicators and crisis managers writ large?  Social 
media have been developing, diversifying, and expanding their reach in a highly dynamic and 
multi-directional fashion.  Media organizations traditionally operated in a one-way mode in 
which media gatekeepers selectively gathered and distributed information to the public. 
Contemporary social and hybrid communications media now facilitate and incorporate a 
variety of multidirectional, decentralized conversations among citizens themselves as well 
as among citizens, journalists, and elites.  In this sense social media are highly participatory. 
Though it has been suggested by Malcolm Gladwell3 among others that social media are 
primarily about relatively weak social ties among large numbers of acquaintances, in fact 
social media support both weak and strong (close friends, family, and colleagues) ties.  In 
crisis situations, therefore, people are potentially communicating with and taking real time 
behavioral cues from the words and deeds of those closest to them, from others in their 
physical and online communities, as well as from various public and authority figures.4  Social 
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media are constantly developing and changing, reaching broader and broader demographics 
and developing new, dramatic, and potentially disruptive capabilities.  Familiar platforms 
evolve and branch out while new ones regularly appear on the scene.   Facebook not only 
expands its repertoire for expressive emotions and opinions about posts, but also develops 
specialized capabilities for enabling people to report their status and inquire about others 
in disasters.   The familiar ability of YouTube to serve as a partially curated platform for 
uploading and publishing videos is complemented by the ‘revolutionary’ ability of more 
recent social video media (e.g. Periscope and the new Facebook Live functionality)  to stream 
personal video live and in real time.   Social media  and other related web-based and smart 
device-enabled services such as Craigslist, Angie’s list, Uber and TaskRabbit serve to radically 
reduce transaction costs and help buyers to find sellers or service providers and compare 
prices with greatly enhanced speed, efficiency, and accountability.  What we are seeing is an 
enormous expansion, acceleration, and diversification with regard to the production and 
consumption of information. 
These developments have profound implications for public policy and politics in general—
and for risk and crisis management in particular.   The debate regarding controversial issues 
rages in new, highly visible and accessible fora.  The competitive nature of the market for 
advice as well as processes of opinion-making and taking has sharpened considerably.  A 
wider variety of views are made available more easily to broader and broader segments 
of the population on a 24/7 basis.  This socio-technical infrastructure of communication— 
that brings the world to one’s hand as well as one’s computer —facilitates not only rapid 
mobilization of opinion coalitions with regard to policy issues but also the potential for 
equally rapid counter-mobilizations.  Furthermore, and this realization is as yet unevenly 
distributed in both government and the corporate world, social media and the smartphone 
revolution provide new means of documenting and spreading the word about alleged 
injustices, insensitivities, or incompetence.   In other words, much as traditional mass media 
have provided alternative means of holding government and industry accountable, so too 
do social media and smartphones provide new and powerful means in this regard.5   To take 
just one obvious example, the ubiquity of camera phones with both still and video capability 
– along with the proliferation of body and dashboard cameras is changing the conditions 
of policing – for better and worse.  The power of images, and especially video, portraying 
apparent examples of unjustified use of(often deadly)force is unmistakable as indicated in 
the many cases which have gone viral—from Ferguson, Missouri to New York City, from 
South Carolina to Israel.  The deployment of these capabilities can both trigger crises (of 
legitimacy) for government and first responders and as we will see— also provide new and 
equally powerful means of managing them.
Given this socio-technical backdrop, this article explores the following questions:
• What are the core tasks of contemporary crisis management6 and what are the 
implications of the rise of social media and smart devices for these tasks?
• What are the key aspects of social media which should be taken into account 
when developing strategies and systems for crisis management (including crisis 
communication)?
The article departs from and draws upon the growing literature on this topic7 and builds 
on research8 conducted in conjunction with the European Union 7th Framework Program 
Project ATHENA.9
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Crisis Management Tasks and the 
Implications of Social Media and Smart 
Devices
Several decades of intensive empirical research10 and practical experience of crisis 
management in contemporary governmental/nongovernmental settings shows that 
organizations and their leaders face recurring challenges when confronted with (the 
prospect of) community, societal, or international crises.11 These challenges are sense-
making, decision-making & coordination, meaning-making, accounting, and learning.  
Sensemaking12 in crisis refers to the challenging task of developing an adequate interpretation 
of what are often complex, dynamic, and ambiguous situations.13  This entails developing 
not only a picture of what is happening but also an understanding of the implications of the 
situation from one’s own vantage point and that of other salient stakeholders. As Alberts 
and Hayes14 put it:  “Sensemaking is much more than sharing information and identifying 
patterns. It goes beyond what is happening and what may happen to what can be done about 
it.”   Prior to a crisis, sensemaking is difficult due to attention scarcity, weak or conflicting 
signals regarding mounting threats, and a high degree of uncertainty.  Once it is clear that 
a crisis has occurred, a paradoxical combination of information overload and uncertainty/
scarcity regarding key parameters is common. Given the changes in the media and 
communications technology landscape noted above, it is clear that sensemaking efforts—
not only by government and non-governmental agencies involved in crisis/emergency 
response but also by ordinary citizens seeking to protect themselves— can be enhanced via 
crowdsourcing and communication facilitated by social media and personal communications 
technology (such as smart devices and computers).  These socio-technical platforms enable 
multidirectional exchange of information and provide windows into the perceptions, pre-
dispositions, and concerns (short term and longer term) of citizens and other members of 
the community.15  As such, social media-based information serves as a complement to other 
sources of information/intelligence.  Furthermore, empowered by personal communications 
devices and networks, individuals are now able to document and share (potentially time-
stamped and geo-tagged) text, images, and video also complementing more traditional 
situational reporting.
Before concluding the discussion of this task, it should be mentioned that the significant 
positive sense-making potential associated with citizen reporting in crisis and disasters is 
accompanied by certain risks and vulnerabilities. Social media and personal communications 
devices may be used not only to spread accurate and helpful information but also to spread 
inaccurate rumors, disinformation, or attempts to manipulate public opinion and discourses. 
However, this risk is thought to be at least partly mitigated by the self-correcting nature and 
“wisdom” of crowds—though researchers disagree to some extent regarding the timeliness 
and relative impact of such crowd-corrections with regard to social media discourses.16 
Decision-making and Coordination17 refers to the fact that crises tend to be experienced 
by crisis managers, first responders, and citizens alike as a series of ‘what do we do now’ 
problems triggered by the flow of events.  These decision occasions emerge simultaneously 
or in succession over the course of the crisis.18 Protecting communities tends to require an 
interdependent series of crucial decisions to be taken in a timely fashion under very difficult 
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conditions.  Increasingly, there is a recognition that public sector resources (and traditional 
command, control capacities) are unlikely to suffice when dealing with the larger scale, more 
complex, and challenging contingencies.  Recent experience from around the world—from 
Hurricane Sandy in the United States to the Christchurch Earthquakes in New Zealand— 
clearly demonstrates the power of social media and personal communications-based 
information to inform decision-making and enable more agile, flexible and decentralized 
forms of coordination.  This is critical both for leveraging the potential for community-
based response via self-organizing and for managing the interfaces between the public-
sector, private sector, and non-profit sector components of a whole of community/society 
response.19
Meaning-making and Crisis Communication20 refers to the fact that crisis managers —across 
sectors—must provide relevant information in a timely fashion, attending not only to the 
operational challenges associated with a contingency, but also to the ways in which various 
stakeholders and constituencies perceive and understand it. Because of the emotional 
charge associated with disruptive events, followers look to leaders—and to each other— 
to help them to understand the meaning of what has happened and place it a broader 
perspective.  By their words and deeds, leaders and other communicators can convey 
images of competence, control, stability, sincerity, decisiveness, hope and vision—or their 
opposites. 
Social media channels—including direct social media based communications by leaders 
on fora such as Twitter—have become a key arena in which information is exchanged and 
where alternative political visions as well as risk and situational assessments compete.21  A 
sound understanding of the discursive backdrop and the frames of reference of citizens and 
opinion leaders is essential to formulating and implementing effective strategies for crisis 
communication. 
The following points summarize some basics of strategic crisis communication as meaning 
making as well as some of the challenging contextual features associated with crises:22
Credibility is a key asset; guard it!  Communicators who start out with or quickly develop 
credibility deficits face a significant additional obstacle with regard to crisis communication. 
By contrast, communicators who are proactive about getting and sharing the most salient 
information, who promptly correct erroneous information and are circumspect about making 
and fulfilling promises will tend to maintain and even gain credibility over time. Credibility 
takes time to establish and rebuild, but can be destroyed in a single careless moment. 
• Crisis Management is hard; manage expectations.   Crises are, by definition, difficult to 
manage. Distinctive features include value complexity and conflict, time pressure, 
and profound uncertainties regarding hazards and threats, efficacy or consequences 
of possible solutions, and reactions by adversaries, allies, other key stakeholders, and 
the public. Though it is often tempting to project optimism and impressions of control, 
recognizing the severity of the challenges to be faced and overcome is generally a more 
prudent—and sustainable—posture.  Acknowledging the seriousness of the situation 
and sketching out the steps being taken to prepare and respond tends to inspire—and 
is more likely to maintain—public confidence than a rosy scenario overtaken by events. 
Furthermore, lower citizen and media expectations are easier to fulfill. 
• Crises provoke strong emotions and stress (for leaders and citizens alike).  Crises are 
often associated not only with high levels of negative (e.g. fear, anger, outrage, shame, 
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uncertainty) but also potentially with positive (courage, cooperation, pride, solidarity, 
focus) emotional states and expressions.  Crisis communicators must seek to understand 
and adapt communication to the emotional states of those with whom they need to 
communicate. 
• Conveying crucial information is important and difficult—but not enough.  The first—and 
difficult enough—hurdle of crisis management is to make sure that everyone—inside 
and outside of government—has the information they need to play effectively their 
roles in the crisis management effort and/or to protect themselves and their loved ones. 
This sounds simple, but is in practice a vital and yet often very difficult task, especially 
when information and communications infrastructure is degraded through physical 
damage or overloaded by crisis-related usage surges.  Challenging as it is, conveying 
crucial information is a necessary, but generally not sufficient, component of crisis 
communication. 
• Crises produce a demand for symbolic and emotional (as well as substantive) leadership. 
Those experiencing negative emotions such as the ones mentioned in the previous point 
tend to look to their leaders (and others who communicate on their behalf) for hope, 
inspiration, empathy,23 and guidance.  Citizens and employees expect leaders to inform 
themselves and recognize the importance of what has occurred, reach out to those who 
have suffered losses, affirm core community values, restore hope and point the way 
forward. 
Accounting24  refers to the demands placed on crisis actors to justify their actions— prior 
to, during, and in the aftermath of major crises and emergencies— to citizens, the media, 
organizational and political rivals, watchdog and/or advocacy groups, and in some cases 
to the courts.   The crisis literature identifies a number of questions likely to be posed in 
various accountability fora such as:
• Why was it not possible to prevent the crisis from occurring or more effectively mitigate 
the damage?     
• Why was the organization/society not better prepared?
• Why did delays, misunderstandings, miscoordination, miscommunication etc. occur?
• Why was the response not more effective, fair, legitimate etc.?
• Who is to blame for these alleged performance or fairness deficits?
The rise of social media and personal communications technology— as well as other forms of 
public/personal surveillance technology such as closed circuit television, police vehicle, body 
or helmet cameras etc. —  has profound implications for the accountability process.  The 
media, public sector accountability fora,  and other actors in public discourse are now provided 
with real time information, competing accounts regarding incidents, and feedback (though 
not necessarily sound, systematic, or reliable) regarding citizen reactions and satisfaction 
with services provided by crisis actors.  In other words, the scope, complexity, granularity, 
and accessibility of accountability-relevant information has increased dramatically. 
Effective learning25  requires an active, critical process which recreates, analyzes, and evaluates 
key processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to enhance performance, 
safety, capability etc. The learning process has just begun when a so-called lessons- learned 
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document has been produced. In order to bring the learning process to fruition, leaders 
must initiate effective change management / implementation in a fashion that leaves the 
organization with improved prospects for future success.26   See the discussion of social 
media as learning tool below for a more detailed discussion of the implications of social 
media for learning from crisis.
These observations demonstrate that in principle, the rise of social media and smart devices 
are highly relevant to core crisis management tasks.  However, from a policy-technology 
diffusion perspective, there is reason to assume that governments and other organizations 
in different countries and socio-technical contexts will be disposed and positioned to reap 
these potential benefits at different rates and to somewhat differing extents. Let us now 
delve a bit more deeply into some of the ways in which social media are relevant to crisis 
management in the era of smart devices.
Aspects of Social Media Relevant to Crisis 
Management: 7 Metaphors
While an ever- increasing number of organizations— including many in the spheres of 
homeland security, public health, and emergency management— have embraced social 
media, a holistic understanding of the phenomenon is often lacking and only some aspects 
are addressed with regard to bringing social media into crisis preparedness and management. 
In the interest of promoting a more comprehensive understanding and approach, a number 
of aspects of social media—each associated with a foundational metaphor—are articulated 
below.27  Social media can and should be understood in terms of the following aspects: 
channel, megaphone, arena, bank, radar, mirror, and learning tool.  [See Figure 1.below]
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Figure 1: Aspects of Social Media in Crisis Management
Channel:  The simplest—though still a very important— way of understanding social media 
is as an additional channel for getting the word out to significant constituencies.28  Thus, 
social media becomes yet another way of pushing information out to those a government 
agency, non-profit organization, or corporation wants to reach.   For example, during the 
recent Ebola outbreak, interest in the U.S. CDC emergency twitter feed reportedly rose 
dramatically, breaking the magic million mark in terms of followers (as of December 2016, the 
feed has 1.76 million followers).  Note that the channel metaphor focuses on more traditional 
one way communication—such as from an agency to the public. It is not surprising that early 
efforts to harness the power of social media for crisis communication purposes tended to 
emphasize this relatively familiar aspect. 
Megaphone:   Alternatively, social media can be seen as a megaphone, giving voice to persons 
or groups that might traditionally have been denied or had great difficulty in getting access 
to traditional media or the national stage.   This tends to bring alternative actors into the 
public conversation and can give them a platform for engaging in debate with regard to 
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risk and crisis issues.   From the perspective of government actors in homeland security, 
public health, and emergency management, this can be both vexing and challenging.  Self-
appointed experts of (from the perspective of official actors) suspect credentials and views 
may be able to use social media in ways that greatly amplify their exposure and impact. 
During the H1N1 Pandemic for example, public health officials interviewed expressed their 
frustration with the effectiveness with which anti-vaccination groups used their access to 
social media to promote views considered dubious—if not downright dangerous—by the 
established public health and medical communities.29  Furthermore, social media can be and 
is being used by terrorists of various kind to spread their own toxic messages, recruit and 
radicalize followers, not least as a virtual stage for dramatic acts of “performance violence.”30 
Arena:   Social media also serve as arenas for competitive communication of various kinds. 
Public, private, and non-profit actors alike compete for attention in social media, position 
themselves with regard to key constituencies, and debate controversial issues of public and 
foreign policy.  This metaphor serves as a reminder that communication does not take place 
in a vacuum, but rather against a backdrop of past, simultaneous, and anticipated future 
communications by rivals.   Communication strategies that might have been effective for 
an ‘unopposed’ organization may prove highly vulnerable to one whose every utterance is 
being critically examined by rival organizations. 
Mirror:   The poet Robert Burns once wrote:  “O, wad some Power the giftie gie us , To see 
oursels as others see us!” 31  Not so long ago, it was far more difficult, time consuming and 
expensive for crisis communicators to find out how their messaging was being received by 
the key constituencies.  In the age of social media, traditional strategies such as public opinion 
surveys or focus groups, have been complemented by the ability to follow instantaneous 
reaction to political and policy communications by the public, journalists and tweeting 
(talking) heads, as well as political opponents and allies.  Rapid feedback regarding how 
the organization, its spokespeople, and its message are being perceived can be invaluable. 
Social media can help to provide answers to urgent questions such as:
• How is the organization being perceived?
• Is the message attracting attention?
• Is the message reaching intended target groups?
• Is it having the intended effect?
• Who are the key competitors for influence on this issue?
• What competing advice or counter-arguments are surfacing?
• What, if any, misconceptions are in need of correction?
This is potentially a very powerful use of social media that can enable quick remedial action 
or revision of message in the face of indications that messaging has not produced the 
intended effects. This may be particularly useful in fast-moving crisis situations in which 
margins of error may be small, traditional means inappropriate or inapplicable, and rapid 
feedback particularly useful.  
Bank:  Social media can also be used for crowdsourcing resources—such as financial, 
material, expertise, and labor (both skilled and unskilled)— in crises.   Just as Craigslist 
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and Kickstarter can dramatically reduce transaction costs and help buyers and sellers—
or investors and entrepreneurs—find each other under normal conditions, social media 
can empower and facilitate crisis prevention, response and recovery. The abilities of social 
media and smartphones to communicate needs, identify, and coordinate resources in real 
time at low cost have profound implications for crisis management.  Via social media, it is 
possible to access not only information (see the discussion of “Radar” below), knowledge 
and expertise32 — extremely valuable commodities in their own right— but also to secure 
funds and various forms of critical material resources from food and water to specialized 
tools, vehicles and operators for them. In addition, social media provide means for citizen 
self-organizing and self- help. When official first response resources were overwhelmed 
in the devastating Christchurch earthquakes of 2010-11, citizens made use of social media 
and smartphones to organize a community- based response to complement overstretched 
public sector efforts.  For example, Facebook was used to organize a Student Volunteer 
Army which helped with debris removal and other tasks in the response and recovery effort. 
Similarly, farmers organized themselves into a parallel ‘Farmy army’ in which agricultural 
tractors and experienced drivers were brought into the response effort.33 During the 
devastating terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, citizens sought and provided shelter 
in the affected neighborhoods in real time making use of a twitter hash tag aptly named 
“Porte-Ouverte” [Open Door].34  It is important to recognize that, however great the potential 
benefit of using crowdsourced resources and self-organized community assistance in crisis 
and disaster management, managing the interface between the official and community 
responses (physical as well as digital) remains very challenging.35
Radar:   Monitoring social media feeds can provide invaluable information and “intelligence” 
(broadly defined) for warning, prevention, response, and recovery.  In crisis situations in 
which information is scarce at the outset, social media provide opportunities for both data-
mining and crowdsourcing of information (see above) —strategies which can facilitate early 
detection of potential threats as well as improved situational awareness for crisis managers 
and citizens at every stage of the crisis process.36  Citizens can serve as eyes and ears for 
each other and for organized crisis responders.  Just as traditional media have come to 
rely on so called i-reporters, government can leverage official situational reporting with 
citizen reporting that can be aggregated, analyzed, and displayed in ways supportive of the 
crisis management effort. Such tools were used—with mixed effect— in the hunt for the 
Boston Marathon bombers, where both traditional and social media were used to protect 
and guide citizens as well as encourage them to report observations to the authorities that 
could be helpful in identifying and finding the perpetrators.37  Social media feeds can also 
be mined—manually or using various forms of automated social media monitoring and 
analysis tools—to provide information about potential human threats and natural hazards, 
citizen preparedness, and other phenomena relevant to crisis management. 
Learning tool:  As noted above, the rise of social media and personal communications 
devices has resulted in new forms of crisis documentation which can be exploited for 
post-crisis analysis, evaluation and learning.  Social media accounts and contemporaneous 
audio-visual documentation produced and communicated by personal communications 
devices provide a useful complement to more traditional sources such as government 
documents and mass media accounts of crisis events.38 Though all forms of data must be 
treated with healthy doses of skepticism and source criticism, the fact that social media data 
tends to be time and date stamped and in some cases geo-tagged as well, is very promising. 
Furthermore, social media can be used to elicit and compile statements from ‘witnesses’ 
and to develop communities of practice that can contribute to the learning process.  For 
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example, the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control made good use of a field 
epidemiology ‘wiki’ in documenting its experiences and proposing lessons from the H1N1 
pandemic. 39  
Each of these metaphors captures distinctly different “faces” of social media—each with its 
own distinctive sets of possibilities and challenges.  As organizations seek to develop and 
adapt their crisis preparedness postures to changing conditions, each of these aspects is 
worthy of serious consideration. 
Conclusion
The developments and trends regarding  information and communications technology noted 
above are highly salient to the domains of public safety, security, and resilience.    Despite 
significant progress in recent years, understanding and analyzing the implications of these 
rapidly evolving phenomena remains an urgent task.
The results of analysis and conceptual work presented above may be summarized in the 
form of six key takeaways.
1. Social media and smart devices have significant implications for all of the core crisis 
management tasks—sense-making, decision making and coordination,  meaning making, 
accounting, and learning—identified by Boin et al.40 
2. The Social media/smart device combination is a double-edged sword.  There can be no 
doubt that social media is a potentially powerful force multiplier and has rapidly become 
an essential tool in the contemporary crisis and emergency management tool box. 
However, it is important to be aware that social media and the capabilities of smart 
devices can work for—or against—any given organization at any given time.   These 
capabilities can be used not only by ‘pro-social’ actors but also in various ways by foreign 
state adversaries, terrorists, organized and cyber-criminals, as well as others who do not 
have society’s best interests at heart.  Organizations need to be prepared to use social 
media proactively and offensively—to seek to gain and maintain the initiative—in crisis 
situations.  They also need to be prepared to cope with social media-based propaganda 
and disinformation.  In today’s communications environment, crisis managers must be 
resilient and alert enough to ride out viral waves— and seek to turn the tide— of outrage 
and negative social media reactions.
3. Mind the digital divide and embed social media strategies in a comprehensive  approach to 
strategic and crisis communication.   Though social media and smart device use continues 
to grow and spread across demographics in society, it is important to keep in mind that 
that there are and are likely to continue to be significant elements of the population who 
choose to refrain from— or lack the means and/or  know how—to make use of social 
media and the smart device revolution.   This has a number of aspects.  First of all, crisis 
communications strategies should make use of a variety of modalities and differentiated 
approaches to reach the full range of target groups in society.  Analog (e.g. warning sirens 
and loudspeakers) and digital means, conventional and  social media may all have their 
place in crisis communication strategies.   Furthermore, crisis communication is facilitated 
by having effective risk communication and issues management programs well before 
(and after) periods of acute crisis.41 Cultivating credibility and educating the public and 
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the media in advance about threats, hazards, and response protocols, set the stage for 
effective crisis communication and a fruitful conversation under crisis conditions. 
4. Exploit synergies among and develop partnerships with both social and traditional forms of 
media platforms and organizations:  Clearly, as observed above, traditional media and 
social media are growing together and becoming intertwined as part of a broader trend 
towards media convergence.   Developing strategies for risk and crisis communication 
which engage the full spectrum of and connections among media in contemporary 
communication landscapes is essential.  For example, advertising and publicizing crisis 
apps, web, or social media pages via print and broadcast as well as online will help to 
reach the greatest number in the shortest time, when it matters most.   For example, 
when Washington D.C. was hit by the Snowmaggedon blizzard 2010, the newly started 
Snowmaggedon Cleanup site— where citizens could post and get a situational overview 
about both acute problems and community resources  on a google map—really took 
off when publicized by the Washington Post and WTOP news. 42  The concept has since 
spread to many other cities.  
5. Be open and forward-looking regarding emerging applications and platforms.  While it may 
be tempting to tailor social media tools and strategies to whatever forms of social media 
are currently the most popular, it is important to take a more open and flexible approach. 
New forms of general and specialized social media emerge (and fade) regularly.  Social 
media components of crisis management strategies should be designed to be able to 
adapt to and make use of not only current social media platforms but also to incorporate 
others likely to emerge in the future.  While initially it may make sense to emphasize the 
biggest ‘players’ (e.g. Facebook and twitter), mature social media strategies will match 
media formats and capabilities with more specific purposes and target groups.
6. Embrace the multi-directional and multi-dimensional character of social media.  While highly 
effective for that purpose as well, social media are not merely another channel for 
pushing out information.   The discussion above identified seven key aspects of social 
media:   channel, megaphone, arena, bank, radar, mirror, and learning tool.  Each of 
these aspects are relevant to the crisis management effort and all should be seriously 
considered and included when developing strategies to bring social media and smart 
devices into crisis management efforts.  Furthermore, crisis managers can effectively 
use social media to share accurate and helpful stories from (and correct reporting errors 
spread by) traditional media outlets.43
The realm of crisis management is often stranger than fiction and the ICT capabilities 
now commonplace in pockets, backpacks, and desktops often exceeds the capabilities of 
yesterday’s science fiction.  Grasping the potential of and avoiding pitfalls associated with 
these developments remains a challenging task best undertaken in partnership and ongoing 
dialogue between the worlds of research and practice.   
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Abstract
Concerns stemming from the convergence of border and cyber security threats are nothing 
new to those involved in both disciplines. Criminals and foreign actors have been exploiting 
computers and cyber methods to circumvent physical border security for decades.  Today 
nearly every crime or homeland security threat that once required some physical nexus 
with the nation’s traditional borders (land, sea, and air) is being committed, or at least 
facilitated, by some cyber component. In many ways vulnerabilities in cyber security render 
some aspects of traditional border security irrelevant, or at the very least, much less secure. 
The article explores this convergence of traditional border and cyber security and proposes 
a policy that would seek to evolve the concept of border security to include the cyber 
domain.  Based on policy work begun over a decade ago by the author while the national 
cybercrime program manager for the U.S. Customs Service, the article details how a national 
cyber border can be defined and enforced. Relying on a methodology that adapts existing 
authorities, the article provides logical justifications and arguments for the need and legal 
authority to define a national cyber border.  The strengths and shortcomings of this adaptive 
methodology are explored along with issues which may require new legislation. The article 
addresses some of the privacy concerns which are certain to arise from the cyber border 
concept using the same adaptive methodology of existing protections and expectations of 
privacy. The ultimate goal of the article is to stimulate  thought- provoking discussion and 
spur further academic research into the convergence of cyber and border security; issues 
which are interdependent and clearly  in the forefront of homeland and national security.
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Introduction
While the protection and control of our national borders has always been an important issue, 
the emergence of terrorist threats over the past several decades has brought concerns over 
border security to the forefront of national and homeland security discourse.  A major topic 
in the 2016 presidential election contest, increasing border security became the central 
theme of the eventual victor and perhaps a strong indicator of the importance of the issue to 
a large portion of the electorate.  Another less traditional security concern, but one that has 
rung alarms around the world, is the issue of cyber threats.  Because of their asymmetrical 
nature and potential severity, cyber threats have become an overarching subject to national 
and homeland security interests. This document asserts that the two-- border threats 
and cyber threats-- are not mutually exclusive, and it explores the convergence of border 
and cyber security. Further, this article will show that the evolution of the concept of the 
border beyond the traditional land, sea, and air frontiers of the nation to include the cyber 
border is both inevitable and necessary.  The article outlines the justification and conceptual 
framework for defining a national cyber border based on historical and traditional border 
analogies, and will discuss the existing legal framework that  makes defining a national cyber 
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border possible, along with the authorities for protecting it. The purpose of this discussion 
is to introduce what at first may seem an exotic concept, and then to bring greater clarity 
and understanding of the subject to the researcher or homeland security professional. The 
article primarily focuses on defining the legal justifications for enforcing a national cyber 
border through the adaptation and interpretation of current and traditional U.S. border 
enforcement authorities. It leaves much of the “how” of policing it to the further academic 
and legal research that it hopes to stimulate. The following analogy is offered as food-for-
thought regarding the cyber border and the debate for which this document hopes to be 
the catalyst.  For hundreds of years, the distance of a cannonball shot was used to measure 
how far from shore a country should extend its legal control and territorial claims.1 Leaders 
arrived at this distance based on the best technology of their day-- a cannon shot. This 
distance has changed and evolved over the years as newer technology made this original 
metric obsolete. We owe the founders of our country and the people of the nation our best 
attempt at interpreting the technologies of our day to develop policies and strategies to 
address the dynamic ways that cyberspace is changing the world and impacting national 
security.
The Convergence of Cyber and Border
What is border security and why is it so important? Simply put, the border is the point 
where foreign threats become domestic realities.  The right and duty of government, is to 
control who and what crosses the nation’s borders to protect the country and its people 
from foreign threats. The threats range from the obvious such as terrorists or criminals 
seeking to perpetrate an attack or commit a crime, to the less obvious such as contaminated 
agricultural and food products which could severely impact the nation’s farming industry 
or sicken the populous. Because protection of the nation is such a compelling interest, 
border security is clearly viewed as a primary responsibility of the state. The traditional 
border security efforts of the government are obvious.  Customs and Border Protection 
officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Coast Guard cutters are all physical measures employed 
to control the movement of persons and material entering, and in some cases exiting the 
country. These measures are a series of physical deterrents and inspection capabilities 
at the nation’s boundaries to identify and control who and what is allowed to cross the 
border. The emergence of cyber threats however has radically changed the border security 
landscape forever. 
The Internet and cyber methods provide an opportunity to circumvent traditional border 
security measures to perpetrate crimes and to harm the nation to a degree once only 
possible through large scale military actions. Terrorists, criminals, and nation states can 
and do take advantage of the asymmetrical nature of cyber methods to threaten and harm 
the nation and its people. Attacks on critical national infrastructure, the theft of sensitive 
government and industry trade secrets, the importation of hazardous and illegal materials, 
and the stealing of funds from banks and citizens are just a few of the crimes and threats 
that once normally required some physical compromise of traditional border security 
and controls to perpetrate. All of these actions are now possible by the illicit use of the 
Internet.  Some crimes commonly committed against individuals by foreign actors today, like 
the theft of personal information or finances, would have been impossible or improbable 
before the advent of the new “cyber vector” of attack.  Today cyber threats have converged 
with traditional border security threats and now either complement them, or provide new 
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opportunities to threaten the nation. By providing an avenue to circumvent physical border 
security measures, cyber methods have made many traditional border security efforts 
obsolete.
The Need to Define the Nation’s Cyber 
Border
With cyber threats being such an obvious danger, one would assume that the government 
would take a similar responsible role in protecting the nation from foreign intrusions and 
threats, however this is not the case. Unlike traditional border security, the government’s 
role in defending the nation from foreign cyber intrusion is far less robust. Rather than 
focusing on preventing the entry of cyber threats, the government functions in a response 
role, investigating after the fact and after an attack has occurred. Defense of the nation’s 
cyber frontier is largely left up to private entities, both persons and organizations, to protect 
their own cyber borders. From a border security perspective this is highly undesirable due 
to interdependency issues since each individual or organization’s computer or network 
once compromised can become an additional attack vector operating within the borders of 
our nation. This situation is analogous to making every individual responsible for their own 
physical border security, and ultimately that of the entire nation.  Imagine the government 
conceding responsibility for land border security to the private land owners living along the 
border with little more than recommended best practices and advice on protecting their 
portion of the border. Imagine the responsibility for food and drug safety being left up to the 
individual consumers or businesses importing these goods. While this may sound absurd, 
this is essentially the situation in the government’s approach to cyber threats.  
 One solution to the problem of foreign cyber threats is the evolution of the concept of 
the cyber border Once the concept of cyber border is defined, the government can use 
traditional laws and authorities to better protect the nation from current and future foreign 
cyber threats.
Borders in Cyberspace
An oft-repeated line is that in cyberspace there are no borders. This statement, while 
philosophically desirable among those seeking a more open world and society, is simply 
not true. There are physical borders that data transmission lines cross and there are 
functional equivalents of the border where data arrives directly from foreign places-- a very 
important concept that will be discussed further.  The concept of borders in cyberspace 
even permeates computer network phraseology where terms such as “border routers” and 
“demarcation lines” are used to express the boundaries between networks. Yes, there are 
borders in cyberspace, we have just chosen not to acknowledge the cyber border as we 
do the land, sea, and air borders.  Disruptive technologies which impact traditional border 
concepts are nothing new; the Internet is just the most recent. Air transport was another 
disruptive technology which required an evolution in traditional border security thinking 
and which provides an easy analogy to justify a similar evolution in the concept of the cyber 
border.
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Disruptive Technologies and Border 
Security
The advent of air travel could arguably be judged as equal to or exceeding the Internet in the 
disruptive impact it has had on the world. Like the Internet, it has opened up opportunities 
for commerce and contact between peoples that would otherwise not exist.  Like the 
Internet, air transport has also had a major impact on how war is waged, In terms of border 
security impact, air travel was also disruptive since there was no longer a traditional land 
or sea crossing at the countries’ boundaries. Aircraft could fly across the borders and land 
deep within the country. The response to this was not to surrender border security and 
authority over what and who was entering the country via aircraft, but an adaptation and 
evolution in the definition of the border which allowed the exercising of traditional border 
authorities. The definition of the cyber border requires a similar adaptation and evolution 
in border thinking.  
Defining the Cyber Border 
Many current legal rulings and decisions regarding the Internet and Cyberspace are based 
on the interpretation of existing laws that govern conventional non-cyber circumstances. In 
many cases this methodology has succeeded in finding a workable application of existing 
laws, while in others, attempts at such an application have been cumbersome. Viewed in this 
light, the governance of cyberspace and the Internet may ultimately require some radical 
departure from contemporary legal thinking, perhaps a new separate U.S. Code crafted 
specifically for it.  However, the legal framework to define the cyber border appears to be 
already present without any modifications or additions to existing laws.
Traditional Borders
The concept of traditional border— land, sea, or air—is relatively easy to grasp.  Land borders 
are the geographic boundary separating the adjacent territories of other countries.  The sea 
borders are a bit more complex and extend the physical border seaward from shore out to 
a specified distance. Currently this distance is 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. coast, 
increased from a 3 nautical distance which had been the distance claimed for many years. 
This claimed 12 mile zone is referred to as the territorial sea and is treated as the maritime 
border of the country. Additionally, the U.S. claims a further 12 mile nautical distance from 
the boundary of the territorial sea as Customs waters effectively allowing enforcement of 
customs and border controls seaward 24 nautical miles from the U.S. coast.  Further, the 
U.S. claims an additional 200 mile seaward zone to enforce an economic, exploratory and 
exploitation zone which evolved from a 200 mile fishery conservation zone.2 The variations 
and adjustments to border enforcement in the maritime realm are pragmatic and reflect the 
reality that time and technology necessitate changes and adaptations in order effectively 
to protect the nation. A similar adaptive view concerning enforcement of the air border 
discussed next, can also be used to define the cyber border. 
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The Air Border Analogy
The air borders are simply vertical extensions of the land and sea borders allowing control of 
the nation’s airspace. As an aircraft enters U.S. airspace it is very much crossing the nation’s 
border. Performing a Customs inspection of the aircraft, its passengers, and its cargo 
however would obviously be impractical at 35,000 feet. Where the aircraft lands therefore 
becomes what is referred to as the Functional Equivalent of the Border or FEB.  The FEB 
is the first practical point where border controls can be exercised on the aircraft.3  The 
clearest example of FEBs would be the foreign arrival areas of international airports where 
immigration and customs inspections of aircraft, passengers, and cargo are conducted well 
away from the actual physical border at its functional equivalent.  
Functional Equivalents of the Border
The concept of the Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB) is critical to border security 
because it allows the legal imposition of regulatory requirements (search, inspection, and 
seizure) away from the physical borders. In order to have an FEB, circumstances must exist 
which create the same environment as the border: those being: 1) there is a “nexus” to 
the border, a border crossing, or to something which has crossed the border; 2) there is 
a reasonable certainty that there has been no material change since the nexus with the 
border; and 3) the search and/or inspection occurs at the first practical detention point after 
the border crossing.4  It is this same type of interpretation of the FEB that makes defining the 
cyber border largely possible. 
The Cyber Border
The simplest method to define the cyber border is to apply the land border concept. The 
place where data transmission cables cross the physical national borders would constitute a 
border crossing.  This analogy is deficient, however, since data can cross the border via other 
means independent of terrestrial data transmission cables – via satellite for example. It is 
also impractical for border protection and inspection for the same reason inspection of an 
in-bound aircraft at 35,000 feet is impractical.  The cyber border therefore is best defined as 
the FEB where the data arrives at the first practical point of inspection— a network router, 
computer server, PC, or other networked device. 
 The web site example depicted in figure1 demonstrates the FEB concept applied to the cyber 
border. It depicts a World Wide Web (www) site involved in the sale of some type of illegal 
merchandise. This merchandise could be any item that would constitute an illegal import at 
the border such as controlled substances, counterfeit products, or child pornography.  In 
this example the web site is hosted on a server located in the U.S., but directly managed and 
controlled by a foreign located criminal.  
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
The website operator in Paris (1) logs into their web hosting account in Houston (2) and 
uploads merchandise (software, music, movies, etc.) that is advertised for sale and down-
load from their web site. The Houston web server becomes a Functional Equivalent of the 
Border (FEB).
Figure 1. Example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity
The illicit web site in the example above could be providing information on the merchandise 
for sale, how to place an order, how to pay for the merchandise, and the options to arrange 
delivery. In the case of Internet deliverable merchandise, the web site can also be the point 
where customers access and retrieve (download) the merchandise; alternately the customers 
could also be directed to a second web site or file server to download the merchandise. Still 
another option is it that the customer can receive the merchandise directly as an email 
attachment from the seller from either a foreign or domestic email server.  
Figures 2 and 3 depict more complex scenarios for an illicit web site that involves the 
interpretation of multiple FEBs involved in the ordering and receipt of illegal imports. 
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
4. Customer in Duluth (EB)
3. Email hosted in San Jose (FEB)
3. The website operator in Paris receives customer orders and sends invoices and down-
load instruction to customers via their email account hosted in San Jose which becomes a 
Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB).
4. A customer in Duluth sends an order for merchandise via email to the seller’s email 
account hosted in San Jose and receives the order invoice and the download instructions 
from the seller. The customer then downloads the merchandise from the seller’s website 
in Houston directly to the customer’s computer which becomes and Extended Border (EB).
Figure 2. Example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity with multiple FEBs
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
4. Customer in Duluth (FEB)
3. Email hosted in San Jose (FEB)
File Server in 3rd Country (Sweden)
4. Customer accesses seller’s le server in third country (in this example Sweden) and 
downloads the merchandise directly to their computer. The customer’s computer eec-
tively becomes a Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB).
Figure 3. Another example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity with 
multiple FEBs
Critical to the understanding of how the FEB concept applies to defining the cyber border 
is an understanding of border enforcement authorities and how they work to protect the 
nation from border threats, while also addressing important constitutional and privacy 
concerns.
Border Search Authorities and Their 
Application to the Cyber Border
One of the most important border protection tools is the border search authority.  This 
long-standing  authority held by Customs officers and other authorized officials  dates from 
the time of the nation’s founding and is derived from some of the first statutes passed by 
Congress.5  Based on Congress’s broad authority to regulate foreign commerce and enforce 
immigrations laws, border search authority is a  long- established exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause and search warrant requirements. 6 
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The contemporary threat from terrorism and a basic interest in national self-protection 
make border search authority a necessary and legally accepted exception to normal 4th 
Amendment concerns. Border search authority allows for the warrant-less inbound and 
outbound search of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at the borders, the functional 
equivalent of the border, and in some other cases away from the border at what is referred 
to as the extended border.7 While traditional border searches focus on the inspection of 
people, conveyances, and merchandise, the focus of cyber border searches would focus on 
the import and export of digital merchandise.    
The primary purpose of a Customs border search is to inspect persons, baggage, and 
merchandise to ensure  that duties are collected and to ensure that whatever is entering 
or leaving the country is in compliance with U.S. law.8  Another important purpose of these 
searches is to search for and seize prohibited imported or exported merchandise. The 
definition of merchandise is  “goods, wares, and chattels of every description.”9  If there 
is any debate as to whether the data carried over the Internet is merchandise it would 
come as a surprise to the thousands of copyright owners and vendors of software, music, 
movies, and books which are delivered to millions of customers daily via the Internet, or to 
the customers who pay for this digital merchandise. The debate on whether digital data is 
imported or exported in the traditional sense can be argued as being a function of the origin 
and ultimate arrival country of the digital merchandise.  The illegal material or contraband 
which can be and is imported and exported via the Internet runs the gamut from child 
pornography, to counterfeit or illegally copied software and music, to stolen credit card 
information, to seditious materials— all materials which would be subject to seizure as 
imports or exports contrary to law.10   
Of special importance to the cyber border discussion, particularly in the area of border 
inspection, is the inclusion of documents within the purview of a border search.11   As stated 
previously, web sites advertising the sale of some type of merchandise can be simply that, 
an advertisement for a product, which provides a channel for the customer to contact and 
arrange the purchase and delivery of the merchandise. These contacts and arrangements 
can be accomplished through a variety of avenues including via email, web messages, 
or via an advertised telephone number on the web site. In the case of a web site being 
controlled by a foreign source, the email associated with the web page will likely contain 
information relating to the orders for these products and services and should be considered 
as documents relating to the importation of the merchandise.  In the illustration examples, 
the emailed documents pertaining to orders from customers, whether those customers are 
located in the U.S. or elsewhere, are retrieved by the foreign source from a domestically 
located U.S. email or web server and transferred/exported to their foreign source’s location. 
Conversely, documents relating to the orders sent from the foreign source to customers 
in the U.S. are sent from the foreign source’s computer and are imported to their email 
server located in the U.S.  In a traditional border search scenario, documents arriving from a 
foreign source, whether carried on a person, in baggage, or accompanying the merchandise, 
would be subject to search and examination to see if they pertained to the importation of 
goods. These same documents arriving via the Internet are not subject to this same search. 
A domestically hosted but foreign-manipulated web site can not only serve as simply an 
advertising and ordering mechanism for merchandise that is shipped via traditional parcel 
service or mail, but can also serve as the actual delivery vehicle for the merchandise. Web 
sites that offer digital merchandise such as software, music, and videos commonly store the 
merchandise in separate file directories on the web host computers that the customers pay 
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to access. In such cases it is reasonable to assume that the digital merchandise placed in 
these file directories by the foreign source was imported to those computers by the foreign 
source from their foreign location. In most cases this can be verified by inspecting the IP 
history logs maintained by the web hosting company. The digital merchandise located on a 
domestic web hosting company computer/server that has been imported to that computer/
server by a foreign web site operator should be subject to a Customs border search as an 
FEB.
Legal Merchandise versus Prohibited 
Merchandise
The Internet border search issue goes well beyond just the concern of illegal imports and 
contraband, but also to the much wider subject of general merchandise being imported 
via or assisted by the Internet. The exponential growth of Internet e-commerce represents 
legitimate commerce by both individual consumers and corporations. Internet border search 
authority may eventually be required to fulfill the other Customs missions of protecting the 
nation’s revenues and for the proper assessment of duties.  While the immediate impact that 
the addition of Internet/cyber border authorities would be most evident in the suppression 
of smuggling and other illegal activities, the benefit to the overall revenue protection may 
eventually prove just as significant. 
Merchandise versus Communications
Current border search authority allows authorized officials to search for imported or 
exported merchandise including documents, at the border or its functional equivalent. 
This discussion of redefining the border for the purposes of enforcing a cyber border is not 
directed at private communications unless those communications pertain to an importation 
or exportation of merchandise— legal or otherwise. 
Privacy Issues and Concerns
The cyber environment should not enjoy any enhanced protections over what persons 
should rightfully expect in the traditional physical world.  Therefore, privacy issues involving 
the cyber border should be of no greater concern than in a traditional border situation. 
Since the focus of cyber border enforcement is on merchandise (legal and illegal, entering 
or exiting via the cyber border), private or privileged communications are already protected 
from inspection the same as in non-border situations.12  Only data containing merchandise 
or documents relating the import/export of merchandise, legal and illegal, would be subject 
to inspection and border search and seizure. Granted, the cyber world does present some 
issues which may not have a corollary in the non-cyber world, but just as the evolved view 
of the traditional border must be adapted, so must the interpretation of border authorities 
so they may evolve  to address the uniqueness of the cyber environment.
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Conclusion
The importance of defending the nation against cyber threats is critical to national and 
homeland security. The magnitude of current and emerging cyber threats is equal to and 
may in actuality surpass traditional threats. The asymmetrical nature of cyber provides to 
minor nation-state enemies and even lone wolf actors the ability to inflict great harm to a 
great military power like the United States.  Criminals do and will continue to exploit cyber 
to their advantage rendering many aspects of traditional crime prevention ineffective or 
obsolete.  Stopping and preventing foreign threats at the border has been and always will be 
a key element in protecting the nation and its people. Adapting and evolving our definition of 
the border to define a national cyber border will help deny this pathway for foreign threats 
into our country.
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Abstract
The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, funded by 
The Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University 
Programs (DHS S&T OUP) since 2010, uses an industrial and organizational psychology approach 
to assess the characteristics of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in relation to their capacity 
for innovative and violent performance. In the current paper, we use the LEADIR database and an 
internal strategic organizational approach to assess the unique set of resources and capabilities that 
provide a competitive advantage within the “Jihad Industry.” The results suggest that VEOs ability 
to utilize or acquire one or more unique resources or capabilities provides a competitive advantage 
over other groups in the larger Jihadi Industry. We will discuss practical implications for DHS I&A, as 
well as the methodological contributions of using a lens from management theory and organizational 
psychology to the scholarship on violent extremism. 
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Introduction
While the amount of research on violent extremism has increased since the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, only a handful of studies have delved into the complexities of violent 
extremist organizations.1 Broadly speaking, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are 
coordinated efforts among individuals that share a similar ideological framework and employ 
violence as a means toward a collective goal.2 In terms of their sophistication, VEOs can range 
from relatively simple (e.g., Animal Liberation Front) to highly complex organizations (e.g., 
Da’esh). Regardless, VEOs are marked by a shared ideology as well as common organizational 
goals that are necessary for the group’s survival such as recruitment, fundraising, training, 
and disseminating information. 
In the current paper, we use models from industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology and 
management to examine ten VEOs with a foothold in the “Jihadi Industry.” More specifically, 
we use the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) 
project to gain insight and differentiate VEOs relative to their peer organizations in terms 
of capability, resilience, and attractiveness. We performed a Value, Rareness, Imitability, 
Organization (VRIO) analysis3 to assess each VEO’s unique set of strategic resources (e.g., 
cyber infrastructure) and capabilities (e.g., tactical innovation) that provide a competitive 
advantage among their industry peers. 
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The results of our analysis offer general and operational-level implications. More specifically, 
at a general-level, this study highlights:
1. The robust nature of using an organizational approach to examine and differentiate 
VEOs. In particular, this approach may prove useful for agencies in identifying high versus 
low risk threats, and allocating resources to combat those threats. 
2. A novel approach to gather, quantify, and compare the cyber capabilities of VEOs. 
While prior research on VEOs’ use of cyber has focused solely on descriptions of use of 
publicly-available social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, YouTube) or encrypted forums, 
our contribution is that we systematically analyzed what cyber innovation means in the 
Jihadi Industry by assessing the underlying behaviors facilitated by their use of an array 
of platforms and web-based features. 
Next, at the operational level our analysis suggests: 
1. Da’esh leads the Jihadi Industry on all performance metrics, but they have been 
significantly degraded since 2014. Examining their cyber presence, our data shows less 
collaboration across domains and fewer durable cyber objects produced since the end 
of 2015. Thus, using organizational metrics such as collaboration in both physical and 
cyber space can provide CT professionals with a unique metric for the effectiveness of 
capturing digital terrain and degrading the organization. 
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) (formerly al-
Nusra Front) are only second to Da’esh in terms of organizational legitimacy efforts, 
leadership and human capital, and fundraising. Similar to Da’esh, AQAP’s long-term tenure 
within a turbulent environment (e.g., Yemen) has created an efficient, legitimate, and 
sophisticated organization profile. Likewise, JFS has effectively played on the grievances 
of the Sunni populace by branding themselves as a viable group that is different from Al 
Qaeda Central. The method of examining organizational capacity can provide an early 
warning indicator of growing strength for emerging threats.
3. Despite over a decade of international pressure, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) continues to operate 
with impunity in Pakistan. In turn, LeT is one of the most effective VEOs at fundraising 
in the Jihadi Industry. Fundraising as a sustained advantage for LeT is concerning and 
should be closely monitored given the establishment of al Qaeda’s new affiliate in the 
Indian Subcontinent.
4. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and, to a slightly lesser extent, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) performed poorly across most indices in our analysis. In-fighting between high-
ranking members of each organization as well as successful counter-terrorism operations 
have diminished the capacity of each group. ASG and AQIM are the least likely to acquire 
the resources to sustain a competitive advantage compared to the other organizations 
in this analysis. 
In the following section, we provide an overview of the methodology used for this study as 
well as a more in-depth discussion of our findings. 
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Methodology 
This project employed a historiometric methodology in order to evaluate the strategic and 
comparative threat posed by VEOs within the Jihadi Industry. Following best practices4, we 
defined the sample that would provide the best comparative attributes to evaluate some of the 
most prominent VEOs within the larger framework of high threat VEOs. After identifying the 
sample, we gathered data from primary and secondary sources, evaluated the organizations 
in our sample using the LEADIR content coding scheme and indices of technical capabilities 
and sophistication.5 Finally, we conducted analyses to identify organizational attributes and 
resources that differentiate certain VEOs and their competition in the Jihadi Industry. Figure 
1 provides a visual representation of the methods used for this study.
Figure 1. Overview of Methods
Data Collection and Procedure 
We partnered with three government-civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) familiar with 
the Jihadi Industry to select key VEOs whose ideology is centered on Salafist conceptions 
of Jihad. Specifically, we focused on Da’esh and its affiliates as well as affiliates of al Qaeda 
Central (AQC). Given that Da’esh was formerly an affiliate of AQC, this was considered the 
most appropriate sample for comparison, because by virtue of forming those alliances (with 
the exception, perhaps, of AQAP), the ideology, tactical operations, and targeting preferences 
of the affiliates were shaped by AQC. Table 1 highlights the ten VEOs being examined.  
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Table 1. Sample of Ten VEOs 
VEO Primary Area(s) of Operation
1) Da’esh Iraq, Syria
2) Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) Iraq, Syria
3) al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Algeria, Mali
4) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Yemen
5) al-Shabaab Somalia
6) Boko Haram Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad
7) Afghan Taliban Afghanistan, Pakistan
8)    Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan, Afghanistan
9) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Pakistan
10) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Philippines, Indonesia
Organizational and Leadership Data 
To gather information about these organizations, secondary data were gathered from 
academic and government sources (e.g., profiles and data from the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Southern Poverty Law Center, 
Mapping Militant Organizations by Martha Crenshaw) as well as scholarly case studies and 
public-records databases (e.g., Lexis-Nexis). In some cases, we triangulated these secondary 
sources by using source-verified primary documents from the organizations themselves, 
such as manuals, propaganda, videos, and websites run by the organizations to cross-
reference information found in archival, analyst reports (e.g., START resources). 
Since one of our main research objectives for this paper was to identify key areas where VEOs 
in our sample differ, we used a psychometric approach to scale development and criterion 
from previous LEADIR projects6 to code and classify the organizational-level data. For each 
category of variables (i.e., organizational characteristics, performance-related constructs, 
and controls), operational definitions with readily identifiable benchmark examples were 
used, employing psychometric best practices used to evaluate other types of heterogeneous 
organizations
Attack and Cyber Data
The attack-level data in this study were drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
Rather than simply assessing lethality as an indicator of performance, we performed a 
stratified random sample of each VEO’s attacks as reported by the GTD and applied an 
innovative coding scheme to each one7. In total, 27 rating scales were applied to 1,441 attacks 
across the ten VEOs in our sample. 
To assess cyber sophistication and expertise, we collected and analyzed web material 
associated with each VEO. The data was collected through a combination of “key word” 
searches and the utilization of an automated web crawler. After collection, the cyber data 
were evaluated by technical SMEs to determine the sophistication of the resources and 
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expertise that would be required to produce them. For example, webpages that had multiple 
indices of encryption capabilities were evaluated as more sophisticated than those with 
fewer security parameters deployed. 
Analytic Strategy: VRIO Analysis 
To compare the ten Jihadi Industry VEOs, we used a VRIO analytic technique, or a technique 
that evaluates the likelihood that an organization will obtain a sustainable advantage based 
on its resources.8 Competitive advantage references an organization’s ability to create more 
value than its rivals, and requires SMEs to assess each VEO’s resources on 1) their value, b) 
rarity, c) inimitability, and d) the degree the other resources in an organization are organized 
effectively to take full advantage of that advantage. Organizations possessing only valuable 
resources and capabilities are expected to perform the same as all other organizations 
in the industry (i.e., competitive parity). Organizations possessing valuable and rare 
resources and capabilities are expected to perform better than other organizations but 
only for a short period of time (i.e., temporary competitive advantage), while organizations 
possessing valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable resources and capabilities are expected 
to demonstrate a long-term advantage (i.e., sustained competitive advantage). Imperfect 
imitability of a resource or capability was determined by the presence of one or more of the 
following attributes. 
1. History – The focal resource or capability was acquired at a particular place and time 
in the past. Competing organizations are unable to imitate that resource or capability 
because they are operating in a different place and time (e.g., senior military leadership 
of ISIL who came from Saddam Hussein’s regime). 
2. Causal ambiguity – Competing organizations are unable to imitate the focal resource or 
capability because of its complexity, tacit, and/or intangible attributes (e.g., social media 
and cyber sophistication).
3. Social complexity – Competing organizations are unable to replicate the focal resource 
or capability due to its presence within a sectarian conflict that has its own magnetism 
(e.g., public discontent with the Assad regime).
The overall organization (i.e., its structure) must also be aligned in such a way as to 
take advantage of the resources or capabilities in question. If misaligned, competitive 
disadvantages may emerge even though resources and capabilities are valuable, rare and 
difficult to imitate. VRIO analyses evaluate the likelihood that an organization will obtain a 
sustainable advantage in a given competitive arena. Sustainable competitive advantages 
are assumed to originate from the resources and capabilities controlled by the organization. 
Strategically Differentiating Resources
Resources represent the tangible and intangible assets controlled by the organization. 
Resources can be financial (e.g., cash), physical (e.g., equipment, natural resources), 
human (e.g., knowledge, intelligence, training, creativity) and organizational (e.g., reporting 
structure, culture, planning and control mechanisms). For the present effort—building upon 
the findings from our 2014 report on the VRIO of Da’esh compared to its competitors—we 
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assessed each of the ten VEOs in our Jihad Industry sample on six resources: (1) Marketing 
and Branding, (2) Recruiting and Human Capital, (3) Fundraising, (4) Tactical Innovation, (5) 
Cyber Sophistication, and (6) Cyber Interactivity. The subsequent sections provide more 
justification and detail into each VEO’s differentiators. Figure 2 shows the overall findings 
from our VRIO analysis. In the following sections, we describe the subsections of the VRIO 







Figure 2. VRIO of Ten VEOs
Marketing and Branding
An organization’s brand can be described as its personality.  Like individuals and other firms, 
each VEO has a unique personality that is shaped by the VEO itself and the consumers of 
its products.  A branding and marketing strategy can be understood as complementary 
components to an organization’s outreach. The brand is the representation and staple of 
the organization, while marketing is comprised of the behaviors the organization undertakes 
to sell its brand.  In other words, marketing behavior is how an organization sells its brand 
or its personality.  VEOs, like other organizations, put forth effort to establish themselves 
as a unique brand within the terrorism field and therefore engage in similar strategies like 
traditional firms, such as the production of media favoring the brand.  
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For this analysis, we used two measures of reputation and prominence to gauge the 
effectiveness of the marketing and branding of the ten VEOs. An organization’s brand is 
largely built in the relative reputation or status that organization has.  This status can be 
understood as how popular or well-known a certain organization is within its industry.  In 
our analysis, this industry would be the “Jihad Industry.”  Therefore, we used cultural and 
comparative reputation to measure the degree to which each VEO compares in status against 
other organizations within the industry.  Prominence is a multiplicative index measuring 
both the level of co-branding and external legitimacy of an organization. The degree to 
which an organization allies or “co-brands” with another brand increases the performance 
and prominence of the organization and influences the relative understanding of the brand. 
For example, co-branding allows for two organizations to make use of the brand of the allied 
organization to further increase the prominence of its own brand and add to the relative 
performance of the other brand.  This co-branding often leads to an increase in customers 
and resources because both brands can make use of the resources of the other brands. 
Meanwhile legitimacy is a measure of the degree to which an organization follows the rules 
of industry and is an indication of how the group is regarded as a “professional” within its 
field.  
Table 2. Comparative VRIO rating
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High AQAP
AQAP’s Inspire magazine is one of the flagship 
English-language jihadi publications and is one 
of many propaganda magazines AQAP publishes. 
These publications are not only used to recruit, 
but also shape potential sympathizers and 
supporter’s attitudes and perceptions of the 
group. 
Low Abu Sayyaf Group
In 2014, one of Abu Sayyaf Group’s core leaders 
pledged allegiance to Da’esh. Despite this oath 
of allegiance, no credible link between the two 
groups has been found. Given the decline of 
Jemaah Islamiyah and their weakened relationship 
with al Qaeda Central, ASG lacks a clear linkage to 
the most prominent organizations in the current 
Jihadi Industry. 
Human Capital and Recruitment
Like most organizations faced with increasing competition and growing external pressures, 
VEOs have realized that they too must evolve to meet emerging challenges. The current 
iteration of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as Da’esh, Al-Shabaab, and AQAP 
have been particularly successful at perpetrating violence and spreading fear through 
innovative means such as the utilization of social media and web-based platforms. The 
sampled VEOs are adept at building their ranks through a combination of both time-tested 
and increasingly novel personnel attraction and selection mechanisms. The importance 
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of knowledge about social, personal and economic factors for recruitment, as discussed 
above, is reinforced by research both on the nature of VEO propaganda. Zelin9 analyzed 
Da’esh social media output and identified that alongside promoting their military-related 
activities, the group highlighted their social services as well as “the great life one can live 
under the Caliphate, especially by foreign fighters.” Other VEO media seek to show their 
familiarity with western culture to attract western members; for example, posting pictures 
of fighters with Nutella jars.10  Da’esh spends significant energy presenting the view that 
they are active and on the march. Moreover, when communicating to potential recruits from 
the West, Da’esh has images that showcase both their military prowess and highlight their 
organizational legitimacy as well as couch pragmatic advice about travel and operations 
in ideological imperatives. This mix of pragmatic advice, ideology, and organizational 
legitimacy creates a powerful brand to influence potential recruits.11  In LEADIR, we assess 
the techniques VEOs use to increase their human capital. Following from how recruitment is 
assessed in conventional organizations, we rate each VEO’s tactics in terms of their novelty 
(degree of surprise or uniqueness in a given region and time), diversity (number of different 
types of techniques), and overall effectiveness (degree to which the recruiting strategies 
yield a viable pool of skilled members). 
Table 3: Comparative VRIO rating12
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High Da’esh
Until recently, Da’esh has been able to recruit an array 
of specialized recruits to the caliphate. Da’esh success 
in recruitment is largely due to their novel use of social 
media and other peer-to-peer cyber technologies. 
Low AQIM
AQIM primary targets low-skilled recruits through their 
regionally-focused, anti-colonialism propaganda. Despite 
operating their own media-wing, Al-Andalus Media, AQIM 
is said to lack the sophistication to recruit globally, outside 
of the Sahara and Sahel region of Northern Africa. 
Fundraising
While it is difficult to assess the true wealth of any clandestine organization, LEADIR does 
have data to speak to the novelty of fundraising mechanisms used by a given VEO. Our 
benchmark scales require raters to compare VEOs based on low novelty fundraising tactics 
(e.g., membership dues) versus high novelty fundraising tactics (e.g., looting artifacts from 
the ancient city of Palmyra and selling them). For the present effort, we compared each 
VEO in our sample longitudinally to assess changes in the creativity of tactics to secure 
resources. Before turning to these results, however, we would like to point out two additional 
findings concerning fundraising. First, the relationship between novelty in fundraising and 
an organization’s age tended to be inverse, which is to say that the longer the organization 
has been together, the less innovative their approach. The relationship is not linear, 
however, and organizations that have been together for approximately fifteen years are 
more innovative than those who have been together for ten years, but are less innovative 
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than those which  are relatively new (less than ten years). Second, the relationship between 
destructive fundraising tactics per monetary unit and an organization’s age approximates a 
U-curve, indicating that the newest groups tend to have moderately destructive fundraising 
techniques. The oldest groups largely employed non-destructive fundraising tactics, while 
those that have been together for roughly fifteen years employed the most destructive 
fundraising tactics. 
Table 4: Comparative VRIO rating
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High LeT
LeT relies very little on coercive or illegal methods to 
secure funds. Instead, LeT has established a stable 
infrastructure through an expansive network of private 
and public donors and charitable organizations.
Low TTP
TTP relies heavily on illegal activities to secure funds 
(e.g., drug trade, kidnapping, bank robberies). These 
funding streams may provide short-term success, but do 
not provide a long-term, sustainable funding solution.
Tactical Innovation
Organizations within the Jihadi Industry operate in a turbulent environment with immense 
competition over human capital, which is drawn to a Salafist Jihad ideology. In order to survive, 
VEOs must work toward creative goals and, more importantly, develop innovative ways to 
thrive in an unpredictable market. Tactical innovation or the extent to which VEOs “adopt 
news methods or means of violence13” provides one indicator of creativity and innovation. To 
illustrate VEOs capacity for tactical innovation, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
on the attack-level variables in our sample. A total of 1,441 attacks were coded yearly for each 
VEO in our sample and variables were explored using a principal component analysis (PCA) 
with varimax rotation. The PCA resulted in eight items loading on two different constructs. 
The first factor included three items pertaining to markers of originality and expertise. This 
factor was named Unique Proficiency and describes attacks that require expertise and are 
unique in terms of the weapons used and methods employed. The second factor included 
five items pertaining to complexity and physical infrastructural damage. This factor was 
named Attack Sophistication and is characterized by highly coordinated, well-executed 
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attacks that often cause major infrastructural damage. The two factors were moderately 
correlated (r = .359, p < .01).
Table 5. Average Tactical Innovation Scores (n=1,441)
VEO Unique Proficiency Attack Sophistication
Afghani Taliban 5.87 9.39




Abu Sayaaf Group 5.17 7.75




1) Unique Proficiency ranges from 3-13; Attack Sophistication ranges from 5-20.
2) Higher scores on both constructs indicate stronger performance.
Each VEO’s average Unique Proficiency and Attack Sophistication scores were used to guide the 
VRIO analysis and act as a descriptive indicator of each organization’s capacity for tactical 
innovation. Above, Table 2 shows that there was relative consistency in each organization 
score across both measures. For example, Da’esh, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, AQIM, and AQAP 
scored in the upper half on both Unique Proficiency and Attack Sophistication, while the Afghan 
Taliban, LeT, TTP, and Abu Sayyaf Group scored in the bottom half. Two groups, Al-Shabaab 
and Boko Haram, were less consistent, scoring highly on one construct, but not the other. 
Al-Shabaab rated second only to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Unique Proficiency, yet scored in 
the bottom half on Attack Sophistication. Boko Haram had the third highest average Attack 
Sophistication rating, but scored poorly on Unique Proficiency.
Cyber Sophistication and Interactivity
Because the examination of cyber profiles of VEOs is relatively new, we first provide an 
overview of how the VEOs in our sample use cyber resources to execute organizational 
functions such as marketing, recruiting, fundraising, and attack planning. VEOs leverage 
domains with low barriers and low authentication in order to host the content in the open as 
long as possible. There are several different patterns considering page and content posting 
and attributes. Page attributes fall under one of three distinct aspects; those who view 
pages for the group membership or loyalty; up- and down- loading of content; or content 
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engagement. This is confirmed by the results of an exploratory factor analysis of the web 
content we harvested with varimax rotation. Nine items obtained loading scores of .80 or 
higher across two different constructs. The four items loading on the first factor pertained 
to markers of complexity and the variety of features employed. This factor was named 
Sophistication and designates increasing technological skills and instantiations employed in 
message and content delivery by VEOs online. The five items loading on the second factor 
largely pertained to the facilitation of (social) ties between actors in the network. This factor 
was named Social Interactivity and is interactivity between actors in the social graph, including 
two types of direct message exchanges. The two factors were moderately correlated (r = .46, 
p < .01).14 
Table 6. Cyber Sophistication and Social Interactivity Scores
VEO Sophistication Social Interactivity
Afghani Taliban .30 .32




Abu Sayaaf Group 3.43 2.20




1) Higher scores on both constructs indicate stronger performance.
2) No transient webpages were found for LeT.
To assess each VEO on these factors, we obtained scores on each factor across their cyber 
objects. Table 3 indicates that while Da’esh is the most sophisticated and holds the most 
capability for social interactivity, AQAP is a close second on all metrics. In addition, while Boko 
Haram scored high on social media interactivity, it appears that they leverage existing open 
architecture in predictable ways. Thus, they may not have the cyber capability to program 
or innovate similarly to Da’esh, AQAP, or al-Shabaab. Interestingly LeT and Taliban have 
the lowest cyber capabilities. The main contribution from this analysis is that our process 
for assessing differences in the innovation and social media interactivity of these 10 VEOs 
allowed us to array the Jihadi Industry VEOs in the present sample. This has implications for 
their capacity to recruit and share their messaging, raise funds, and execute command and 
control.
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Conclusions and Implications
The paper’s main findings indicate that leadership, organizational structure, and innovation 
vary across the Jihadi Industry, which has implications for how government resources should 
be allocated for monitoring and analysis. In addition, the findings highlight the need for 
additional research to determine advanced indicator and warning signals of which groups 
will emerge as the most strategically differentiated and capable of malevolent innovation in 
coming years. 
First, Da’esh leads the Jihadi Industry on all performance metrics, but they have been 
significantly degraded since 2014. Across leadership, organizational structure, marketing, 
attacks, and cyber capabilities, Da’esh outperformed each VEO in the present sample of 
the Jihadi Industry. However, since our last assessment of their human capital in 2014, the 
quality of leader talent and innovation of attack sophistication have diminished. 
Second, we developed a method to gather, quantify, and compare VEO cyber sophistication 
and social media interactivity, and this custom method statistically differentiated the ten 
VEOs in our sample. Most of the research to date on VEOs’ use of cyber has focused solely 
on descriptions of use of publicly-available social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, YouTube) or 
encrypted forums. Our contribution is that we systematically analyzed what cyber innovation 
means in the Jihadi Industry by assessing the underlying behaviors facilitated by their use of 
an array of platforms and web-based features. 
Finally, conflict between top management team members are related to lower organizational 
capabilities and less innovation. The clearest example of this in our dataset is that of the 
Afghan Taliban, who should be poised for high levels of performance given their strategic 
location, third party endorsement by al-Qaida Central leaders, and organizational age. 
Despite these resources, infighting among leaders and lack of clear leadership mission has 
resulted in a less capable organization. Conversely, organizations such as Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham and Da’esh gain strength under the stewardship of a mix of pragmatic and ideological 
leaders working collaboratively toward organizational goals.  
These findings lead to the recommendations flowing from the present effort. First, monitor 
AQAP’s rebrand efforts in Yemen, as well as outreach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters abroad. 
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been the most capable AQ branch, and its 
marketing efforts indicate a pivot to focus on the social services it provides as well as the 
resilience of its organizational structure despite leader losses. Given the nexus of the state-
sponsored groups, failed/ fragile state markers, and crime-laden territory of Yemen, this 
group is poised for a re-emergence by all indicators. In addition, the high degree of social 
interactivity on various AQAP cyber platforms raises warnings for their potential outreach to 
those capable of executing a large-scale, sophisticated attack outside their territory. 
Finally, focus strategic communication efforts and operational planning to denigrate VEO 
leadership. Success from efforts to degrade the Da’esh organization should highlight at least 
one practice to continue and increase: leadership targeting. While leadership targeting has 
mixed results, VEOs in our sample with the strongest cadre of leaders and a collaborative 
leadership team also have the most sophisticated attacks, cyber presence, and fundraising 
portfolio. Rather than focusing on the capacity of any one individual in a leadership position, 
it’s critical that policy makers focus strategic communications and planning on disrupting 
the organizational dynamics afforded by an adversary’s diverse and collaborative leadership 
team. 
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Abstract
Protecting critical infrastructure, especially in a complex urban area or region, should focus 
on identifying and prioritizing potential failure points that would have the most severe 
consequences. Such prioritization can inform targeted planning and investment decisions, 
such as what infrastructure should be hardened or relocated first or what infrastructure 
should receive priority restoration following a disaster, among other uses. Without a 
prioritization process, assessment and protection programs are typically guided by 
intuition or expert judgement, and they often do not consider system-level resilience. While 
understanding how to prioritize high-consequence failure points for assessments and, for 
protection is essential, the complexity of infrastructure systems can quickly overwhelm. For 
example, in a notional region with 1,000 electric power assets, almost one million failure 
scenarios are associated with an N-2 contingency and nearly one billion failure scenarios 
are associated with an N-3 contingency. As a result, it is simply not feasible technically 
nor financially for system operators and government agencies to assess and prepare for 
all possible disruptions. Therefore, a primary goal of critical infrastructure protection and 
resilience programs should be to identify and prioritize the most critical contingencies 
affecting infrastructure systems. Achieving this goal will allow decision makers to identify 
high-impact isolated failures as well as cascading events, and to prioritize protection 
investments and restoration planning accordingly. To solve this problem, Argonne National 
Laboratory developed an optimization framework capable of modeling and prioritizing 
high-consequence failure points across critical infrastructure systems. The optimization 
framework can model at the system level or the interdependent “system-of-systems” level 
and is applicable to any infrastructure. 
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Introduction
Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has developed an optimization algorithm and 
modeling framework capable of identifying the highest-consequence failure points within 
critical infrastructure systems. The optimization algorithm and framework can be applied 
to any infrastructure at the system level or the interdependent “system-of-systems” level 
and can be used to model any combination of infrastructure failures. Results from the 
optimization modeling can be used by analysts to identify priority assets for assessments 
and to assist infrastructure system owners and operators and government agencies when 
they are making critical infrastructure protection and mitigation investment decisions.
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Understanding Infrastructure Failures
A fundamental component of critical infrastructure security and resilience programs should 
include understanding how, why, and where systems fail. This understanding should guide 
decisions on where to conduct in-depth assessments as well as which protection and 
mitigation measures to pursue. However, a complicating factor is that infrastructure failures 
vary significantly. Some failures will generate significant consequences at the system or 
regional level, whereas effects from other failures remain local, while still others have little 
to no effect on the overall service provided. For illustration purposes, Figure 1 shows a 
345-kV electric power transmission system between a generator substation and a remote 
substation.
Figure 01.  Electric Transmission Lines1
In this example, the generation plant produces 1,520 MW2 of power that is transported to 
the remote substation via three transmission corridors. Corridor 1 combines two circuits 
(lines) that allow transport of a maximum of 750 MW. Corridor 2 is a single circuit that allows 
transport of a maximum of 400 MW. Corridor 3 combines two circuits that allow transport 
of a maximum of 800 MW. By design, the three corridors operate below their maximum 
capacity levels, which allows for the relocation of power among the remaining circuits in the 
event of a disruption in one of them. For example, if the Corridor 2 circuit fails, the system’s 
overall vulnerability will increase but it will not experience cascading system failure because 
the two other corridors can compensate for the loss (Figure 2).
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Figure 02.  Loss of Corridor 2 Circuit
Corridor 1 circuits would operate at 97% of their capability and Corridor 3 circuits would 
operate at 91% of their capability. Similarly, the loss of one circuit from Corridor 1 would 
not trigger a cascading system failure because of the ability of the remaining circuits to 
compensate (Figure 3).
Figure 03.  Loss of One Circuit in Corridor 13
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Building on the operating conditions identified in Figure 3, Corridor 3 would operate near 
full capacity (97%); Corridor 2 would operate at 72%; and the remaining circuit of Corridor 1 
would operate at 103%, which, over time, could lead to the loss of the second circuit and 
therefore a failure of Corridor 1 (Figure 4).
Figure 04.  Loss of Two Circuits in Corridor 1 
A loss of Corridor 1 would impede the ability of the two other corridors to operate safely. 
Corridor 2’s circuit would operate at 104% of its capability, and Corridor 3’s circuits would 
operate at 129% of their capability. Under this scenario, the circuits could begin to heat 
and ultimately trip, triggering a system failure. Assuming all other risk factors are equal, 
this simplified example shows that the consequence of disruption of Corridor 1 is greater 
than disruption of Corridor 2, and, as such, Corridor 1 should receive priority when making 
security and risk management decisions.
Infrastructure fails in many different ways with varying consequences. This N-1 contingency 
test shows that this system can sustain the disruption of Corridor 2. However, in our example, 
the loss of one circuit in Corridor 1 would generate an overuse of the remaining circuit in the 
corridor and could lead to additional consequences. The N-1 contingency can be mitigated 
by shedding some of the load to bring the transfer capability in Corridor 1 back to 100%, 
which could avoid problems leading to the N-2 contingency case. The N-2 contingency test, 
resulting in the total loss of the two circuits in Corridor 1, would cascade to the two other 
corridors and lead to an overall system failure.
While this section focused on electric power, there are many similar nuances associated with 
failures in other infrastructure. For example, within the telecommunications sector, loss of 
a cellular tower does not necessarily mean that your phone will lose service, the closing of a 
road does not always mean that you can’t get to your destination, and so on. In other words, 
infrastructure system failures are not all created equal.
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The Need for Prioritization
Without a prioritization process, infrastructure assessment, protection and mitigation 
programs are typically guided by intuition or expert judgement, and they often do not 
consider system-level reliability, redundancy, and overall resilience. While understanding 
how to prioritize high-consequence failure points for assessments and, for protection is 
essential, the complexity of infrastructure systems can quickly overwhelm decision-
makers. For example, in a region with 1,000 electric power assets, almost one million failure 
scenarios are associated with an N-2 contingency, and nearly one billion failure scenarios are 
associated with an N-3 contingency (Figure 5). As a result, system operators and government 
agencies find it technically and financially prohibitive to assess and prepare for all possible 
disruptions. 
Figure 05.  Possible Failure Scenarios with an N-3 Contingency for 1,000 Electric Power Assets
Therefore, a primary goal of critical infrastructure protection and resilience programs should 
be to identify and prioritize critical contingencies affecting infrastructure systems. Achieving 
this goal will allow decision makers to identify high-impact isolated infrastructure failures, 
as well as cascading events, and to prioritize protection investments and resilience planning 
accordingly. Such an approach should also consider infrastructure interdependencies.
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Considering Infrastructure 
Interdependencies
Interdependencies among critical infrastructure assets increase risk to individual assets and 
the overall system. These interconnected infrastructure components constitute a “system 
of systems” where the failure of one or multiple infrastructure elements can cascade and 
affect the resilience of the entire system and ultimately the region. Figure 6 illustrates 
interdependencies among seven different infrastructure sectors and subsectors.
Figure 06.  Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies4
However, as highlighted in the earlier electricity example, simply identifying connections 
between infrastructure does not provide a sufficient understanding of why or whether a 
connection is critical to the operational integrity of the system. The following case study of 
electric power and natural gas interdependencies in Florida further illustrates this point. 
Because Florida is a terminal state, this case study represents one of the simplest examples 
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of interactions between electric power and natural gas because there is no complex 
downstream system to consider that could further propagate the disruption. Furthermore, 
the natural gas system is relatively simple with only two major high-pressure transmission 
pipelines serving the state (i.e., Florida Gas Transmission Co, and Gulfstream Natural Gas 
System). Figure 07.   Cascading Failure Simulation in Florida shows the results of the cascading 
failure simulation between natural gas and electric distribution systems in Florida.
Figure 07.   Cascading Failure Simulation in Florida
The scenario postulates the occurrence of a guillotine (i.e., complete) break on a major 
interstate transmission pipeline supplying natural gas to the state, resulting in a 100% 
reduction in the flow of gas through the pipeline. The pipeline break also disrupts fuel 
delivery to a large number of gas-fired power plants in the state. These power plants would 
cease operation, leading to a statewide electricity outage with varying load curtailment 
intensity ranging from 10% to 100%.5
In addition, the scenario assumed that Florida has three small natural gas processing plants 
located in an area that would experience a 40% percent load curtailment, requiring them to 
curtail operations temporarily. However, because the combined output from these facilities 
is small relative to the total load, the associated gas curtailment would have no notable 
impact on gas customers in Florida.6
As discussed in the previous section, infrastructure failures are not all created equal. When 
interdependencies are involved, a failure in one infrastructure can cascade to other systems 
increasing the overall consequences. Therefore, considering interdependencies should be 
an integral part of critical infrastructure security and resilience programs.
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Applying an Optimization Algorithm to 
Prioritize Infrastructure
Managing risk associated with infrastructure interdependencies requires an understanding 
of infrastructure failures and, especially in complex urban environments, an ability to 
prioritize protection and mitigation efforts. Argonne has developed an optimization 
algorithm for selection and prioritization of infrastructure that runs at the system-level or 
the interdependent “system of systems-level”. The algorithm can apply to the assessment 
of any infrastructure system.
The optimization algorithm assumes that the physical behavior of a system (e.g., a power 
network, gas pipeline, or coupled system) is described by the following optimization problem:
F(d) := minuЄU(d)f(u)
where:
d is the 0-1 vector representing the failures at infrastructure assets,
u is the control(s) that can be manipulated to mitigate disturbances, and
f(u) is a system output metric of interest such as cost, delivered load, or deviations from a 
target operation.
This problem can be solved by the generalized Benders decomposition method proposed 
by Salmeron et al. (2009).7 This method solves the master problem maxdЄDF(d) by iteratively 
approximating the function F(d) with a set of linear inequalities. Set D contains a set of failure 
scenarios denoted by d. An element of the set D is denoted by d = (d1, d2, …, dn), where an 
element di of the vector is either 0 or 1 for i = 1, …, n  to create a combination of the asset 
states. For example, d = (0,0,1,0) can model an event in which, out of n = 4 assets, the third 
asset is disrupted whereas the other assets are not. 
The dependence of the control set U(d) on d captures the fact that the control actions 
available to counteract the disruption might be affected by the disruption d. The control set 
implicitly captures the network topology and physical laws of an infrastructure system.
Worst-case contingency analysis aims to find a contingency that causes the maximum 
damage to the system. The worst-case event (denoted by d(1) can be found by solving the 
optimization problem:
D(1) = argmaxdЄDminuЄU(d)f(u)
The second most damaging event (denoted by d(2)) can be identified by restricting the event 
set as D\{d(1)} and by solving the problem d(2) = argmaxdЄD\{d(1)}minuЄU(d)f(u). This procedure 
can be applied recursively to identify the k-th most damaging disturbance. This step is 
performed by restricting the disturbance set as D\{d(1), d(2), …, d(k-1)}. Our optimization algorithm 
systematically restricts the disturbance set by iteratively adding the linear inequalities to the 
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worst-case interdiction problem. This approach significantly saves the computational times, 
as compared with an exhaustive search.
The algorithmic steps are then summarized for identifying the  most damaging disturbances 
as follows:
1. Create the initial set of disturbances D and the control set U(d) that is dependent on 
disturbance d Є D. Set k = 1.
2. Solve the worst-case interdiction problem to find d(k) = armaxdЄDminuЄU(d)f(u).
3. If k = K, then STOP.
4. Update the disturbance set in order to exclude the k-th most damaging disturbance d(k).
5. Update k = k + 1, and go to step 2.
In step 2 of this algorithm, updating the disturbance set  (step 4) is also equivalent to adding 
a linear constraint to the Benders master problem. The optimization algorithm has been 
implemented in Julia script language, and CPLEX is used to solve the master and subproblems 
in the generalized Benders decomposition.
Argonne has applied this optimization algorithm to a test system of the California Independent 
System Operator (CAISO) interconnected with the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC). The test system is obtained from Kim et al. (2017).8  This test system consists of 
225 buses, 375 transmission lines, 135 generation units, and 40 loads.9 The algorithm ran 
to detect the 100 most critical substations in the system. The criticality of substations is 
measured based on the amount of load lost resulting from the event that a substation is 
disabled. In this computational test, the objective function f(u) is defined as the amount of 
load lost. The control set U(d) is defined by a set of constraints for the security-constrained 
economic dispatch problem as in Kim et al. (2017).10 Note, however, that our algorithmic 
approach is generic to have a user-defined objective function and additional constraints 
(e.g., generation cost, repair time of the failure components etc.). Figure 8 shows the results 
based on the test system.
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Figure 8. Result of the Optimization Algorithm for the Test System of CAISO Interconnected 
with the WECC
In this example, a total of 36 substations resulted in significant load loss and failures; the 
other substations did not cause any load loss. The optimization algorithm terminated after 
the detection of zero-load substation failure. Government analysts and infrastructure 
owners and operators can use this type of information to protect the highest consequence 
failure points within infrastructure systems.
Conclusion
Protecting critical infrastructure, especially in complex urban areas, should focus on 
identifying and prioritizing potential failure points that would have the most severe 
consequences. Applying a technique like this optimization algorithm can inform this 
prioritization process. For example, the algorithm can identify the highest-consequence 
failures resulting from a cyber-attack against a specific critical infrastructure system, or 
identify the most consequential failures affecting complex interdependent infrastructure 
systems supporting a large urban area, regardless of the cause of disruption. Infrastructure 
system owners and operators, and government agencies can use results from optimization 
modeling to identify priority assets for in-depth security and resilience assessments, and 
to inform investment decisions related to critical infrastructure protection and mitigation.
Argonne is currently refining the optimization algorithm framework described within this 
paper through the Resilient Infrastructure Initiative, which is funded through Laboratory 
Directed Research and Development (LDRD) resources.11 The list of critical assets resulting 
from the optimization algorithm can be analyzed further by infrastructure impact models 
such as EPfast12 for electric power. Because of the computational complexity of assessing 
high numbers of infrastructure connections and associated failure scenarios, these studies 
are performed on Blues, a 350-node, high-performance computing cluster at Argonne. 
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Notes
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Abstract
How is the theory behind critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR) protection evolving? 
Practitioners who implement strategies should be confident their strategies are based on 
sound theory, but theory evolves just as strategy evolves. Many theories, techniques, and 
models/simulations for CIKR protection have been proposed and developed over the years. 
This paper summarizes several of these approaches and explains how they relate to basic 
risk concepts explained in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Risk Lexicon.
We explain unique contributions of ways to model threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
which have implications for how we assess risk. This work builds on previous work in the 
areas of operations research, prospect theory, network science, normal accident theory, and 
actuarial science. More specifically, we focus on deterrence measurement to characterize 
threat differently. We also explain work that models supply chains or “transfer pathways” as 
networks and applies principles of reliability engineering and network science to characterize 
vulnerability differently. Next, we explain work to incorporate CIKR resilience and exceedence 
probability measurement techniques to characterize consequence differently. Finally, we 
conclude with implications of how CIKR risk may be treated. 
We anchor our exposition of these contributions with various terms from the DHS Risk 
Lexicon. Also, we present these ideas within a framework of three “attack paradigms”: direct 
attacks against a single CIKR with the intent to destroy just that target, direct attacks against 
a single CIKR with the intent to disrupt a system of infrastructure, and exploiting CIKR to 
move a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) through the global commons to its ultimate 
destination.
Suggested Citation
Taquechel , Eric F., and Ted G. Lewis. “A Right-Brained Approach to Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Theory in support of Strategy and Education: Deterrence, Networks, Resilience, 
and “Antifragility.”  Homeland Security Affairs 13, Article 8 (October 2017).  https://www.hsaj.
org/articles/14087
Introduction
A strategy for critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) protection should have solid 
theoretical underpinnings. How is theory regarding CIKR protection evolving? Practitioners 
who implement strategies should be confident their strategies are based on sound theory, 
but theory evolves just as strategy evolves.
Many theories supporting CIKR protection and resilience have been proposed for application 
or repackaged into new theoretical approaches. This paper will focus on recently proposed 
theoretical approaches to protecting CIKR from terrorism and other threats, summarizing 
the authors’ work in several realms of CIKR protection, and incorporating other insights. 
Importantly, the authors’ work in these domains builds on rich foundations of previous work 
in the risk analysis, network science, reliability engineering, and operations research (OR) 
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fields. This paper will minimize technical discussions of each individual theoretical approach, 
and instead will propose how these approaches fit together to support implementation of 
the basic Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk equation Risk = Threat x Vulnerability 
x Consequence. Also, we will anchor our exposition of these approaches with other terms 
from the DHS Risk Lexicon (hereafter “Lexicon”). 
This basic equation still forms the DHS foundation for CIKR risk analysis and mitigation, 
although there are different opinions in the literature on the appropriate ways to characterize 
the finer details of the equation’s components and how data is collected and analyzed.
Background: Current State
The Lexicon defines risk as the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, 
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.”1 
Likelihood is:
“the chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or estimated 
objectively or subjectively, or in terms of general descriptors (such as rare, unlikely, 
likely, almost certain), frequencies, or probabilities.”2
And, consequence is:
“the effect of an event, incident, or occurrence, including human consequence, 
economic consequence, mission consequence, psychological consequence.”3
So, what are considerations for estimating the chance of a terrorist attack on a CIKR being 
attempted or succeeding, and what are considerations for evaluating effects of an attack on 
CIKR? We now examine context for threat and vulnerability, the combination of which form 
the chance of successful execution of an attack. We also examine context for consequence 
and resilience.
Context: Threat
Threat is the likelihood that an attack occurs, and that likelihood includes attacker intent 
and attacker capability, estimated as probabilities. Ordinarily, threat is an input to the DHS 
risk equation. However, there is a body of literature in the OR world that expresses concerns 
with treating threat as an input to the equation, instead advocating it should be an output. 
This is because terrorists, as thinking adversaries, can adapt to our defenses. For example, 
see Cox (2008)4. If this is true, then intent, expressed as a probability an attack is desired, 
is not necessarily constant. In that case, the quantification of risk would be inconsistent. 
Instead, those in the OR field have suggested that threat should be an output of vulnerability 
* consequence, signifying that prospective attackers formulate intent to attack based on 
observations and estimates of specific CIKR vulnerability and consequence.
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Deterrence: Influencing Attacker Intent
The Lexicon defines deterrence as a “measure that discourages, complicates, or delays an 
adversary’s action or occurrence by instilling fear, doubt, or anxiety.”5 Historical literature 
on deterrence theory and studies of deterrence theory in action tend to focus on what we 
refer to as “absolute deterrence”: influencing an opponent’s decision calculus such that they 
decide not to act. However, we think the concept of “relative deterrence” in CIKR threat and 
deterrence analysis warrants consideration.  The probability of acting in a certain manner 
may constitute a metric for relative deterrence, as opposed to either acting or not acting.
Game Theory and Deterrence
Game theory has been applied to economics and other fields to model interactions and 
expected outcomes. It models the interactions of intelligent agents, often quantitatively so. 
It has also been applied to explain nation-state conflicts. In recent work it has been used 
in counterterrorism modeling. For example, see Yin et al. (2010) who apply game theory to 
develop an “intelligently randomized” homeland security boat patrol model for the U.S. Coast 
Guard.6 The particular approach that Yin et al. develop leverages the concept of a Strong 
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) to model how an attacker can observe a defender’s defenses 
and then pick their best course of action, e.g. attack the CIKR that is the best combination of 
minimally defended and most valuable to attack. One can link the claim that threat should 
be an output of a risk equation to the attribute of game theoretic modeling that yields 
preferences as outcomes of strategic interactions. For example, a “mixed strategy” reflects 
probabilistic preferences of intelligent agents. Evaluating these probabilistic preferences 
may lay the foundation for making claims of “relative deterrence”.
The Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat
There is also a repository of literature that discusses concern over terrorists exploiting 
the maritime supply chain to move a WMD into the U.S. The DNDO, or Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office, was established to help mitigate this threat. Various technological solutions 
and modeling approaches to reduce WMD risk have been explored.
Context: Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the likelihood an attack is successful, given it is attempted.7 Attacks can be 
against individual CIKR with the intent of destroying those CIKR. A second paradigm is that 
attacks might occur against individual CIKR with the intent of destroying/damaging a system 
of CIKR. The Lexicon defines a system as:
“any combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications 
integrated for a specific purpose.”8
Similarly, a network is defined as: 
“A group of persons or components that share information or interact with each 
other in order to perform a function.”9
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If we focus on the vulnerability of systems of CIKR to terrorist attack, perhaps our techniques 
to assess vulnerability should be different than those of the standard individual CIKR 
vulnerability assessment. Network science offers techniques for assessing vulnerability 
of systems to perturbation, considering both the vulnerabilities of individual assets, and 
then characterizing the vulnerability of systems. For examples, see Lewis, 2006, chapter 5,10 
and Lewis, 2009, chapter 11.11  Also, Lewis (2011) defines criticality as the degree of system 
dependence on a single component. But, the Lexicon focuses on criticality of an asset to 
its customer base.12  Perhaps we can stretch the Lexicon definition to mean the “customer 
base” of an asset could include its linked components that form a system.
A third paradigm for framing vulnerability analysis is that CIKR are susceptible to exploitation 
for nefarious purposes, such as moving a WMD through a port infrastructure with the intent 
to detonate in an inland city. Though some CIKR might have great security against direct 
attacks, they might have suboptimal security for interdicting a WMD being moved through 
enroute to a different destination.
In sum, we offer three paradigms for modeling attacks:
Paradigm 1: direct attacks against CIKR with intent to disable/destroy that CIKR;
Paradigm 2: direct attacks against CIKR with intent to cause cascading perturbations 
throughout a system of CIKR; and 
Paradigm 3: exploitation of a CIKR to inflict damage on a different CIKR “downstream” in a 
system.
Context: Consequence and Resilience
We cited the Lexicon definition of consequence earlier. Then, the Lexicon goes on to define 
resilience as the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and 
rapidly recover from disruption.”13 Thus, to the extent disruptions create undesirable effects 
or consequences, resilience is the ability to recover from consequences. Vugrin et al. (2010) 
focus on the magnitude and duration of deviations from desired system performance levels 
as two parameters of the ability to recover from disruptions.14
DHS websites on resilience acknowledge the evolution of policy emphasis on resilience 
towards efforts to define it.15 However, when we did our research, DHS policies and programs 
emphasized resilience but did not explicitly guide stakeholders on how to quantify it or how 
to implement resilience measures. So, it falls to academia to propose definitions. 
Evolution: Possible Future States
Given this context, how might theory supporting threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
analysis evolve? We now summarize our work in these areas.
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How We Analyze Threat: The Importance of Deterrence 
and Cognitive Biases
We mentioned earlier that the concept of “relative deterrence” in CIKR threat and deterrence 
analysis warrants consideration. Instead of convincing our opponent not to act at all, or 
conceding they will definitely commit an undesired act, does it make sense to think of 
influencing attacker intent on a spectrum – in probabilities? In other words, is it worth 
exploring the probability one attack is quantitatively more desirable than an alternative 
attack, when multiple CIKR are possible targets? And, should we try to model how attacker 
intent might change, as a proxy for deterrence?
The game-theoretic modeling approaches discussed earlier leverage algorithms that 
produce a probability distribution. This probability distribution is translated into a tactical 
patrol schedule for armed Coast Guard law enforcement boats throughout their area of 
operational responsibility. In theory, executing their patrol schedules according to this 
probabilistic distribution minimizes the chances an observant adversary can plan and 
execute an attack on maritime CIKR. Moreover, in theory this deters an attacker, at least 
from a “relative deterrence” standpoint.
Starting Simple: Quantifying Deterrence
Given our belief that relative deterrence warranted attention, and given that previous 
literature had leveraged game theory to produce a probabilistic approach to deterrence, we 
published a paper entitled “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk” in 2012.16 The thrust of this approach was that deterrence against CIKR attacks can 
be quantified as the extent to which attacker intent to attack a certain CIKR changes after 
security measures are implemented at that CIKR, as compared to attacker intent to attack 
that CIKR before implementation of such measures. The quantification of deterrence took a 
very simple form:
Intent i
pre Intent k l
post
$AB
E l =k Intent ipre $AB
Equation 1. Quantification of deterrence17
The intent values were based on expected utility ratios of pre-security expected utility from 
attacking the CIKR in question, and post-security expected utility. These expected utility 
values were derived from a game theoretical CIKR attack game between a notional attacker 
and notional defender, such as a CIKR operator. 
We claimed that expected utility from an attack should include the quantification of 
attacker capability as a probability, but should exclude probabilistic expressions of intent. 
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This was our “compromise” between the default risk equation that incorporates both intent 
and capability into the threat component, and the Operations Research (OR) community 
objections to including threat as an input because it fails to account for adaptive adversaries.
Also, we used an exploratory approach to the game theoretical scenario, averaging results 
of possible courses of action that the notional attacker and defender faced, rather than 
relying on the theoretical Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. A Nash Equilibrium 
predicts the “optimal” outcome of a game such that each player will choose the best solution 
they possibly can, given their opponent is also trying to pick their own best solution. Thus, 
we hedged for the possibility that an attacker might not necessarily pick the theoretically 
“optimal” solution. 
This work built on a previous thesis which claimed risk propensity, or an actor’s attitude 
toward risk and choice, should influence deterrence.18 In our paper, we made the opposite 
(but possibly complementary) claim: that deterrence should influence risk analysis. We also 
incorporated previous work on modeling vulnerability reduction as an exponential function 
of dollars invested to improve security; Al-Mannai and Lewis (2008) proposed example 
functional forms.19 We treated vulnerability as a linear function of investment, which may 
have been an oversimplification.
Furthermore, we explored conditional and unconditional risk. Unconditional risk reflected 
the risk of CIKR attack given the attacker’s intent (as modified by security investments), 
combined with their capability, vulnerability, and attack consequence. However, conditional 
risk reflected the equivalent of attacker expected utility: the product of attacker capability, 
CIKR vulnerability, and CIKR failure consequence. This was consistent with the Lexicon 
definition of conditional probability: the probability of some event given the occurrence of 
some other event.20 The “other event” we surmised was the attacker decision to attack a 
specific CIKR with 100% intent. Thus, we treated conditional risk as the product of capability, 
vulnerability, and consequence, multiplied by an intent factor of 1.
Finally, we made a case for differentiating tactical intelligence from strategic intelligence 
in a game theoretical context. Strategic intelligence in some CIKR risk tools at the time of 
our writing reflected high-level quantitative estimates of various terrorist group intent to 
attack certain types of CIKR and capability to use various attack modes. As an alternative, 
we proposed that tactical level intelligence with regard to CIKR protection entailed a target-
specific assessment of vulnerability and consequence by a would-be attacker, both before 
and after hypothetical security measures were implemented. This tactical intelligence would 
reflect their target-specific intent to attack (or not attack), and when compared to their 
estimated intent to attack other CIKR, could be leveraged to estimate unconditional risk 
and create “deterrence portfolios” to characterize various security investment options and 
inform decision makers.
One objection we anticipated when we wrote the paper was that deterrence efforts simply 
may shift prospective attackers to other CIKR with higher consequence. This broached the 
concept of threat-shifting. The Lexicon defines threat-shifting as the:
“response of adversaries to perceived countermeasures or obstructions, in which the 
adversaries change some characteristic of their intent to do harm in order to avoid or 
overcome the countermeasure or obstacle.”21 
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The Lexicon then goes into detail about domains in which  threat-shifting can occur, including 
target domain: selecting a less protected target. However, we claimed our approach allowed 
for threat-shifting, more specifically “intent-shifting”, but did not necessarily increase risk to 
the CIKR in the game. 
We applied our methodology to quantify deterrence and measure the change in CIKR risk in 
a notional case study, with the security investments modeled as hypothetical investments 
provided by FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). 
The Lexicon definition of “adaptive risk” includes:
“threats caused by people that can change their behavior or characteristics in reaction 
to prevention, protection, response, or recovery measures taken.”22 
By examining and quantifying how adversaries might assess desirability of various CIKR 
attacks in response to hypothetical protection measures, we add granularity to CIKR risk 
analysis and make more informed CIKR investment decisions. Furthermore, the Lexicon 
claims, 
“for some types of risk, like those involving human volition, the probability of 
occurrence of an event may not be independent of the consequences and, in fact, 
may be a function of the consequences.”23
In our approach, the probability of intent, not of attack occurrence, was modeled as a function 
of a combination of consequences, attacker capability, and modifications to vulnerability, 
based on hypothetical grant investments.
Increasing Complexity - Threat, Deterrence and 
Cognitive Biases
Our work on quantifying deterrence assumed Expected Utility Theory (EUT) applied to 
the expected utility functions. This theory provides that people make decisions linearly, 
estimating costs, benefits, and probabilities. They make decisions consistently across how 
information is provided, or “framed.”
However, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Nobel Prize winning psychologists, showed 
experimentally that people often make decisions inconsistently depending on changes in 
frame, in contravention to the tenets of EUT. They created Prospect Theory (PT) to explain 
their findings. Therefore, in a follow-up piece to our work on quantifying deterrence, we 
modified our approach to account for PT considerations in deterrence. We also explored 
whether information incompletion could influence the quantification of deterrence and 
resulting CIKR risk.
The Lexicon annotates the definition of “social amplification of risk” as follows:
“a field of study that seeks to systematically link the technical assessment of risk with 
sociological perspectives of risk perception and risk-related behavior.”24
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Kahneman and Tversky discovered that people perceived risk differently when prospective 
outcomes were presented as losses from a reference point, rather than gains beyond that 





Figure 1. Relationship between gain/loss and value25
Figure 1 reflects their findings that losses held more “value” or salience to those faced with 
prospects, than did quantitatively equivalent amounts of gain. This finding violated one 
of the central tenets of EUT.  Kahneman and Tversky also discovered a phenomenon they 
dubbed the “certainty effect” meaning that subjects generally preferred certain outcomes 
to probabilistic outcomes. When presented with gains, subjects preferred a certain smaller 
gain to a larger but probabilistic gain. When presented with losses, subjects preferred 
probabilistic larger losses to certain smaller losses, thus reversing the certainty effect and 
yielding the term “reflection effect.” Figure 2 below amplifies on comparisons between EUT 
and PT, although the claims regarding what behavior losses and gains might predict under 
PT assumptions omit a discussion of probability – both the “certainty effect” and “possibility 
effect” that Kahneman discusses in his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow.26
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Low % of high utility
High Certainty Equivalent (CE)
Gamble more preferred than expected value for certain
High CE
Losses predict risk-seeking
Overweight utility when presented 
as loss relative to reference point
High % of low utility
Low CE
Gamble less preferred than expected value for certain
Low CE
Gains predict risk aversion
Underweight utility when presented 
as gain relative to reference point
Figure 2. How EUT (also Subjective Expected Utility or SEU) and Prospect Theory (here called 
“Prospect Utility”) may influence Risk Propensity27
Thus, we applied insights from their discoveries to predict what would-be CIKR attackers 
might prefer from amongst various CIKR attack options. The overall goal of this new 
research was to explain and recommend an approach to support decisions on whether to 
publicize information about CIKR security investments intended to deter attack, or whether 
to obfuscate those investments, by considering what we called “cognitive biases”.
First, we proposed a new definition of a “prospect” to distinguish the use of that word from 
its use in PT. A prospect simply meant the aggregation of possible future outcomes from an 
attacker COA (course of action). We then further specified that an “ordinary prospect” mean 
a prospect not derived from a game theoretic scenario.
We expanded on these definitions of prospect by then proposing the concept of “equilibrium 
prospect” meaning a prospect where the outcomes were influenced by what an intelligent 
opponent might do in a game theoretic interaction. Moreover, we showed what the equation 
for an ordinary prospect might look like if it was modified based on Kahneman and Tversky’s 
findings. This equation would reflect a relationship between gains/losses and value ascribed, 
fitted to the data that Kahneman and Tversky gleaned during their research. 
These differentiations in equations for prospects helped us alter the way we proxied 
attacker intent as we explored how information incompletion and prospect theory could 
influence deterrence quantification and resulting risk. For example, one assumption was 
that an attacker would choose the equilibrium solution to a deterrence game; therefore, 
their quantified intent for that COA would be 100%. Alternatively, they might hedge among all 
prospective outcomes of the game, comparing the expected utility of one possible outcome 
to the aggregate of expected utilities of all possible outcomes, thereby creating an “intent 
ratio” proxy for their intent. Or, they might choose an “aggregate prospect” with maximum 
value with 100% probability - reflecting the sum of expected utilities if the attacker chose 
one COA, but reflecting the aggregate influence of possible defender actions in the game. 
Finally, they might create intent ratios using prospects, rather than using individual game 
outcomes.
We also proposed a heuristic for analyzing outcomes of deterrence games under conditions 
of incomplete information. In this case, the attacker would play a different “game” than the 
defender, since the attacker created proxies for defender deterrence investments at the 
CIKR in the game, whereas the defender knew their true investments. We proposed the 
term “organizational obfuscation bias” or OOB to represent attacker bias under conditions 
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of incomplete information. We proposed business rules for how to quantify deterrence and 
create deterrence portfolios under these conditions.
Furthermore, we used an exponential investment-vulnerability relationship as an alternative 
to the linear relationship from our 2012 paper. Exponential relationships between effort and 
result may be more realistic than linear relationships, especially in counterterrorism analysis 
on the assumption our adversaries adapt to observable (or unobservable) vulnerability 
reduction measures.
Also, in our update we explored the effects of incomplete information. Different authors in 
the deterrence theory literature suggest different things. Some suggest deterrence is most 
effective when both parties share a common estimate of the other’s intentions (for example, 
see Moran, 200228) whereas others suggest ambiguity might actually enhance deterrence 
(for example, see Chilton and Weaver, 2009).29 Furthermore, the game theory literature 
distinguishes incomplete information from imperfect information. The former means that 
if all players can observe opponents’ previous moves in the game, they might not know all 
the rules that define the game. In contrast, imperfect information means that even if players 
know all the rules of the game, they don’t know their opponents’ previous moves. 
Results of Notional Case Study
We varied our deterrence games to assume the attacker had incomplete information and 
thus we used proxy values to represent what they might estimate the quantitative values of 
CIKR vulnerability to be, based on attacker OOB. This yielded results that defender risk was 
less when investments were obfuscated than when they were publicized, for all attacker 
OOBs, and assuming EUT. However, this was specific to the assumption that the attacker 
used an intent ratio for intent proxy, rather than selecting an equilibrium game solution. 
In circumstances when the attacker was presumed to choose the equilibrium solution 
and intent was thus 100%, there was no quantifiable advantage of obfuscating deterrence 
investments over publicizing them, again under EUT assumptions. Quantifiable advantage 
here meant that unconditional risk was lower after change in intent was applied. We also 
found that if we assumed PT held rather than EUT, the defender gained no quantifiable 
advantage of obfuscating deterrence investments, over publicizing them.  
Together, biases from PT and biases from incomplete information formed our “cognitive 
biases.” The implications of our findings were that under circumstances where it would it 
would be quantitatively more advantageous to obfuscate details of possible deterrence 
investments, the government would also have to obfuscate other details such as available 
budgets and estimated reduced CIKR vulnerabilities after deterrence investments were 
made. We therefore expanded upon our 2012 paper claim:
“In order to generalize these findings, any advantage of a specific information 
availability circumstance must be robust given utility theory assumptions.”30 
To conclude our discussion on the evolution of how threat can be treated in CIKR risk analysis, 
we return to the Lexicon which states that risk reduction “can be accomplished by reducing 
vulnerability and/or consequences.”31 However, based on our research, we propose that 
threat reduction, through deterrence quantification and consideration of cognitive biases, 
may be another way to analyze risk reduction.
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How We Analyze Vulnerability: Systems 
Approaches and Organic vs Inherited 
Vulnerability, Or Exploitation Susceptibility
Starting Simple – Transfer Threat Modeling
Our first approach to exploring vulnerability in a new light involved the third paradigm we 
offered for modeling attacks. We explored how to model the concept of “layered defense” 
for defending CIKR networks from exploitation. Previous work on CIKR protection had 
leveraged the concept of fault trees.32 Fault trees showed how a fault, or in the case of CIKR 
risk analysis, a terrorist attack, could propagate throughout a network of CIKR. The Lexicon 
annotates a fault tree as a tool to estimate quantitatively the probability of program or 
system failure by visually displaying and evaluating failure paths.33
However, fault trees only demonstrated what Taquechel (2010) described as “inherited 
vulnerability” or the probability of fault propagation as governed by De Morgan’s Law and 
the logic gates (AND or OR) that connected nodes in the fault tree network. In reality, nodes 
in a CIKR network also have “organic vulnerability” as reflected by their own inherent security 
measures, or lack thereof.34
Thus, Taquechel reasoned that risk of exploiting a network composed of nodes that had 
organic security measures must be assessed using a combination of organic and inherited 
vulnerability terms.  For example, a “terrorist transfer network” of overseas and U.S. ports 
could be rendered as a network of CIKR nodes, with logic gates governing the propagation of 
illicit material between nodes, but with each node having a quantifiable organic vulnerability 
inversely proportional to security measures at the node. Returning to the proposed 
definitions of criticality, perhaps exploitation of this network would depend highly upon 
one very vulnerable foreign port. Alternatively, it might depend on a more holistic measure 
of aggregated network failure probability derived from the combination of organic node 
vulnerabilities and inherited vulnerability of each “layer” of nodes, ports in this case.
Ultimately, we modified Lewis’ Model Based Risk Assessment (MBRA) network modeling tool 
to create a logic graph that leveraged fault tree principles, but added an emergence-based 
algorithm to optimize funding to “harden” ports against terrorist transfer, reducing organic 
vulnerability and thus reducing overall network vulnerability. We combined the concept of 
topology from network science with the classic CIKR risk analysis treatment of vulnerability. 
Topology is a “mapping function” showing the relationship between nodes and links in a 
network.35 It is the “architecture” of the network, which may change over time if the network 
is “dynamic.”36
Logic gates in this approach reflected a different type of topology, wherein they represented 
virtual links between nodes, rather than physical links. The virtual link was a proxy for 
attacker decision making – whether to transfer illicit materials or people through both nodes 
to get to the next node (AND gate), or to transfer materials through a single node (OR gate). 
This extended the existing functionality of the MBRA tool to address a problem of interest 
to DHS as depicted in figure 3.
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Figure 3. MBRA adaptation logic graph: optimal budget allocation minimizes network risk37 
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Preferential attachment undergirds the MBRA algorithm we used to model terrorist transfer 
networks as depicted in Figure 1. Lewis discusses how preferential attachment is a source 
of Self-Organized-Criticality (SOC), meaning a system is on the verge of collapse due to 
emergent processes occurring within the system to make it more efficient during steady 
state functioning, but also more susceptible to failure.38  Essentially, the MBRA algorithm 
is an emergent algorithm that allocates a dollar to a node to reduce organic vulnerability 
(or exploitation susceptibility). It documents the reduction in overall system vulnerability 
and risk. Then, it allocates another dollar at random. If the overall system risk is reduced, 
the dollars remain allocated as such. The algorithm reflects the system’s “preference” for 
allocations that reduce overall risk or increase overall system resilience. However, if the risk 
does not change or is increased, the algorithm “retrieves” the previously allocated dollar and 
searches for another recipient node. This is similar to how ants or termites “self-organize” in 
their flocking behavior as discussed in Lewis (2011).39
Increasing Complexity – WMD Transfer Modeling
With this third paradigm in mind, our initial work treated terrorist transfer threat as a 
general threat in our layered defense modeling. However, we decided to then focus more 
specifically on the WMD (weapon of mass destruction) threat for follow-on work. We also 
decided to merge our concepts of layered defense and deterrence measurement with a 
network science approach in our 2015 paper on measuring the deterrence value of securing 
maritime security chains against the WMD threat.40
In this work, we modeled a supply chain that an adversary might try to exploit by transferring 
a WMD, but we explicitly modeled port “node” vulnerability, or exploitation susceptibility, as 
a function of notional WMD detection technology in those ports. We modeled probabilities 
of encounter and detection at notional U.S. ports of debarkation or ports of entry, holding 
encounter probabilities constant and modifying detection probabilities proportional to the 
investment necessary to build and operate detection technology. The “elimination fraction” 
would represent a 95% probability of detecting a WMD within a container in a U.S. port, 
and the “elimination cost” would represent the investment necessary to build and operate 
technology with that 95% detection probability.  The detection probability was combined with 
the encounter probability in a U.S. port to produce a notional “organic failure susceptibility” 
of that port.
Then, we incorporated logic gate principles from the previous layered defense modeling work 
to proxy attacker “transfer pathways” from foreign ports, through U.S. ports, and ultimately 
to inland “target cities”. These transfer pathways thus represented “inherited exploitation 
susceptibility”, as opposed to inherited vulnerability from previous work. Conceptually, this 
combined technology effectiveness modeling with network theory and is depicted in figure 
4.
We then incorporated concepts from deterrence quantification. Once we could characterize 
the organic exploitation susceptibility of a port, and incorporate inherited exploitation 
susceptibility probabilities from logic gates representing transfer pathways, we then could 
create risk equations, reflecting risk of WMD detonation in a U.S. inland city. These were 
conditional risk equations that excluded attacker intent probabilities.
These conditional risk equations could change based on the different permutations of 
transfer pathways an adversary could exploit to transfer a WMD. We converted the equations 
to utility functions, showing the expected utility an adversary would gain from detonation 
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of a WMD. Doing so allowed us to then create a game theoretic scenario case study wherein 
the defender had different options to invest in WMD detection technology equipment at U.S. 
ports, and the attacker had various pathways to exploit. From this game we gleaned proxies 
for attacker intent, here again an output of risk equations, and created unconditional risk 
equations for the inland cities. This created a different flavor of “deterrence portfolio” from 
the portfolios we had created that reflected attacker intent for direct attacks on CIKR in our 
2012 work on quantifying deterrence. This allowed us to measure how various investments 
in WMD detection technology might deter adversary exploitation of supply chains. 
Overall, this work offered an alternative to a claim in the Maritime Commerce Security Plan: 
that inspecting containers for WMD once they arrive in U.S. ports is too late.42 We suggested 
that this is not necessarily true if the target is an inland city – after the container is offloaded 
onto a truck and moved toward a large inland population center. However, we did not claim 
that it was altogether imprudent to first inspect containers overseas or at U.S. ports of entry.
Results of Notional Case Study
One finding of our case study that applied our methodology was that the best investment 
in WMD detection technology was against a specific transfer pathway that differed from 
what traditional attacker-defender modeling efforts might suggest. This was because our 
methodology did not necessarily rely on the equilibrium output of the deterrence game we 
analyzed, but instead hedged against the possibility that an adversary might not consider an 
“optimal” transfer pathway to exploit.
Another finding was that we could put discussion of possible attacker tactics to move WMD 
into the U.S. into quantitative terms. If a logic gate between a foreign port and a U.S. port 
was “AND”, this represented that the vessel the WMD was secreted upon would stop at two 
foreign ports before its voyage to the U.S. If the logic gate in our model was “OR”, this meant 
the vessel only stopped at one foreign port before its voyage to a U.S. port.
Similarly, an AND gate between the U.S. port node “layer” and target inland U.S. city meant that 
the attacker intended to “decentralize” the introduction of the WMD by offloading component 
parts at one U.S. port. Then, the vessel would continue onto another U.S. port and offload 
the remaining components. Eventually the attacker would arrange for the components to be 
reunited and continue their transit toward the inland target city. Alternatively, the OR gate 
would mean the weapon was moved through a US port of debarkation intact and ready to 
detonate upon arrival at the target city.
A practical implication of this research was that intelligence collection and analysis efforts 
might focus on attacker preferences for exploiting various US ports. This would help inform 
decisions on how to invest in WMD detection technology, accounting for foreign port 
exploitation preferences. To elaborate, if intelligence estimates were confident that multiple 
US ports would be exploited in a WMD component “decentralized introduction” effort, foreign 
port exploitation preferences would be not be especially valuable in informing investment 
decisions, per the model’s approach.
Another practical implication was that the costs to create WMD detection technology 
could be compared to the probabilistic effectiveness of detection, to calibrate a model that 
compared actual investment to “desirable investment” to maximize detection probabilities.
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The Lexicon claims that event trees are used to project forward in time, modeling probabilities 
of events leading to some future outcome, whereas fault trees look retrospectively at the 
cause of an event that has already occurred.43 Fault trees leverage logic gates to combine 
probabilities. Even though fault trees are recommended for retrospective analysis in the 
Lexicon, we offer that leveraging logic gates as proxies for attacker decision making and thus 
leveraging the fault tree approach might be a useful alternative for estimating probabilities 
of future terrorist attacks.
How We Analyze Consequence: Resilience, 
Exceedence Probability, Antifragility
Resilience
 The Lexicon defines resilience as the:
“ability of systems, infrastructures, government, business, communities, and 
individuals to resist, tolerate, absorb, recover from, prepare for, or adapt to an 
adverse occurrence that causes harm, destruction, or loss.”44
With this in mind, we refocused our attention on FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP). Taquechel had worked in an office that provided technical expertise on port security 
to FEMA, and thus developed a technical approach to model grant allocation based on a 
resilience-oriented, network-focused framework. This approach was touted as one option 
to support a prospective policy decision to convert the PSGP program to a resilience-based 
program.
Starting Simple – Networks and Resilience
Returning again to the concept of criticality, we claimed maritime supply chains could be 
modeled as nodes, here ports and inland cities, and links, here means of transportation 
between those ports/cities. We wanted to show that supply chains might depend on ports 
to keep running after a disruption, and proposed an approach to reduce the criticality of 
the ports to the overall supply chain, thereby increasing supply chain network resilience. 
Resilience funding allocations would reduce the cascading economic disruption effects 
caused by port shutdown or damage to port facilities.
First, we discussed the idea that we should identify a certain level of supply chain loss to be 
expected after an attack, but identified challenges with port facilities sharing specific data, 
for fear of violating proprietary data restrictions or disclosing information that would give 
their competitors an advantage. 
Then we claimed the current theoretical foundation underpinning the FEMA allocation of grant 
funding, the classic R=TVC equation, might be insufficient if the grant program transitioned 
to a resilience-based, network-focused approach. This was because this equation did not 
capture network metrics such as node degree (number of links to other nodes), and instead 
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took an asset-centric focus on risk, rather than a network-based focus on system resilience. 
Equation 2 below is a risk equation that accounts for node degree, thus incorporating a 
network metric:
 ∑ ∑=i igVCTR
Equation 2. Risk equation for risk to network with i nodes, g=node degree. Threat (T) is 
generic threat to network.45
We also discussed an approach to modeling system resilience that used network interdiction 
methods, an approach espoused in the OR community, and explained the difference between 
those models and probabilistic risk-based network science models.
Next, we proposed definitions of quantifiable resilience for both individual maritime supply 
chain networks and ports, because our modeling approach leveraged quantitative values of 
risk, thus linking risk and resilience. We also needed our approach to remain fairly consistent 
with the PSGP principle of allocating money to ports, and then the ports redistributing 
money to various claimants such as port CIKR. We further proposed that resilience can be 
organic and maximized with organic CIKR resources, or enhanced/further maximized with 
PSGP allocations earmarked to rebuild damages after an attack. Enhanced resilience can be 
further broken down into mathematically optimal or sub-optimal resilience, depending on 
decision maker preferences for funds allocation.
Our approach integrated aspects of OR “reverse-engineering”, but in a way we did not 
discover during our literature review. Instead of reverse-engineering systems to fine-tune 
performance for steady state operations, our approach would arguably help reverse-
engineer maritime supply chain network “performance potential” to return to standards 
after a perturbation. Also, we proposed how the network science concept of preferential 
attachment, wherein hubs accumulate increasingly more links to other nodes based on 
efficiency and optimization of function, can be counteracted by a different “preferential 
attachment” – the optimization of grant funding towards the most critical hubs to 
minimize port failure after a perturbation and thus maximize supply chain resilience. The 
“counteracting” preferential attachment demonstrated during a simulated distribution of 
resilience funding to network nodes would reduce the economic efficiency-driven SOC that 
had naturally evolved in that supply chain network.
Throughout our detailed explanation of our model’s equations, we used the phrases 
“organic failure susceptibility” and “inherited failure susceptibility” instead of “organic 
vulnerability” and “inherited vulnerability.” We wanted to emphasize that even though the 
event that precipitated a supply chain network perturbation might be paradigm 2, direct 
attack to cause cascading downstream effects, the focus of network resilience modeling was 
susceptibility to failure after the attack had occurred, not the probability the attack would 
occur in the first place.  Thus, we leveraged an approach from our work on layered defense 
against a terrorist transfer network, but modified it to accommodate probabilities of failure 
after an attack had already occurred. 
We then formulated detailed equations for supply chain network “expected consequence” 
that modified maximum consequence by applying the failure susceptibility of the nodes 
in that network. This approach also incorporated a new way to represent inherited 
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failure susceptibility: node degree or how many links the supplier node and other nodes 
had to downstream nodes.  Our previous approaches to modeling inherited exploitation 
susceptibility had treated this probability as a function of attacker preferences as modeled 
via logic gates.
Organic failure susceptibility was now a function of the probability a CIKR node would fail 
to resume production after a perturbation, based on reserve raw product, relationships 
with suppliers, and organic ability to rebuild damaged physical infrastructure onsite. This 
approach leveraged the Lexicon concept of redundancy:
“additional or alternative systems, sub-systems, assets, or processes that maintain 
a degree of overall functionality in case of loss or failure of another system, sub-
system, asset, or process.”46
Then, we created a network conditional risk equation, which excluded attacker intent 
to attack that network, specifically the maritime port CIKR. Next, we combined network 
conditional risk values to create a proxy “port conditional risk value”. Fourth, we developed 
an equation for “port organic resilience” as a function of port conditional risk, and developed 
“resilience ratios” for each port to govern the first “macro-distribution” of PSGP funding to 
individual ports. In an approach that was reminiscent of  how we converted risk to utility for 
deterrence and threat analysis, we converted risk to resilience metrics in this approach. 
Fifth, we showed how our approach could accommodate flexibility to distribute funding 
to ports based on unconditional port risk as an alternative to conditional port risk. This 
leveraged the principle of intent ratios from our work on quantifying deterrence, and 
changed the formulation of the port organic resilience equation. Sixth, we proposed an 
equation for supply chain network organic resilience, to help guide “micro-distribution” of 
PSGP funding or subsequent redistribution to maritime CIKR claimants within each port. 
Just as port organic resilience can be based on conditional or unconditional port risk, we 
showed how to model network organic resilience based on conditional or unconditional 
network risk. 
Seventh, we revisited the MBRA iterative emergence-based algorithm to be used to optimize 
PSGP funding distribution amongst CIKR nodes in each port’s supply chains.  The objective 
function of this algorithm was now to maximize port resilience, enabling us to convert 
organic port resilience to enhanced port resilience. Importantly, this approach optimized 
by allocating to multiple CIKR within a port, rather than allocating all resources to the most 
“attractive” CIKR. Eighth, we explained how this optimization would create enhanced supply 
chain network resilience as a function of network conditional risk after optimal allocation. 
We then summed the new network conditional risk values to get port conditional risk after 
an equilibrium allocation was achieved, and then created a new enhanced port resilience 
value. 
Ultimately, we created an approach to synthesize risk, resilience, network science, 
performance constraints and tradeoffs, optimization, and quantification of deterrence in a 
unified modeling/simulation approach to potentially support a paradigm shift in an existing 
DHS program.
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Increasing Complexity - Normal Accident Theory, Self-
Organizing Criticality, Topology, Exceedence Probability, 
and Antifragility
We now return to the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC). SOC reflects the catastrophic 
failure potential of a tightly coupled system prone to cascading failures. With this in mind, 
we discuss a related theory. Three key ingredients of Perrow’s normal accident theory are 
(1) two failures in a system coming together in an unexpected way; (2) failures cascade 
faster if the system is tightly coupled, and (3) systems prone to normal accident theory 
have “catastrophic potential.”47 Lewis then goes on to explain how power laws can be used 
to model unpredictability in systems, and how coupledness of system components can be 
modeled using network theory. 
Topology can also proxy SOC, as discussed earlier. In previous discussions of approaches to 
characterizing vulnerability, we discussed how logic gates can be a proxy for attacker transfer 
pathway preferences, and are thus a proxy for network topology. Alternatively, we showed 
how the degree of supply chain nodes, node degree being another proxy for topology, can 
influence resilience in the port security grant reallocation approach. Essentially, topology 
influences the coupledness of systems. 
If the topology is such that one hub in a network has many links and other hubs have 
significantly fewer, that network may be considered “scale-free” and likely has a low resilience 
exponent and is a high risk system.  We will explain resilience exponent later. That is, if the 
hub fails and transmits the failure throughout its many links to other nodes, or other nodes 
are cut off from supply, the network fails, possibly catastrophically. 
Thus, topology is related to network fragility. One way a network becomes fragile is “link 
percolation” or accumulation of links at a hub, rendering the system more efficient but also 
more prone to collapse if the hub fails.48 If links percolate at multiple nodes, not just the hub, 
this may have different implications for network topology, fragility, and SOC.
Network Science Metrics, SOC, and 
Organic vs Inherited Failure/Exploitation 
Susceptibility
We can argue that node degree of a network’s hub, or node with highest link percolation, 
is a way to proxy network inherited vulnerability or inherited exploitation susceptibility. 
Furthermore, we can propose that transfer pathways as a proxy for network topology are 
also a proxy for inherited failure or inherited exploitation susceptibility of a network.  This 
dyad of “physical links” vs “virtual links” is now further explained.
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Transfer Networks – Exploitation Susceptibility
A WMD transfer network has high organic exploitation susceptibility if the WMD detection 
equipment at its nodes is poor. Coupled with OR gates between nodes, here meaning 
terrorists prefer to ship the WMD components from one foreign port to one U.S. port of 
exploitation, thus reducing opportunities for detection, this network would have a high 
exploitation susceptibility, would be fragile, and thus would have high SOC. The prominence 
of OR gates as a “virtual link” may have similar effect as physical link percolation, in the 
sense that many links increase exploitation susceptibility by creating many opportunities to 
transfer a contagion throughout a network.
Focusing on organic exploitation susceptibility, Lewis suggests it makes sense to protect 
highly connected hubs to prevent network failure. By increasing security at these hubs, we can 
reduce organic vulnerability or exploitation susceptibility.  Returning to the WMD modeling 
approach, increasing WMD detection technology capability at foreign ports reduces organic 
exploitation susceptibility of those ports. If they are “hubs” for U.S. shipments, meaning 
a preponderance of container ships flow through that foreign port enroute to U.S. ports, 
improving security should in theory reduce overall network exploitation susceptibility and 
reduce risk, the inherited susceptibilities notwithstanding.
Also, networks can be “rewired” to reduce self-organized criticality, thus changing inherited 
failure susceptibility. If a hub has some links removed and re-wired to other nodes, the 
inherited failure susceptibility of downstream nodes might be lowered. To wit, if the newly 
“less connected” node fails, subsequent cascading network failure may be less likely or have 
less impact since fewer nodes depend on the hub.  However, we would have to evaluate the 
flow of a failure throughout the remainder of the network if other nodes now have higher 
degree.
In the case of a WMD transfer network, if an attacker’s desired transfer pathway to move a 
WMD is forced to change to a riskier pathway (e.g. the AND logic gate which means multiple 
ports are exploited, increasing their chances of detection), in effect we have “de-percolated” 
the network. De-percolation may mean reducing the overall number of links in a network, 
but here we suggest it could also mean re-wiring links away from a hub, reducing degree 
of that hub. The parallel argument here is that we have reduced options available to the 
attacker, the equivalent of an AND gate, forcing them to exploit multiple U.S. ports rather 
than just one. We have thereby increased chances of detection, the organic node WMD 
detection capabilities notwithstanding, and arguably have reduced SOC.
Supply Chain Networks – Failure Susceptibility
If a maritime port CIKR has many transportation links leading outward to downstream 
nodes, it has a high degree. Moreover, if that hub and its links (e.g. rail transport in and out 
of a refinery) are poorly protected, that poor security is a proxy for high network organic 
exploitation susceptibility. High organic node failure susceptibility (poor security) but few 
links (low degree) may not have an overall effect on network resilience.
Also, if there are many AND logic gates between nodes, meaning a node needs the supply of 
multiple upstream suppliers, not just one, then that proxy for network topology increases 
the inherited failure susceptibility of the network. Therefore, high hub node organic failure 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  22
susceptibility, coupled with a certain network topology of logic gates, may increase overall 
supply chain network SOC to the point of high likelihood of collapse.
Link Density and Topology?
Is link density a good proxy for network topology, or helpful for estimating SOC of a network? 
Link density represents the ratio of actual links to possible links in a network.49 Many links 
may mean a contagion (e.g. a container with a WMD) can spread easily through a network, 
meaning a terrorist organization has many options to move the weapon from one node to 
another. However, many links might also mean a network is resilient, meaning if one link that 
moves a commodity to another node fails, other links exist to shoulder the load. So, it may 
depend on what kind of network we are analyzing.
If we are assessing a WMD transfer network, link density may mean there are many links 
between nodes, or that terrorists consider attractive many different possible transshipment 
routes between foreign ports, US ports, and inland cities. Therefore, a transfer network with 
a high link density might naturally be highly exploitable, or have high inherited exploitation 
susceptibility, notwithstanding the organic security at individual ports of embarkation and 
debarkation. This network might be said to have high SOC (unless every individual node 
is highly organically resistant to exploitation). In contrast, a transfer network with low link 
density might mean very few of the possible transfer pathways are attractive to a terrorist 
organization. That network would have low SOC.
However, high link density in a supply chain network such as the one we analyzed in our work 
on the PSGP and resilience might mean something different. If the port “hub” of the network 
fails or supplier nodes are damaged, downstream cascading effects might be minimized if 
there are many links. But this would also require high link security or link resilience. Also, it 
may not matter how many resilient or redundant links exist in the network if CIKR within the 
port “hub” are the sole sources of supply in the network, but are damaged. Thus, link density 
may not be a useful metric to ascertain network SOC in this type of CIKR network.
Other Examples of Organic and Inherited 
Failure/Exploitation Susceptibility
The organic vs inherited failure/exploitation susceptibility dyad appears in other discussions 
of SOC. For example, Lewis (2011) discusses how to minimize the spread of disease through 
analysis of a “social network” of people. Prevention of disease is difficult due to the 
adaptability of microorganisms in response to the evolution of vaccines.50 Therefore, it is 
difficult to reduce the “organic infection susceptibility”, another way of saying “vulnerability 
to disease”, of individual humans. 
However, the alternative could be to change the topology of the human social network through 
quarantining measures. This would in effect reduce “inherited infection susceptibility” by 
increasing the length of the links a disease organism must travel between human “nodes” 
to propagate the infection. Whereas reduction of the number of links in a network is link 
depercolation, here one can conceive how increasing the length of links between people 
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could essentially have the same effect as link de-percolation. Conservation of energy means 
that longer links take energy from shorter links, requiring more expenditure of energy for 
a disease to propagate, and thus decreasing the likelihood of sustained infection within a 
population.51  The individual ability of each person to fight infection when exposed is less 
relevant here; if the disease cannot travel, even the weakest person would be immune.
Lewis summarizes his discussion of de-percolating human social networks by claiming that 
“inoculation is a form of hardening that reduces vulnerability while depercolation is a form 
of resiliency that reduces consequence.”52 Here we expand on that concept and claim an 
alternative interpretation is that inoculation reduces organic failure susceptibility, while 
quarantine and isolation (depercolation) is also a hardening that reduces network- inherited 
failure susceptibility. By making it more difficult for failures to cascade between critical 
infrastructures, for example by increasing redundant sources of supply for downstream 
refineries in a petrochemical supply chain network, we might de-percolate CIKR networks 
through removing or effectively bypassing “infected” links. By doing so, we “isolate” infections, 
here the spread of supply chain failure. Thus, we minimize inherited failure susceptibility, 
and increase resilience and minimize network SOC. 
Long Links: Better or Worse?
Longer links could be good if we are trying to minimize cascading failures brought on by 
epidemics, or in the case of CIKR protection, failures brought on by exploiting maritime ports 
to transship a WMD in a container. However, longer links can also be a burden and increase 
SOC of CIKR networks. This can be demonstrated with a study of the evolution of the power 
sector. Over time, this sector has evolved and approached SOC through a combination of 
economic and regulatory forces. Essentially, longer transmission lines between generation 
stations and customers have increased the fragility of the power network, as these lines 
become subject to failure from excessive load.53 The longer links have the opposite effect if 
we are trying to protect our CIKR from failure; instead of making it more difficult for failures 
to propagate throughout a system, the links themselves are subject to failure. Link density 
and length may represent a catch 22 for network protection and resilience.
Exceedence Probability
Another concept to consider in resilience analysis is that of exceedence probability. The 
components of the standard DHS risk equation leverage probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) 
terms that focus on the probability an attack will be successful given it is attempted. When 
multiplied by consequence of that attack, we get risk. However, what if we instead consider 
the probability that the magnitude (consequence) of an event will exceed a certain threshold, 
rather than focusing on the probability the event will occur in the first place? 
This might constitute a paradigm shift of a different flavor. OR advocates have warned against 
static quantifications of threat, claiming that it fails to account for adaptive adversaries. 
One shift in response to that concern has been to modify the treatment of threat, through 
deterrence measurement as described earlier. However, a second shift could be to consider 
the probability of the consequence exceeding a pre-determined level, hence the term 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  24
exceedence probability. This way, the issue with static vs dynamic probabilities of attack 
occurrence may be bypassed.
The insurance industry uses exceedence probability to set premiums. For examples, see 
Grossi and Kunreuther.54 More recently, Lewis et al. (2011) have used it to classify various 
hazards CIKR networks face as low risk (high resilience) or high risk (low resilience).55 
Exceedence probability is used to create a “resilience exponent” of a network, shown in 
Equation 3:
 qCCEPPML −== 1)(
Equation 3. Probable maximum loss (PML) as a function of resilience exponent “q”56
Now, instead of PRA, we have PML as an alternative expression of risk, for systems of CIKR.57 
q is the resilience exponent, derived from plotting exceedence probability of the system 
failure exceeding a certain threshold, which yields a power law. If q>1, the system is low risk, 
or high resilience. If q <1, the system is high risk, or low resilience.
Low risk systems, as characterized by Equation 3, may adapt. High risk systems may collapse 
and fail, becoming extinct. This distinction between higher and lower-risk systems can be 
reflected in a feedback loop diagram of “punctuated reality”.
Figure 5. The two major feedback loops of Punctuated Reality58
In this depiction, systems evolve and approach SOC. A “normal accident”, punctuating the 
equilibrium that existed until that point, will occur and the system may adapt, increasing SOC 
even more and re-establishing a new equilibrium. However, a “black swan” event of much 
higher consequence but lower probability may occur, driving the system toward extinction 
rather than adaptation. Low risk (high resilience) systems may be grouped with those that 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  25
can achieve small adaptations, but also withstand black swan events, whereas high risk (low 
resilience) systems may become extinct after a black swan event cripples that system.
Returning to the discussion of supply chain networks and resilience, over time these systems 
might evolve to become more efficient. However, what happens when a Deepwater Horizon 
occurs? Arguably this was a Black Swan-type event. This paper does not explore the details 
of how the petrochemical supply chain in the Gulf of Mexico was impacted, but imagine if 
the system was optimized such that the Deepwater Horizon platform was the sole source 
of feedstock to the major Gulf refineries? From an economic standpoint, that might have 
made sense, but from a redundancy and resilience standpoint, the consequences could be 
catastrophic.
SOC can be reduced, and system resilience thus increased, by “increasing the resilience 
exponent” of a system per Equation 3. How do we do this for CIKR systems? Lewis proposes 
some ways: adding surge capacity, operating systems below capacity, and redesigning 
networks altogether.59 But, these solutions are not without costs. 
The Future – “Antifragility”?
In addition to SOC and exceedence probability, can we extend past resilience and apply 
the concept of antifragility to CIKR protection? Nassim Nicholas Taleb has written about 
the concept of “antifragility”, which essentially describes systems that actually benefit from 
disorder, rather than suffer.60 He emphasizes in his works that antifragility is not the same as 
resilience. The latter term means the ability to return to a pre-perturbation state; whereas 
the former term means the system will exceed pre-perturbation performance levels. 
This is an interesting concept to explain complex systems like the stock market, where Taleb 
has experience and observed phenomena that influenced his theories and publications, 
but what are the implications, if any, for CIKR system protection and resilience? Taleb 
differentiates between “mechanical” systems, that wear from use, and “organic” systems, 
which actually benefit from stress and (reasonable) perturbations.61 For example, humans 
as organic “networks” of organ systems and sub-systems benefit from strenuous exercise 
over time, whereas a washing machine will wear over time with strenuous use, even with 
consistent maintenance. If we believe CIKR networks are “mechanical” systems, it may be 
futile to hope perturbations are beneficial. However, if we believe the “organic” model can 
be applied to CIKR networks, perhaps systems of CIKR can improve after shocks.
For example, how will the Gulf coast petrochemical industry network adapt to Deepwater 
Horizon? It may be too early to tell, but many years from now, we might compare productivity 
and other appropriate metrics to pre-Deepwater levels, and conjecture whether this disaster 
contributed to long term improvement in petrochemical supply chain network management. 
An example from popular culture could further illustrate. In Forrest Gump, the protagonist’s 
shrimping vessel was subject to perturbations during the storm, but was robust to the 
elements and survived, while the rest of the fleet was brittle as they were tied up at the 
pier and were destroyed by the elements. Gump’s subsequent monopoly on the shrimping 
industry may reflect a flavor of “antifragility” if we consider the entire shrimping community 
as a network. In fact, the shrimping business might have improved from pre-storm levels. 
With less competition, the risk of overexploiting the resource may have diminished, allowing 
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better stock health and improving the overall market. This may be an example of a mitigating 
effect on the “tragedy of the commons”, where a common resource is overexploited to the 
eventual detriment of all. Taleb claims that “the antifragility of some comes necessarily at 
the expense of others.”62
Organic systems supposedly respond to acute stressors better than chronic stressors.63 
As a real world example, one author has claimed downtown Manhattan, as an “economic 
system”, may have benefitted from the tragedy of 9/11.64 It may seem distasteful to claim 
that long term benefit is a product of disaster, but if we look at the hard numbers, we may 
have a case. Arguably, 9/11 was an “acute stressor.”
Also, organic networks tend to be self-healing.65 During 2012, the New England and New 
York petrochemical facilities adapted in the aftermath of Hurricane SANDY. They found 
feedstock from other sources and shared information that they might otherwise manage as 
proprietary information, to facilitate recovery. Does any data support that those networks 
are stronger now than they were before SANDY?
Returning to the concept of resilience exponent, the Taleb arguments might extend the 
utility of this exponent beyond only representing a proxy for system resilience. Could we 
hypothesize that q could predict antifragility of CIKR networks? The lower the exponent, 
the more likely the system could benefit from perturbation, increasing output or other 
performance metrics. This claim would be subject to modeling/simulation and real world 
event validation. 
In our 2013 paper on PSGP resilience, we emphasized that the “desired” post-perturbation 
system performance level would have to be agreed upon in order to establish a baseline 
for the resilience modeling effort.66 If stakeholders agree that a goal should be to come 
back stronger after a perturbation, this would transition the notional model from resilience 
evaluation to antifragility evaluation. It is unclear how specific resilience investments to 
rebuild damaged infrastructure would increase productivity beyond pre-perturbation levels, 
but this is an exercise for future research.
However, there are also arguments against conceptualizing CIKR networks as organic 
systems. We might claim that if individual CIKR within a network were antifragile, that means 
the system is also antifragile. For example, as we improve ability to restore node productivity 
past pre-perturbation levels, thus improving overall system resilience, we might improve 
system antifragility. However, Taleb’s claim regarding organic system antifragility is that the 
individual component is fragile whereas the whole is antifragile. Taleb offers the example 
of genes: humans are individually fragile and thus die, but we may propagate our genetic 
information before death, meaning the human race writ large is antifragile.67 Therefore, 
this concept might not apply to networks if we claim improving hubs improves the overall 
network.
Survival of the Fittest?
Taleb discusses the concept of autophagy, wherein weaker cells in an organism are killed, 
but the remaining cells become even stronger.68 Can we apply this concept to the CIKR 
network discussion? This might suggest that laissez-faire economic policies to let industry 
grow unchecked and let market forces govern would be the ideal approach. The weaker 
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industries would fail or be subject to merger/acquisition. Taleb advocates against excessive 
intervention in the markets, citing the concept of “iatrogenics” — intervention to manage 
complex systems that yield long term deleterious effects exceeding benefits of that 
intervention.69
However, Lewis might argue that laissez-faire policies would enable the evolution of SOC 
in CIKR networks — economic efficiency at expense of resilience. History has shown that 
various sectors in the economy tend toward SOC when de-regulated. This would make 
networks fragile, not antifragile. Therefore, some government regulation might be necessary 
to ensure antifragility.
A third view could be that is it better for overall antifragility to let SOC evolve and then 
weaker CIKR systems are eliminated during a punctuated equilibrium or Black Swan event. 
This would be some low probability but extremely high consequence disaster that affected 
business networks in a way that the SOC made them vulnerable to. The weak networks 
would collapse; the resilient networks would survive; antifragile systems would “thrive” and 
benefit from perturbations. Survival of fittest at the “national economy” ecosystem level, 
if not at the individual CIKR system level, could be the best approach. Managing public 
expectation for supply of certain commodities would be critical.
Taleb claims “antifragility of higher levels may require the fragility of lower levels within 
an ecosystem.”70 In other words, local but not global overconfidence is good within the 
economic ecosystem — we want individuals to take risks and fail which means systems 
should improve over time.71 We might extend this argument to claim that individual business 
systems will take risks and fail, which means the national economy should in theory improve 
over time as lessons are learned (and hopefully heeded!)
A final thought on Taleb’s analysis. He discusses “transferring fragility from the collective 
to the unfit.”72 For example, in 2009 the federal government bailed out failing banks. Did 
this make them more fragile over the long term because they did not have to bear the 
consequences of their decisions? Applying this logic to the PSGP program, if we subsidize 
maritime CIKR “hubs” through port security grants, we harden the hubs and increase 
resilience from a network science perspective — but are we inadvertently harming the system 
by decreasing self-reliance in those hubs? If left to their own devices but encouraged to be 
individually antifragile, without government subsidy, would they ignore that encouragement 
and continue to optimize for economic efficiency but decrease system resilience? 
SOC arguably reflects the reverse argument: transfer of fragility from the individually unfit 
MCIKR to the collective. As a hub accumulates more influence over a network (e.g., through 
link accumulation) but fails to increase security or individual node resilience, the entire 
network resilience may suffer as a perturbation to that node could have cascading effects 
throughout the entire system. Again, we are back to a dilemma: do we allow market forces 
and deregulation to permit SOC and transfer of fragility from the unfit to the collective, 
knowing that if a system fails, the next system may or may not be stronger? Or, do we 
transfer fragility from the collective to the unfit and regulate industry such that resilience is 
increased but economic efficiency may be stifled? Is there a balance between the two goals?
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Alternative Futures
The Lexicon defines “alternative futures analysis” as:
“a set of techniques used to explore different future states developed by varying a 
set of key trends, drivers, and/or conditions.”73 
One example is a statistical forecasting technique known as Winter’s method, used in the 
past by DHS to project anticipated migrant flow in the Caribbean based on political and 
economic “push-pull” factors. If these alternative futures techniques included forecasting of 
probabilities, Taleb might object, as the “black swan” or low probability, high-consequence 
event cannot be predicted by ordinary probability estimates. Therefore, to have credibility in 
Taleb’s world, alternative futures analysis might predict the range of possible consequences 
of an outcome, and then decision makers could hedge for the worst case consequence, 
rather than relying solely on probability estimates. If we adopted this philosophy, we would 
be well advised to look at the magnitude and reach of previous disasters, and optimize 
systems for these consequences first, and then make refinements for economic efficiency 
second.
Putting It All Together: Implications for 
CIKR Protection and Resilience?
We have given examples of how to analyze threat, vulnerability, and consequence in different 
ways. If we use intent as the output of game theoretic modeling, our risk equations may 
account for “tactical intelligence” as well as “strategic intelligence” and may have implications 
for deterrence. If we model layered defenses against terrorist transfer of WMD as a network 
and use logic gates as proxies for attacker preferences, absent more specific intelligence, 
this approach may provide us with alternate analysis to inform where to invest in WMD 
detection technology. If we model ports as “hubs” with downstream customer networks, 
and estimate network resilience, that may have implications for how we allocate funding to 
protect our port infrastructure through grant programs.
Also, if we calculate exceedence probability and probable maximum loss to CIKR networks 
instead of the traditional PRA calculations, would this have implications for how we allocate 
resources? Should we allocate prevention-based resources to high risk/low resilience 
systems to try and protect against the “black swans”? For higher-resilience or lower risk 
systems, should we allocate resources toward responding to higher probability, but lower 
consequence events? Finally, is resilience enough? Are there ways to engineer CIKR systems 
to come back even stronger after a perturbation, or promote “antifragility”?
The Lexicon defines “risk governance” as:
“actors, rules, practices, processes, and mechanisms concerned with how risk is 
analyzed, managed, and communicated.”74
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If we believe the theories behind CIKR risk analysis, protection, and resilience are evolving, 
then that naturally influences the “rules, practices, and processes” concerned with how risk 
is analyzed, managed, and communicated. The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR) of 2014 emphasizes deterring terrorists, interdicting WMDs, and safeguarding 
legal trade.75 It also acknowledges CIKR network interdependencies, and that networked 
partnership is important to combat terrorism. We hope that the ideas posed in this paper 
will help inform theory and practice as the homeland security and emergency management 
enterprise evolves in its understanding of risk. 
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Abstract
Despite the emphasis on resilience, disasters continue to challenge the response 
capacities of communities around the United States. These challenges are generated by 
the complexities and uncertainties present in the post-disaster environment. This article 
presents the findings of an exploratory investigation into the development and evolution of 
four disaster response networks that formed along the Gulf Coast, Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita in 2005, and Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Ike in 2008. Using data collected 
from newspaper articles that referenced each hurricane during a period that spanned six 
days prior to landfall to twenty-two days after landfall, we identified the organizations 
that participated in each response network. We then used UCINET 6 to calculate network 
density and degree centralization, plotted longitudinally by date, and evaluated whether 
each network underwent structural change. The findings demonstrate that all four 
response networks underwent structural change, as a large heterogeneous collection of 
response organizations came together, collected and disseminated information, and sought 
to identify and implement solutions that would address the needs of those affected by the 
disaster event. While additional research is necessary to reveal the causal factors behind 
these structural changes, the findings presented in this article suggest that investments 
in information communication technologies, such as those made by the state of Louisiana 
after Hurricane Katrina, can help to facilitate the resilience of disaster response networks.
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Introduction
The concept of resilience has become a central focus of emphasis for disaster and emergency 
management researchers and policy-makers. The United States Department of State officially 
recognized resilience, defined as “the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, 
withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.”1 The U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
(2012) further refined this definition in its report, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, 
which serves as a working guide to resilience studies in both research and practice. Likewise, 
the Department of Homeland Security indicated that strengthening resilience was one 
of its five critical missions in its 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.2 The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also considers resilience to be a component of its 
National Preparedness Goal, which it identifies as “[a] secure and resilient nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”3
Despite the emphasis on resilience as a public policy goal, disasters continue to challenge 
the response capacities of communities around the United States. These challenges are 
generated by the complexities and uncertainties present in the post-disaster environment. 
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For public managers, complexity refers to the characteristics of a system, which means 
that complexity can refer to ill-structured administrative problems,4 mismatches between 
organizational structures and operational conditions,5 and the inability to identify and 
understand the linkages that exist within a system.6 Uncertainty, in contrast, refers to the 
sense of doubt that blocks or delays a decision maker’s actions.7 According to Elinor Ostrom, 
policy institutions often provide policy actors with the opportunity to pursue multiple policy 
choices.8 Since the choices taken by policy actors are often interdependent, this variety of 
choices can create uncertainty in the policy environment. Thus, a decision maker may know 
the type of action that she should take to obtain a certain outcome, but in an uncertain 
environment, she is unable to predict with any degree of confidence which of the possible 
actions will enable her to obtain the desired outcome. 
In a disaster management context, complexities and uncertainties can undermine 
administrative effectiveness9 and generate cascades of failures.10 When such failures occur, 
the activities undertaken by disaster response organizations can become delayed, sporadic 
and ineffective, thereby leaving vulnerable populations subject to further risk. Recognizing 
this constraint, some governments have sought to manage uncertainty and complexity by 
using information technologies to facilitate information exchange and improve decision 
making.11 Thus, an important question is whether, and to what extent, access to information 
shapes the capacity of an organizational network to mobilize and structure disaster response 
operations? 
This article presents the findings of an exploratory investigation into whether investments in 
information technology can affect the structural development and evolution of four disaster 
operations networks that formed in response to hurricanes along the Gulf Coast.12 Two of 
these networks formed in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Hurricane Rita in 
Texas. The other two networks formed in 2008 after Hurricane Gustav in Louisiana and after 
Hurricane Ike in Texas. After a brief introduction to resilience, this article explores three 
streams of literature relevant to this inquiry: inter-organizational network theory, complex 
adaptive systems theory, and social-technical systems theory. The second section reviews 
the four cases investigated by this study, focusing on the consequences of the events and 
the operational conditions under which the disaster response networks emerged. The 
third section presents the study’s research questions and methods of analysis. After the 
presentation of the findings, the article concludes by identifying policy implications for 
improving resilience of disaster response networks.
Resilience as an Evolving Concept
Aaron Wildavsky defined resilience as “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after 
they have become manifest, learning to bounce back.”13 Alternative definitions construe 
resilience as the adaptability of systems to new environments through rapid transformation 
of existing resources to new demands. These approaches underline the role of information 
and information exchange in the facilitation of resilience.14 Although the focus of significant 
discussion, disaster management scholars and practitioners have yet to formulate a 
consensus as to what resilience means and how resilience should be evaluated. Recent 
research into the components and indicators of community resilience, however, has begun 
to advance the study of resilience.15 Ashley Ross, for example, conceptualizes resilience as a 
dynamic phenomenon that is driven by a set of adaptive capacities and processes.16 In this 
article, we applied this definition of resilience to the study of disaster response networks. 
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Three streams of literature are relevant to this investigation of resilience in disaster response 
networks.
Inter-Organizational Networks 
According to Michael McGuire, networks are “multiorganizational arrangements for 
solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by a single organization.”17 
These networked arrangements are considered superior to traditional administrative 
structures. Networks provide an alternative to hierarchy and specialization, meaning they 
can accommodate a diversity of organizations – public, private, and nonprofit – which 
can work together to achieve collective goals.18 Networks are also highly flexible, enabling 
their constituent organizations to adapt their interactions in response to changes in the 
operational environment. Further, networks are scalable to the extent that their participants 
have the capacity to seek assistance from other organizations, whether vertically by level of 
jurisdiction or horizontally by source of funding. Finally, networks enable participants to 
identify and acquire the information and resources they need to complete their activities.19 
Provan and Kenis note that networks provide a community of organizations with the 
structure they need to interact with one another and engage in learning activities.20 As such, 
a network of organizations designs a structure that enables its members to learn how to 
modify their activities within, and in response to, the complexities and uncertainties present 
in the operational environment.21 Similarly, a network’s interaction structure can facilitate 
the efficient distribution of resources, which is important for disaster response networks.22 
As they work to structure and re-structure their relationships, organizations in a disaster 
response network can quickly locate resources such as information, money, personnel 
and equipment, and move these resources to where they are needed. Although the inter-
organizational network literature suggests that networked governance structures are 
better positioned than traditional governmental structures to address the dynamic and ill-
structured policy problems, the literature does not specify the processes that organizations 
would use to overcome the uncertainties and complexities present in the operational 
environment. 
Proposition 1: A resilient disaster response network will be comprised of a 
heterogeneous collection of organizations that interact with one another to pursue and 
obtain collective goals.
Complex Adaptive Systems
A second stream of literature suggests that a disaster response network comprised of a 
heterogeneous collection of organizations may have the capacity to adapt in response to 
the uncertainties and complexities of changing environments.23 This adaptive capacity 
emerges when a system of organizations operates as a complex adaptive system, that is, 
a non-linear system of interdependent agents that collectively learn how to adjust their 
activities in reaction to environmental changes.24 The agents present in such systems 
receive information about the external environment. When a decision is needed, agents use 
internal models of rules to analyze the information they receive, which gives them insight 
into the actions that they should take. These rules draw upon internal cognitive building 
blocks, which agents employ to simplify their environment.25 In the public administration 
context, these building blocks take the form of signals that may be communicated through 
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memoranda and directives, and boundaries that may be established by legislation and 
agency mission statements.26
Complex adaptive systems theory can be used to investigate the resilience of disaster 
response networks. In the words of Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen, a system of agents 
can harness complexity by acknowledging the interdependent relationships that exist in a 
system and taking deliberate action to restructure the system to align with a desired measure 
of performance.27 For example, a policy-maker might encourage the organizations in a 
disaster response network to modify their actions by permitting them to exploit emergent 
opportunities and rewarding them when they identify novel solutions.28 Policy-makers may 
encourage organizations to modify their interaction patterns by enabling them to make 
internal procedural adjustments or by adjusting their operational environment, perhaps by 
exempting them from regulatory requirements during a crisis. Finally, policy-makers may 
encourage organizations to identify and select successful strategies by providing them with 
a clear understanding of what constitutes success, and rewarding them when they cast 
aside ineffective strategies.29 In a disaster context, inter-organizational relationships are a 
central aspect of this adaptive process because they lead to the development of “networks 
of reciprocal interaction that foster trust and cooperation.”30 
Proposition 2:  Learning, adaptation, and structural adjustment to environmental 
uncertainties and complexities are indicators of resilience in a disaster response network. 
Sociotechnical Systems and Information Technology
A third stream of literature suggests that information technology can support a disaster 
response network’s capacity to adapt to uncertainty and complexity. That is, information 
technology represents a tool that can bring together a disconnected and spatially separated 
community of organizations.31 Information technology provides officials with the ability to 
scan the operational environment, detect and verify potential risks, and transmit risk and 
response information across an expansive network of organizations charged with disaster 
management and operational responsibilities.32 
Albert Charns argued that the integration of technology within a social structure leads 
to the development of a sociotechnical system.33 Herbert Simon considered design as a 
means of structuring relationships among human beings, organizations, and technology.34 A 
sociotechnical system drives the processes of adaptation within a networked system, thereby 
enabling it to adjust and reorganize as required by changing conditions in the environment.35 
There are several ways that technology can strengthen the capacities for performance and 
processes of adaptation in disaster response networks. The National Academies of Sciences 
identified three disaster management functions that were enabled through information 
technology: 1) robust, interoperable and priority-sensitive communications; 2) development 
of situational awareness and common operating picture; and 3) improved decision 
support, resource tracking, and resources allocation.36 All three functions are supported 
by information technology that, properly designed and implemented, can facilitate learning 
and adaption in a disaster response network. 
Proposition 3: Information Communication Technologies (ICT), properly designed 
and implemented, can facilitate resilience (learning, adaptation, and structural adjustment) 
within disaster response networks. 
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An extensive body of literature focuses on networks and their roles in disaster management 
contexts. Empirical investigations of disaster response networks, for example, often 
focus on networks at a specific point in time (e.g., a single day) or as an aggregation of 
several points in time (e.g., a collective set of days or weeks). Investigations such as these 
have demonstrated the importance of disaster response networks and the existence of 
problematic resource and information gaps between organizations.37 In the context of 
resilience, however, these studies provide little insight into how disaster response networks 
emerge or evolve over time. Further, the literature on disaster response networks says little 
about network effectiveness, suggesting that the factors or conditions that promote or 
inhibit the resilience of disaster response networks are not yet fully identified. Relatedly, the 
extent to which policy changes might influence the emergence, evolution, and performance 
of disaster response networks is not yet known.  
Case Study Selection
To evaluate the three propositions identified above, we conducted a small-n case study of 
the interaction structures of disaster response networks that formed after four Gulf Coast 
hurricanes. Specifically, we identify and compare the structural features of the organizational 
response networks that formed in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and 
Hurricane Rita in Texas, with those that formed in 2008 following Hurricane Gustav in 
Louisiana and Hurricane Ike in Texas.
Louisiana: Hurricane Katrina, 2005 and Hurricane 
Gustav, 2008
Classified as one of the deadliest disaster events in the history of the United States, Hurricane 
Katrina struck the coast of Louisiana east of New Orleans the morning of August 29, 2005. 
Although New Orleans managed to withstand Hurricane Katrina’s impact, the storm surge 
and rainfall-induced flooding caused the subsequent failure of the levee systems, which 
inundated large portions of the city. In the days that followed, disaster management officials 
worked to avert an even larger humanitarian catastrophe. The federal government reported 
that Hurricane Katrina affected 41 of the state’s 64 parishes, caused approximately 1,100 
deaths, and generated US$ 100 billion of damage.38 Approximately three years later, on 
September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav came ashore in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana as a 
Category 2 storm. The National Weather Service reported that Hurricane Gustav weakened 
to a tropical depression, but continued to produce severe winds, tornados, and substantial 
rainfall, as much as twenty-one inches in some areas, as the storm slowly moved north 
beyond Baton Rouge.39 In Louisiana, Hurricane Gustav was responsible for seven deaths and 
an estimated US$ 4.618 billion of damages.
Texas: Hurricane Rita, 2005 and Hurricane Ike, 2008
Less than three weeks after Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 Hurricane called Rita was 
moving towards the western coast of the Gulf of Mexico.40 Given the devastation wrought 
by Hurricane Katrina, government officials were concerned about the threats that Hurricane 
Rita posed to the oil and gas industry. Equally important, Hurricane Rita threatened the city 
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of Houston, so officials ordered wide scale evacuations. According to the National Weather 
Service, Hurricane Rita came ashore between Sabine Pass, Texas and Johnson’s Bayou the 
morning of September 24, 2005 as a Category 2 Hurricane. Fortunately, the region avoided 
a catastrophe, with only two reported fatalities. Nevertheless, Hurricane Rita caused more 
than US$ 12 billion of damages. In after action reports, discussions about the governmental 
response to Hurricane Rita focused on the massive traffic jams caused by the evacuation 
orders. On September 13, 2008, almost three years after Hurricane Rita, a Category 2 storm 
named Hurricane Ike made landfall near Galveston, Texas.41 Along Galveston Bay, the storm 
surge increased to between ten and fifteen feet. Hurricane Ike’s sustained winds generated 
several tornados and severely damaged Houston’s downtown area. The storm took the 
lives of 21 Texans, and at least 16 people remained missing as of August 2011. Hurricane 
Ike became the third most expensive hurricane in the history of the United States, with 
damages estimated to be more than US$ 29.5 billion.42
Separated by a period of three years, these two sets of hurricane events make it possible 
to compare the structures of the disaster response networks that emerged to operate in 
the same general region of the United States. Many of the organizations, especially the 
public emergency management agencies, were present in both Louisiana and Texas for all 
four hurricanes, which increases the comparability of these disaster response networks. 
However, while activities of Texas and Louisiana were guided by federal laws and policies, 
each state had developed different perceptions of risk, and made different policy choices 
regarding the management of information in their respective communities in the months 
and years that followed the first hurricane event. Given that these four cases represent a 
valid small-n field study for the examination of the resilience of disaster response networks, 
we investigate the theoretical propositions stated above through an exploration of four 
comparative research questions:
1. To what extent were the four disaster response networks characterized by heterogeneity 
in contrast to homogeneity in the respective sets of participating organizations? 
2. At what rate did response organizations interact with other organizations in these four 
disaster response networks? 
3. To what extent did the interactions exchanged among response organizations drive the 
structural evolution of these four disaster response networks? 
4. To what extent did investments in information technology and training between hurricane 
events facilitate structural changes in the disaster response networks? 
Methods
This article investigates the resilience of the disaster response networks that emerged after 
hurricanes that occurred in 2005 and 2008: Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav in Louisiana 
and Hurricanes Rita and Ike in Texas. To answer the research questions stated above, we 
collected, coded, and analyzed data obtained from newspaper articles and government 
reports that covered the response activities that occurred before and after the hurricanes 
made landfall. The processes that we used to collect and analyze our data are discussed in 
the following subsections.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 9 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Haase, Ertan & Comfort,  The Roots of Community Resilience  8
Data Collection and Coding 
The data came from newspaper articles from the Times Picayune and the Houston Chronicle, 
which are respectively published in New Orleans, Louisiana and Houston, Texas. These 
articles covered the activities undertaken by the response networks that formed after each 
hurricane event, and constitute a day-to-day record of the activities undertaken by the 
organizations participating in each network. To focus our data collection activities, we used 
time and shared behavior to set the boundaries of the disaster response networks.43 Then, 
we conducted keyword searches in the LexisNexis Academic Database to identify articles that 
referenced each hurricane by name and were published between six days prior to landfall 
and twenty-two days after the storm made landfall. We classified articles as relevant if they 
referenced activities that fell within the fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) covered 
by the National Response Plan44 and the National Response Framework.45
We then coded the content of the newspaper articles and created Excel databases for each 
hurricane response network. To create these databases, we reviewed each article and 
identified the organizations reported to be involved in the response network. We assigned 
each organization a numerical identifier and an acronym, and classified the organizations by 
the date they became active in the response network, their source of funding (public, private, 
or nonprofit) and their level of jurisdiction (national, regional, state, county, or city). We also 
identified the interactions exchanged between organizations and coded each interaction 
as a separate transaction. All interactions were coded as non-directional and unweighted, 
since the news articles did not always indicate which organization initiated the transaction 
or the number of interactions that occurred. 
We removed duplicate and irrelevant entries from the Excel databases and cleaned the data 
to ensure the consistency in organizational names, acronyms, source of funding, and level 
of jurisdiction. To ensure reliability, all co-authors participated in the coding processes and 
we conducted weekly comparisons to corroborate coding results. We also cross-referenced 
results from the content analysis with activities reported in government situation reports 
and found them to be consistent. After the databases were finalized, they were converted 
into four sets of relational matrices. We generated one set for each hurricane event, with 
each set comprised of twenty-eight separate relational matrices. Each relational matrix 
represented one day included in the analysis. We then refined each matrix by excluding 
isolated organizations, meaning we removed organizations that were not engaged in 
interactions with other organizations.
Data Analysis 
We used multiple methods to analyze the data for each of the disaster response networks. 
We began by generating descriptive statistics to reveal the organizational composition of 
each network. We used Excel to generate tables that reported the numbers, jurisdictional 
levels, sources of funding and frequency distributions of the organizations detected in 
each disaster response network. We also plotted longitudinally, by date, the rate that the 
organizations became active in each disaster response system, as well as the number and 
type of interactions undertaken by each organization. We used these data to address our 
first and second research questions.
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We used the network analyses software UCINET 6 to evaluate the data contained in our 
four sets of relational matrices.46 We used two common network level network measures to 
reveal the structure of the networks: density and degree centralization. We calculated these 
statistics for each of the twenty-four relational matrices included the period under analysis, 
and plotted the results longitudinally, by date, to evaluate whether each network underwent 
structural change. We then used these data to address our third research question. To 
address our final question, we reviewed governmental reports to determine whether Texas 
and Louisiana underwent policy changes or made investments in information technology 
between 2005 and 2008.
Research Assumptions 
The application of the methods described above were subject to four assumptions, which 
enabled us to isolate the changes in interaction patterns within response networks that were 
stable in size across equivalent time slices. First, we assumed that the organizations did not 
enter a response network, but rather, they were always present in the network and became 
active when they started to interact with other organizations. Second, we assumed that 
organizations did not leave the response networks, but rather, they maintained a presence 
throughout the duration of the period under analysis. In line with these two assumptions, 
for all of the response networks, we used the total number of organizations detected in 
a network to normalize the number of nodes contained in each network’s daily matrices. 
Third, we assumed that the appropriate window of analysis for the investigation of structural 
change was twenty-four hours. This decision was driven by the nature of newspaper 
reporting, but also because larger time slices would undermine our ability to determine if, 
and when, structural changes might have occurred. Finally, we assumed that the detection 
of an interaction between two or more organizations represented the establishment of a 
permanent relationship that lasted throughout the duration of the disaster response. To 
capture this representation, we created our daily meta-matrices on a cumulative basis. As 
such, matrix one represented the interactions detected in day one, matrix two represented 
the interaction detected in day one and day two, and matrix three represented the 
interactions detected in day one, day two, and day three. This process continued until the 
creation of the final matrix, which represented the disaster response network in its entirety.
Findings 
The findings indicate that the disaster response networks that operated after four hurricane 
events, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Hurricane Rita in Texas in 2005 and Hurricane 
Gustav in Louisiana and Hurricane Ike in Texas in 2008, were comprised of a heterogeneous 
collection of response organizations. Additionally, these organizations modified their 
behaviors, at least in terms of their inter-organizational interaction patterns, which may 
suggest that these networks underwent the adaptive processes needed to overcome the 
uncertainties and complexities present in the post-disaster environment. However, as the 
findings presented below indicate, the characteristics of these four response networks were 
not identical.
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System Composition 
We began our analysis by generating frequency statistics that revealed the number and 
nature of the organizations that participated in the four response networks. In terms of 
numbers of organizational participants in the Louisiana networks, the data indicate that the 
Katrina response network was larger than the Gustav response network, at 372 and 222 
organizations respectively. In Texas, the situation was reversed, with more organizations 
participating in the Ike response network than in the Rita response network, at 372 and 
214 organizations respectively. This result is likely because Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Ike were the biggest storm events under analysis. Further exploration of the data revealed 
that each response network depended on contributions of organizations from multiple 
levels of jurisdiction. Reflecting the idea that all disasters are local, the organizations from 
jurisdictions classified as county/parish level or lower were the most represented in all four 
response networks: Katrina (172 or 46.24%); Gustav (117 or 52.70%); Rita (113 or 53.24%); and 
Ike (235 or 63.17%). The organizations from jurisdictions classified as federal and national, 
which included both government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses 
were the second most represented in the response networks: Katrina (94 or 27.27%); 
Gustav (52 or 23.42%); Rita (44 or 20.37%); and Ike (84 or 22.58%). This was followed by 
the organizations from jurisdictions classified as state and regional: Katrina (79 or 21.24%); 
Gustav (48 or 21.62%); Rita (42 or 19.44%); and Ike (42 or 11.29%).
Table 1. Organizational Composition of Hurricane Response Networks by Source of Funding
  LOUISIANA TEXAS
  Katrina Gustav Rita Ike
  N % N % N % N %
Nonprofit 61 16.40 42 18.92 36 16.82 98 26.34
Private 77 20.70 41 18.47 29 13.55 55 14.78
Public 234 62.90 139 62.61 149 69.63 219 58.87
Totals 372 100 222 100 214 100 372 100
Analysis of the organizational data by source of funding revealed similar findings. As Table 
1 indicates, public organizations played a substantial role in response activities following 
each disaster event. More specifically, these data indicate that approximately 60% of 
the organizations detected interacting within all four response networks were public 
organizations. The other sectors also made important contributions to the response networks, 
but depending on the state, their participation reported slightly different numbers. Although 
there were fewer total organizations detected in the Gustav network than in the Katrina 
network, the Gustav network contained a higher percentage of nonprofit organizations 
than did the Katrina network, at 18.92% and 16.40% respectively. The opposite occurred in 
Texas, where both the number and percentage of nonprofit organizations increased from 
Hurricane Rita to Hurricane Ike. Further, in comparison to the other three hurricanes, more 
nonprofit organizations reported interacting in the response network that formed after 
Ike, at 26.34%, than in any other network. These data indicate that all four networks were 
comprised of a heterogeneous collection of organizations, necessary to promote adaptation 
in response to complexity and uncertainty.
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System Growth and Development 
We continued analysis of the response networks by plotting the date that each organization 
became active, meaning that an organization began to interact with one or more organizations 
in the network. Figure 1 presents the comparative results for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Gustav. These data indicate that both networks experienced steady growth over time.
Figure 1. Cumulative Percentage of Newly Active Organizations Detected in Response 
Network by Day: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav
For both the Katrina and Gustav response networks, one quarter of the identified 
organizations were active by landfall. After landfall, the organizations in the Gustav 
network, as a percentage of all identified organizations, became active more quickly than 
the organizations in the Katrina network. By means of comparison, in the Gustav network, 
75.7% of organizations were active six days after landfall. At that same time, only 60.5% of 
the organizations were active in the Katrina network. Subsequently, the organizations in the 
Gustav network continued to become active at a faster rate, allowing the network to reach 
100% capacity sixteen days after landfall. In contrast, the Katrina response network did not 
reach 100% capacity until twenty days after landfall.
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Figure 2. Cumulative Percentage of Newly Active Organizations Identified in Response 
Network by Day: Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike
Figure 2 presents the comparative results for Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike. These data 
indicate that both response networks also experienced steady growth over time. Unlike 
the Louisiana response networks, however, there were marked differences in the activation 
rates in the Texas response networks. For example, when Hurricane Rita made landfall, 
approximately three weeks after Hurricane Katrina, 39.9% of all organizations identified 
in the Rita network were active. Three years later, when Hurricane Ike made landfall, only 
12.6% of the organizations in the response network were active, a substantial drop from 
the findings for the Rita response network. The expansion of the Ike response network 
also proceeded at a slower rate, with 61.3% of the identified organizations active thirteen 
days after landfall, and all identified organizations active in the network nine days later. In 
contrast, 57.5% of the organizations identified in the Rita response network were active four 
days after the hurricane came ashore.
System Structural Evolution Over Time
We generated social network measures for the four response networks for each date 
included in this study. For this article, we investigated two common network measures: 
density and degree centralization. Wasserman and Faust define network density as the 
“proportion of the possible [links] that are actually present in a [network].”47 In contrast, 
degree centralization evaluated the extent to which actors have links to each of the other 
actors in the network. When applied to the network, the degree centrality measure is a 
quantification of the “range or variability of the individual actor’s indices.”48
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Network Density 
The network density scores for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav plotted over time 
are presented below in Figure 3. These results indicate that the overall density scores for 
both response networks were low, which is a common feature of large networks. Over time, 
however, the organizations in both networks became increasingly active. A closer look at 
the data reveals that the densities of the response networks began to diverge after the 
hurricanes came ashore. For the Katrina network, the density increased from 0.000884 
at landfall to 0.007695 twenty-two days later. In contrast, for the Gustav network, density 
increased to 0.005585 five days after landfall. Then, on the sixth day, the network’s density 
increased substantially to 0.011088, after which density gradually increased to 0.014879. On 
the day that this substantial jump in density occurred, FEMA was working with several state 
and parish organizations to open a major aid center, which began to distribute assistance to 
communities affected by Hurricane Gustav.
Figure 3: Comparison of Response Network Density by Day: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Gustav
The network density scores for Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike plotted over time are 
presented in Figure 4. Like the response networks in Louisiana, the overall density scores for 
the response networks in Texas were also low. For the Rita network, response organizations 
began to establish linkages with one another at least four days before landfall. By September 
24, 2005, the density of the Rita network had reached 0.002633, which was the highest 
landfall density of all response networks. In contrast, on the day of landfall, the density of 
the Ike network was 0.000551, which was the lowest density of all response networks. The 
Rita data also indicate that six days after landfall, the density of the network increased from 
0.004475 to 0.006055. On this date, Texas counties were operating supply stations, crews 
were working to remove debris from the streets and to restore electrical services, and FEMA 
opened a disaster recovery center. From a comparative basis, however, these data suggest 
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that the capacity of response organizations to become active decreased in the three years 
that followed Hurricane Rita.
Figure 4: Comparison of Response Network Density by Day: Hurricane Rita and Hurricane 
Ike
Network Degree Centralization 
For the next step in our structural analysis, we calculated network degree centralization 
statistics for each of the hurricane response networks. Figure 5 reports the network 
degree centralization scores for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav plotted over time. 
These data indicate that the organizations in both response networks gradually became 
increasingly connected to one another. At the time of landfall, both the Katrina network and 
the Gustav network were similar in structure. The Katrina network, however, was slightly 
more centralized than the Gustav network, at 0.039761 and 0.030728 respectively. The next 
day, the Gustav network became more centralized than the Katrina network, a finding that 
would remain constant over the next twenty-one days. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Response Network Degree Centralization by Day: Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Gustav
These data also reveal two points of structural change within these response networks. For 
the Rita network, the point of structural change occurred twelve days after landfall, when 
the network’s degree centralization score increased from 0.052306 to 0.108327. This finding 
parallels the density finding discussed in the previous subsection of this article. A point of 
structural change occurred much earlier in the Gustav network, on day six, when the degree 
centralization score increased from 0.067421 to 0.207980. On this day, there were multiple 
interactions exchanged between response organizations. These interactions reflected the 
collective response of city, county and state firefighters to fight fires in Terrebonne Parish, 
the Louisiana Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness working 
with state and local officials to establish and manage aid centers, and agencies such as FEMA 
and the Louisiana Department of Social Services working to provide food and social services 
to aid centers and citizens.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Response Network Degree Centralization by Day: Hurricane Rita 
and Hurricane Ike
Finally, the network degree centralization scores for the Rita and Ike response networks, 
plotted longitudinally, are presented in Figure 6. Like the Katrina and Gustav networks, these 
data indicate that the organizations in both Texas response networks became increasingly 
connected. When Hurricane Rita came ashore, the storm’s response network centralization 
score was 0.018416. Twelve days later, the network’s centralization score reached 0.093897, 
its maximum level. In contrast, the Ike response network, which had a centralization score 
of 0.018416 when the storm came ashore, rapidly increased to 0.095680 three days later. 
Perhaps due to the size of the storm, the Ike network’s centralization score continued to 
increase over the next few days, reaching 0.167801 nineteen days after landfall. From a 
comparative basis, the data presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest that the organizations 
in all four response networks structured their interactions in a way that generated increasing 
levels of centralization, but once  a certain centralization threshold level was reached, the 
centralization processes began to stabilize. 
Investments in Training and Technology Post-2005
For the final stage of our analysis, we reviewed disaster policy changes that occurred after 
2005.49 At the federal level, Congress strengthened the capacity of the federal government’s 
disaster management system. In reaction to problems encountered after Hurricane Katrina, 
legislation such as the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 [Reform Act] 
reorganized the country’s disaster management institutions, strengthened and expanded 
the collection and dissemination of information, and reinforced communication and 
coordination capacities.50 The Reform Act also created the National Integration Center, which 
was charged to strengthen disaster management training and to promote collaboration 
among public, private, and non-profit organizations. Finally, the Reform Act required the 
Department of Homeland Security to modify its National Emergency Communications Plan so 
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that officials and disaster responders had the ability to communicate with one another after 
a disaster event.51
In Louisiana, the legislature amended the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act (Disaster Act) in 2006.52 In doing so, the legislature modified 
the state’s disaster management institutions, thereby improving their capacity to manage 
disaster events. The Disaster Act directed the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) to provide disaster management training and support 
throughout the state. The Disaster Act also established the state’s Emergency Operations 
Center, which coordinates the state’s emergency management operations. The Emergency 
Operation Center also assists local jurisdictions to coordinate response activities with their 
public, private and non-profit partners. Furthermore, the Louisiana legislature required the 
state’s parishes to develop emergency response plans and directed GOHSEP to provide 
technical assistance to parish authorities to help them to develop these plans.53 Finally, 
Louisiana spent more than US$180 million to strengthen the Louisiana Wireless Information 
Network (LWIN).54 Managed by GOHSEP and used by approximately 80,000 public and 
nonprofit personnel, the LWIN communication system can integrate with the communication 
networks used by neighboring states and maintain continuous communications in areas 
affected by disaster.
Finally, in Texas, the legislature also took steps to strengthen the state’s disaster management 
capacities. These changes, which were not adopted until 2007 because the Texas legislature 
convenes on a bi-annual basis, were made to the Texas Disaster Act of 1975. These amendments 
required that all public officials receive at least three hours of disaster management training 
before they assume their duties. The amendments also mandated that the Emergency 
Management Director be the presiding officer of the governing body of a city or country. 
Finally, the amendments established the Texas Statewide Mutual Aid system, which sets 
the conditions under which local governments may assist each other without a written 
agreement. Like Louisiana, Texas communities sought to improve their disaster management 
capacities. Communities like Houston upgraded their communications systems, conducted 
training, and disseminated information to the public. Despite such investments, the state 
of Texas reported that, three years after Hurricane Ike, its public safety communications 
shortcomings had yet to be addressed.55
Discussion
The findings generated by this study support the theoretical propositions that framed 
the analysis presented in this article. Our first proposition stated that a resilient disaster 
response network is comprised of a heterogeneous collection of organizations that interact 
with one another to pursue and obtain collective goals. This proposition is supported by 
the data presented in Tables 1 and 2. These tables indicate that public sector organizations 
from jurisdictions classified as county/parish or lower were the most prevalent in all four 
response networks. This finding not only reflects the idea that local agencies and officials 
are best positioned to respond to a disaster event, it also reflects the idea that communities 
in the United States expect their governments to deliver response assistance after a 
disaster. Moreover, these data indicate that federal and state organizations contributed 
to the response networks, often as coordinators or as the distributors of resources. More 
broadly, these data also indicate that private and nonprofit organizations participated in 
the response networks, bringing with them their resources and experience. Although their 
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participation was documented in different numbers, organizations from these sectors 
represented between 13% and 24% of all organizations identified in each response network. 
In the Rita network, for example, nonprofit organizations represented 16.65% of all identified 
organizations. In the Ike network, however, they represented 26.34% of the detected 
organizations. Despite these differences, which appear to be influenced by the scale of the 
disasters, the organizations identified in all four response networks had the potential to use 
each other to locate information, money, personnel and equipment, and if a relationship 
was established, to move these resources to where they were needed. 
Proposition 2 asserted that a resilient disaster response network can adapt its structure 
in response to the uncertainties and complexities present in the changing operational 
environment. In terms of adaptation as measured by network growth, the data presented 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that all four response networks experienced steady 
growth over time. For example, in Louisiana, approximately 25% of all organizations that 
were active by the date of landfall for both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. After 
landfall, the organizations in the Gustav network became active more quickly than those 
in the Katrina network. In Texas, the data suggest that the opposite occurred, as the 2008 
response network, which formed after Hurricane Ike, became active more slowly than the 
2005 response network, which formed after Hurricane Rita. In terms of network structure, 
the findings presented in Figures 3 through 6 also indicate that all four response networks 
underwent change. Perhaps the best example of structural change occurred in the Gustav 
response network, when six days after landfall, the degree centralization score increased 
from 0.067421 to 0.207980, a result of an increase in reported organizational interactions 
related to firefighting, the management of aid centers, and the distribution of relief resources. 
An additional finding, reported in Figure 4, is the identification of points of structural change 
in the later stages of the Rita and Ike response networks, which may represent the system 
shifting from the response phase to the recovery phase. If so, this finding supports the 
transitions documented in the response and recover processes that occur after disaster 
events in large urban areas.56
The final proposition stated that information communication technologies (ICT), properly 
designed and implemented, facilitate the resilience of disaster response networks. The 
review of policy changes and investments in information technology revealed that steps 
taken at the federal level, and in the state of Louisiana, likely strengthened disaster resilience. 
At the federal level, Congress adopted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006, which reorganized the country’s disaster management institutions, strengthened 
disaster management training, promoted organizational collaboration, and required the 
Department of Homeland Security to modify its National Emergency Communications Plan. 
In Louisiana, the legislature amended the state’s Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act in 2006. In doing so, the state directed GOHSEP to expand access 
to disaster management training, established the state’s Emergency Operations Center, 
and required the state’s parishes to develop emergency response plans. Central to these 
efforts was Louisiana’s decision to strengthen the Louisiana Wireless Information Network, 
the system used to maintain communications in disaster areas. In contrast, although the 
Texas legislature did adopt disaster management legislation, the changes were minor, and 
many did not come into effect until the later part of 2007, leaving little time for officials to 
implement these changes before the arrival of Hurricane Ike. Equally important, despite 
recognizing that it needed to strengthen its communication infrastructure, Texas as a state 
did not appear to take sufficient action prior to the arrival of Hurricane Ike. 
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Viewed collectively, all four disaster response networks demonstrated structural change. 
These structural changes, however, did not occur at the same rate nor did they evolve in the 
same manner, which suggests that each response network sought to find the appropriate 
“fit” for the context in which it operated. While all four networks were activated in response 
to different events, these findings suggest that Louisiana managed to strengthen the 
capacities and processes that generate resilience. Although these findings are subject to 
further inquiry, they indicate why the organizational response to Hurricane Gustav was 
more robust than the organizational response to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast, in Texas, 
the results generated for the Rita response network suggest that the network was likely 
influenced by the observed consequences from Hurricane Katrina three weeks earlier, 
an event that reinforced the need for preparedness and response throughout Texas. As 
the memory of Hurricane Katrina began to fade, and in line with the consensus that the 
response to Rita was constrained by shortcomings in evacuation processes, Texas did not 
take substantial steps to improve its disaster response capacities after 2005. Consequently, 
the level of resilience dropped over the course of three years, which may explain the slower 
response of the Ike network in 2008, in comparison to the Rita response network. 
Conclusions 
In the context of disaster response networks, resilience represents a set of adaptive 
capacities and a set of adaptive processes. Tied together in a series of feedback loops that 
facilitate learning, these capacities and processes provide the organizations in a disaster 
response network the ability to overcome the uncertainties and complexities present in 
the post-disaster environment through adaptation and change. The findings from this 
analysis demonstrate that disaster response networks undergo structural change, as 
a large heterogeneous collection of response organizations come together, collect and 
disseminate information, and seek to identify and implement solutions to address rapidly 
the needs of those affected by the disaster event. Although each of the response networks 
analyzed–Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav in Louisiana and Hurricanes Rita and Ike in Texas 
– experienced structural change, the rate at which these changes occurred differed in each 
network. A review of the policy changes and investments in information technology made in 
Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina, in contrast to those undertaken in Texas, suggests why 
the Hurricane Gustav response network was more robust than the Hurricane Ike response 
network. The findings support the well-established proposition that sustained investments 
in information technology infrastructure support the development of resilience in disaster 
response networks. 
For the organizations and government officials responsible for protecting the United States 
from the consequences of terrorist attacks, technological disasters, and catastrophic 
natural events, the challenge is to determine how to reduce risk in an environment that 
is becoming increasingly interdependent and risk prone. As we advance further into the 
twenty-first century, risk reduction efforts will become more difficult, as policy-makers seek 
the means to manage the effects of urbanization, population growth, environmental change, 
and technological advancement. The promotion of resilience in disaster response networks 
may provide communities with a cost-effective tool that could be used to manage the 
consequences of a variety of risks. This means that, from a public policy perspective, federal, 
state and local governments should continue to update their institutional arrangements to 
facilitate administrative flexibility, organizational collaboration and cooperation, and the use 
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of technology to share information across a heterogeneous community of organizations, 
decision-makers, and individual citizens.57 
In addition to strengthening administrative capacities within the United States, it is essential 
to develop a conceptual framework that outlines the parameters of network resilience for 
disaster response organizations.  This framework needs to identify factors that promote 
adaptive capacity in disaster response networks, as well as indicators that facilitate the 
measurement and assessment of network resilience. As the findings from this study 
suggest, the components and indicators of network resilience likely relate to the design 
of institutional arrangements, use of information technology, development of coordination 
plans and mutual aid agreements, and systematic use of disaster management training. 
To increase network performance, it is essential to evaluate whether public investments 
for disaster preparedness and response operations are producing the expected results. 
Although the concept of resilience does not provide a set of actionable solutions for 
communities exposed to recurring risk, such investigations contribute to more informed 
administrative adaptation.58
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